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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Jeremy Strickler 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Political Science 
 
June 2015 
 
Title: Between Guns and Butter: Cold War Presidents, Agenda-Setting, and Visions of 
National Strength 
 
 
This project investigates how the emergent ideological, institutional, and political 
commitments of the national defense and security state shape the domestic programmatic 
agendas of modern presidents. Applying a historical and developmental analysis, I trace 
this dynamic from its origin in the twin crises of the Great Depression and World War II 
to examine how subsequent presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt have navigated the 
intersecting politics of this warfare -welfare nexus. I use original, archival research to 
examine communications between the president and his staff, cabinet members, 
administration officials, and Congressional leaders to better appreciate how the 
interaction of these dual political commitments are reflected in the formulation and 
promotion of the president’s budgetary requests and domestic policy initiatives. More 
directly, I focus on the relationship between the national security politics of the Cold War 
and the efforts of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to support their objectives in either 
the expansion or retrenchment of the New Deal-liberal welfare state.  
My research suggests that Cold War concerns occasionally aided the growth of 
the welfare state in areas such as public health and federal aid to education, while at other 
times defense and security anxieties provided the backdrop for presidential efforts to 
v 
 
diminish the political capacity of the welfare state.  More specifically, I find that both 
Truman and Eisenhower constructed visions of national strength which framed their 
initiatives in national defense and social welfare as interrelated goals. In the end, I argue 
that the changing institutions, ideologies, and international commitments of the warfare 
state present both opportunities and challenges for presidents to articulate political 
visions in service of domestic policy advancement. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In May 2009, President Barack Obama hosted a group of renowned presidential 
historians at a White House dinner which included an informal discussion about his 
administration and the state of American politics (over the next few years, four additional 
such dinners would take place). Ever the intellectual, the President was interested in 
hearing what these scholars had to say about the potential challenges he might face and 
what lessons he could glean from his predecessors’ tenures in office. At the time of this 
particular meeting, Obama was giving serious consideration to increasing the number of 
combat troops in Afghanistan and, inevitably, the night’s conversation turned to how 
such a decision, and the broader conduct of the War on Terror, might impact his domestic 
agenda of economic recovery and health care reform. Robert Dallek, one of those present 
at the meeting, writes that he and the other scholars cautioned the President against the 
troop surge, telling him that “History has shown the difficulty of combining guns and 
butter.”1  
The problem to which Dallek and his peers referred was meant to evoke the 
political struggles encountered by past reform-minded presidents such as Woodrow 
Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Lyndon B. Johnson, all of whom tried to wage a 
successful war (providing “guns”) while simultaneously pursuing an ambitious domestic 
                                                 
1
 Robert Dallek, “Obama Learns LBJ’s Tough Lesson: You Can Have Guns or Butter, not Both,” Reuters, 
October 22, 2014, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/10/22/obama-learns-lbjs-tough-lesson-you-
can-have-guns-or-butter-not-both/. 
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agenda on the home front (seeking “butter”).2 More broadly, however, the concept of 
“guns vs. butter” also speaks to the real programmatic and budgetary choices that all 
modern presidents have to confront in service of providing for both the country’s national 
defense and general welfare. This dilemma is so well-recognized, and its assumptions 
commonly understood, that it has become a useful short-hand in our public discourse for 
debating the merits of defense spending vs. domestic spending.
 3
 For instance, Laura D. 
Tyson, former chief economic adviser to President Bill Clinton, sums up this perspective 
simply: “Guns versus butter is elementary economics: a society that chooses to spend 
more of its resources on defense and security will have less available for things like 
education, health, retirement security, productive investment and consumption.”4 
Yet, in spite of this conventional wisdom, political scientists have inadequately 
addressed the dynamic between presidents and this supposed defense/domestic policy 
tradeoff. This oversight is primarily a result of a tendency in the discipline to neglect 
analyses that capture the intersection of foreign and domestic politics and policy-making 
on the president’s agenda. However, appreciating this connection is critical if we are to 
analyze the politics of guns vs. butter on the president’s agenda.   
                                                 
2
 For accounts of individual presidents, see: Arthur S. Link, The Impact of World War I (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1969); Alan Brinkley, End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1995); Irving Bernstein, Guns and Butter: The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
 
3
 For examples, see: Jonathan Tasini, “Guns versus butter -- our real economic challenge,” The Huffington 
Post, August 13, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-tasini/guns-versus-butter-our-
re_b_60150.html; John Feffer, “Obama's Guns vs. Butter Dilemma,” The Huffington Post, September 22, 
2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/obamas-guns-vs-butter-dil_b_294976.html; Kenneth T. 
Walsh, “Wars Could Jeopardize Obama’s Domestic Agenda,” U.S. News and World Report, December 10, 
2009, http://www.usnews.com/news/obama/articles/2009/12/10/wars-could-jeopardize-obamas-domestic-
agenda; James Surowiecki, “Guns vs. Butter” The New Yorker, February 11, 2002, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/02/11/guns-vs-butter. 
 
4
 Julian Zelizer, “The Nation: Guns and Butter; Government Can Run More Than a War,” The New York 
Times, December 30, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/30/weekinreview/the-nation-guns-and-
butter-government-can-run-more-than-a-war.html. 
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This problematic domestic-foreign separation bias is especially pronounced 
among scholars of the presidency and is represented most clearly in the “two 
presidencies” thesis.5 Developed out of earlier research on the various “roles”6 of the 
American president and the distinctive areas of “political bargaining” in which he 
operates, this thesis encouraged scholars to examine the relative influence of presidential 
leadership and legislative success in domestic versus foreign policy. 
7
 While seemingly a 
byproduct of a previous generation of scholarship, this notion continues to be 
investigated and reasserted.
8
  
What is more, where the domestic-foreign delineation is explicit in the analytical 
assumptions of research on the “two presidencies,” this divide is implicitly carried 
forward in the practical approach taken by the majority of presidential scholars. In this 
manner, presidential leadership and policy-making are examined from the vantage point 
of either domestic or foreign policy. For example, from the domestic front, presidents are 
analyzed in terms of their ability to “hit the ground running” with their legislative 
agenda,
9
 manipulate and craft public opinion,
10
 construct political authority in relation to 
                                                 
5
 Put simply, in the words of this theory’s originator: “The United States has one president, but it has two 
presidencies; one presidency is for domestic affairs, and the other is concerned with defense and foreign 
policy.” Aaron Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies,” in The Two Presidencies: A Quarter Century 
Assessment, ed. Steven A. Shull (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, Inc., 1991), p. 11. 
 
6
 Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960). 
 
7
 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership  (New York: Wiley, 1980). 
 
8
 For examples, see Brandice Canes-Wrone, William G. Howell, and David E. Lewis, “Toward a Broader 
Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis,” The Journal of 
Politics 70, no. 1 (2008): 1-16; Bryan W. Marshall and Richard L. Pacelle, jr, “Revisiting the Two 
Presidencies: The Strategic Use of Executive Orders,” American Politics Research 33, no. 1 (2005): 81-
105; Brandice Canes-Wrone, Who Leads Whom?:Presidents, Policy, and the Public (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2006). 
 
9
 James P. Pfiffner, The Strategic Presidency: Hitting the Ground Running (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988). 
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established partisan regimes,
11
 and employ the necessary skill and strategy to affect 
policy change.
12
 Alternatively, when turning to foreign policy, scholars have studied how 
presidents gain public and congressional support for their initiatives,
13
 how they structure 
“advisory systems” for decision-making,14 how they use executive agreements to 
circumvent the treaty-making process,
15
 and how they set the agenda in foreign affairs.
16
  
Unfortunately, the analytical and practical application of the “two presidencies” 
syndrome continues to obscure, and thus, leaves questions unasked regarding, the 
interconnection of the presidency, domestic policy, and foreign policy. Ironically, Clinton 
Rossiter, whose framework of presidential “roles” was foundational for the trajectory of 
the existing academic divide, stressed that his “exercise in political taxonomy” should not 
overshadow the fact that “the President is not one kind of official during one part of the 
day, another kind during another part…He is all these things all the time, and any one of 
his functions feeds upon and into all the others.”17  
                                                                                                                                                 
10
 Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the 
Loss of Democratic Responsiveness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
 
11
 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to George Bush 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1993). 
 
12
 William W. Lammers and Michael A. Genovese, The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing 
Leadership Styles, FDR to Clinton (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000). 
 
13
 James Meernik, “Presidential Support in Congress: Conflict and Consensus on Foreign and Defense 
Policy,” Journal of Politics 55, no 3 (1993): 569-587. 
 
14
 John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein, How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 
1965 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989). 
 
15
 Glen S. Krutz and Jeffrey S. Peake, Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements: International 
Commitments in a System of Shared Powers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). 
 
16
 Lydia Andrade and Garry Young, “Presidential Agenda Setting: Influences on the Emphasis of Foreign 
Policy,” Political Research Quarterly 49, no. 3 (1996): 591-605. 
 
17
 Rossiter, The American Presidency, 31 
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Those accounts of the presidency that do take the intersection of foreign and 
domestic politics seriously focus exclusively on the domestic setbacks and advances that 
specific presidents have experienced during wartime.
18
 Unfortunately, such studies fail to 
appreciate how presidents have managed the politics of guns vs. butter beyond periods of 
armed military conflict. This shortcoming is particularly pointed in light of Mary 
Dudziak’s contention that traditional conceptions of ‘wartime’ and ‘peacetime’ have 
begun to blur with the United States’ continual engagement in foreign conflicts since 
World War II, causing a fluidity and unboundedness to war’s legal and political effects.19 
Moreover, such a re-conceptualization of war’s implications for policy-making takes 
seriously what historian Michael Sherry has described as the development of 
“militarization” in the nation’s politics and culture. That is, “the process by which war 
and national security became consuming anxieties and provided the memories, models, 
and metaphors that shaped broad areas of national life.”20 This historical, institutional, 
and ideological perspective leads us to inquire about how the dynamic between warfare, 
the presidency, and domestic policy has unfolded in the post-war era.  
In this dissertation, I argue that the politics of guns vs. butter have been fully 
institutionalized in the presidency since World War II. More specifically, we can locate 
this process, and its attendant politics, in the critical period of the 1930s and 1940s when 
                                                 
18
 Andrew J. Polsky, Elusive Victories: The American Presidency at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012); Robert P. Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics Since 1898 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski, The Wartime 
President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2013). 
 
19
 Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
 
20
 Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: the United States since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995), xi. 
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the commitments of the presidency were fundamentally altered through the twin 
developments of the welfare state and the warfare state. Through archival and historical 
research, I find that in navigating the welfare-warfare state nexus, presidents engage in 
what I call the politics of linkage. In particular, I argue that presidents link their initiatives 
in national defense and domestic policy as interrelated goals by articulating a vision of 
national strength. In the end, I show that the changing institutions, ideologies, and 
international commitments of the warfare state present both opportunities and challenges 
for presidents to articulate political visions in service of domestic policy advancement.  
 
The Modern Presidency, the Welfare State-Warfare State Nexus, and the Politics of 
Linkage 
To analyze the intersection of the presidency, domestic policy, and foreign policy, 
I provide an analytic framework of the modern presidency in the shadow of the welfare 
state-warfare state nexus. I will briefly discuss each development and the presidency’s 
political commitments in each in turn. 
First, in confronting the economic crisis of the Great Depression, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt redefined the role of the executive in championing the rights of 
individuals, thus ushering in a public philosophy of “programmatic liberalism” that 
emphasized the national government’s responsibility of protecting citizens against 
economic and social destitution.
 21
  With the aim of promoting this new conception of 
rights, Roosevelt forged a link between the people, the presidency, and national 
administrative power. In this manner, the “welfare state” was formed and with it came a 
                                                 
21
 Sidney M. Milkis, The President and the Parties: the Transformation of the American Party System since 
the New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
7 
 
new type of politics: officially cementing the presidency as “the steward of the public 
welfare.”22 Along with the redefinition of liberalism, modern presidents would need to 
contend with the budgetary and political commitments of the emergent domestic policies, 
institutions, and interests regarding the general welfare of the nation.
23
  
Simultaneously, as Commander-in-Chief during the events of the Second World 
War, President Roosevelt oversaw a massive rearmament of the nation’s military and the 
rise of the United States as a leader on the world stage. As historian Julian Zelizer writes, 
Roosevelt’s vision of the Arsenal of Democracy became a “complex network of 
institutions, policies, ideologies, and political commitments – that is, a permanent 
national security state.” 24 With the founding of this “warfare state,” the presidency is 
now bound to ensuring permanent military preparedness, promoting an ideology of 
national defense and security, and protecting the national interest through diplomacy and 
military action.
25
 
                                                 
22
 I employ a much broader conception of the welfare state than do scholars of social policy. For 
contrasting examples, see Edwin Amenta, Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern 
American Social Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided 
Welfare State: the Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Christopher Howard, The Welfare State Nobody Knows: 
Debunking Myths about U.S. Social Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
 
23
 In many ways, the notion of “the politics of the welfare state” resembles notions of political regimes and 
political orders. For examples, see Gary Gerstle and Steve Fraser, The Rise and Fall of the New Deal 
Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); David Plotke, Building a Democratic 
Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “Regimes and Regime Building in 
American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s” Political Science Quarterly 113, no. 4 
(1998): 689-702. 
 
24
 Julian E. Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security - From World War II to the 
War on Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 2. 
 
25
 For other perspectives on the “warfare state” and “the security state,” see Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of 
Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Bartholomew Sparrow, “American Political Development, State-Building, and the 
“Security State” Polity 40 (July 2008): 358-359.   
8 
 
These two developments raise interesting questions about modern presidential 
leadership and presidential policy-making. First, how have post-war presidents balanced 
the political commitments of both the welfare state and the warfare state on the national 
agenda? That is, how have presidents envisioned the relationship between national 
purpose in both domestic and defense policy? How have presidents linked these two 
objectives and articulated them to the public? Second, in linking the two, how have 
presidents sought to realize their objectives through their programmatic agendas and 
administrative policies? In particular, those agendas aimed at either expansion or 
retrenchment of social welfare spending and policies?  
In addressing these questions, my dissertation has two main objectives. First, I 
utilize original, archival evidence and secondary sources to provide cross-case 
comparisons of individual presidents in order to assess how they set their programmatic 
agenda, constructed speeches and public statements, and formulated their 
administration’s annual budget. In doing so, I attempt to identify patterns and variations 
in the types of politics constructed by these presidents in their navigation of the welfare 
state-warfare state nexus. This requires going to the source, often presidential libraries, to 
comb through speech drafts, policy memos, budget reports, minutes from legislative 
meetings, and personal diaries so as to better understand how presidents managed the 
often chaotic work of balancing domestic and foreign policy commitments. Second, from 
these individual cases, I turn my analytic gaze to the broader development of the 
presidency to examine how the necessity of balancing guns and butter has shaped the 
politics of the institution over time. 
9 
 
The underlying assumption of my research is that presidents make choices; 
whether it is the decision to use a particular phrase in a speech, advocate for a particular 
program, or push for specific funding. So, to analyze how presidents navigate the politics 
of the welfare-warfare state nexus, my archival research focused on three areas of 
presidential choice: 1) the construction of the president’s vision, 2) their programmatic 
agenda, 3) and the formulation of the budget.  
According to presidential scholar Fred Greenstein, two important characteristics 
of the modern presidency (as a political operator) are political skill and the harnessing of 
a vision reflected in public policy.
26
  In this manner, as Thomas Cronin and Michael 
Genovese write, “Strong presidential leadership can provide a vision that empowers all of 
us to rise above the routine and make real contributions to our common purpose.”27 
Moreover, visions can give “purpose to action” and “direction to a community.”28 As I 
argue, in navigating the politics of the welfare state-warfare state nexus, presidents 
construct visions that link themes of warfare, nationalism, and common purpose. In doing 
so, they hope to articulate their objectives in both foreign and domestic policy.  
But their appeals are more than just rhetoric. Such visions are also about 
constructing projects. A defining characteristic of the modern presidency is the 
development of the president’s program, represented by legislative requests and 
                                                 
26
 Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 5-6. 
27
 Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American Presidency (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 16. 
 
28
 Ibid, 116. 
10 
 
administrative objectives.
29
 Additionally, the president’s objectives can be identified 
through the budget request he puts forth. 
 
Developmental Approach and Chapter Overview  
In the chapters that follow, I advance a developmental argument about how 
presidents construct meaning and authority around the dual purposes they face in 
governing atop the welfare state and the warfare state and how they attempt to realize this 
in practice. In each individual case, I pay close attention to the dynamic between the 
orientation of the president’s domestic program (ambitious vs. modest), the rise and fall 
of defense and security issues on the national agenda (presence of war or crises; 
ideology), and the institutional politics of the defense budget (defense interests both 
within and without the administration). This particular dynamic sets the boundaries for 
the variation in how each individual president navigates the politics of guns vs. butter. In 
doing so, they each construct politics of linkage that become institutionalized, and set the 
stage for subsequent presidents. That is, the foundation for such a vision is laid by 
previous president’s discourse (which is itself shaped by international, political, historical 
context). This is most evident in the articulation of visions of national strength. The focal 
point of my argument is that in constructing visions of national strength (consisting of 
various themes/ideas) the terrain is then set for other political actors to respond to and, 
thus, redeploy in their own way. However, the limits of success are based on institutional 
context. 
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The second chapter analyzes the origins of this vision in the presidencies of 
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 
In this developmental chapter, I first describe Theodore Roosevelt’s boldness in trying to 
instill the presidency’s image and actions with warlike sacrifice and common purpose. 
Wilson’s presidency is a case in point about the limits of reform during wartime and 
suggests what later presidents would could to learn about the quick shifts in the politics 
of the national agenda. The 1932 campaign between Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt is 
noteworthy for its multitude of references to war and sacrifice in the shadow of the Great 
Depression. With Roosevelt’s actions in the New Deal and World War II, the politics of 
guns and butter became institutionalized in the presidency. 
The third and fourth chapters deal with the presidency of Harry S Truman who 
was dealt the unlucky hand of following in the footsteps of Roosevelt, inheriting his 
agenda in both the welfare state and the warfare state. Moreover, Truman’s time in office 
was bookended by two wars and he continually struggled against conservative opposition 
in Congress. However, Truman perfectly illustrates the deep conviction presidents have 
shown in articulating and trying to realize their vision of national strength. The fifth 
chapter examines Dwight D. Eisenhower and his efforts to rein in the politics of the 
warfare state while governing with a less than ambitious domestic agenda. The sixth 
chapter concludes the dissertation and gives a brief account of the politics of guns and 
butter and the end of the Cold War. In addition, I provide some food for thought for later 
research. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRESIDENTIAL VISIONS BEFORE THE WARFARE STATE: 
  
WAR, CRISES, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONAL STRENGTH 
 
 
In 1907, future president -- and respected political scientist -- Woodrow Wilson 
gave a lecture at Columbia University regarding the changing nature of the office of the 
presidency. Reflecting on the United States’ recent rise “to the first rank in power and 
resources[,]” Wilson posited an expanding role for the president, who could “never again 
be the mere domestic figure he has been throughout so large a part of our history.” 
Because of this development, 
Our president must always, henceforth, be one of the great powers of the 
world, whether he act greatly or wisely or not….We have but begun to see 
the presidential office in this light; but it is the light which will more and 
more beat upon it, and more and more determine its character and its 
effect upon the politics of the nation.”30 
 
 Wilson’s new interpretation of the presidency as an office that would bring a 
sense of unity and direction to the nation could not have been more prescient. By the 
middle of the twentieth century, the general outlook of the country’s standing in the 
world and the projection of American greatness would become a paramount concern for 
presidents. Specifically, this necessity established in the American presidency the 
tendency to promote visions of national strength. 
Most directly, this development is attributable to the United States-led victory in 
World War II and the emergence of the nation as a global power. However, taking a cue 
from Wilson, we can train a spotlight on the presidents of the early twentieth century to 
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uncover the ideological and political foundations of national strength as a presidential 
vision. What we find is that prior to the institutionalization of the warfare state and its 
associated politics (as discussed in Chapter I), at times, presidents invoked visions that 
linked themes and programs of warfare, nationalism, and common purpose. Such 
presidential visions were often articulated in service of advancing particular domestic 
objectives during times of war and economic crises. Ultimately, the concept of national 
strength was solidified through the country’s experience during the New Deal and World 
War II and would come to have a wide-ranging effect on the politics of agenda-setting, 
budgeting, and administrative programs.  
 In this chapter, I detail the historical development of visions of national strength 
by examining critical moments and dynamics from the presidential administrations of 
Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
First, I begin with a look at Theodore Roosevelt’s calls for military preparedness and 
renewed national purpose while pursuing a robust programmatic agenda, often backed by 
the usage of warfare metaphors, during the period of American ascendance on the world 
stage. Second, I examine Woodrow Wilson’s presidency and the dynamic of 
progressivism, preparedness, and World War I mobilization. Third, I turn to the Great 
Depression and the 1932 election between Hoover and FDR. In this section I contrast 
their competing visions of the economic crisis as akin to war and their appeals to 
mobilize the nation in response. Finally, I consider the wartime challenge faced by FDR 
in navigating the politics of the New Deal and defense mobilization for World War II. I 
conclude with a brief discussion of how the institutionalization of national strength set 
the stage for the presidential politics of the post-war era. 
14 
 
The Progressive Presidency during the Era of American Ascension: Theodore 
Roosevelt’s Quest for Glory Abroad and at Home  
The shadow of “Rough Rider” Teddy Roosevelt looms large over the 
presidency’s commitment to projecting American strength.  As historian John Morton 
Blum has written, TR thought the United States “deserved both the recognition and the 
responsibilities of a great world power” and the executive alone could wield such 
authority.   With this view in mind there emerged “an equivalently large conception of 
the domestic responsibilities of the federal government, particularly those of the 
president.”31 Together, Roosevelt’s actions in domestic and foreign affairs comprised 
what has been described as a “single political outlook.” 32 Roosevelt himself expressed a 
similar conviction after having left the presidency, lamenting to a friend that he was no 
longer in a position to provide the nation a much needed “vision in both national and 
international matters.”33 
When the assassination of William McKinley thrust Roosevelt into the 
presidency, the United States was beginning its ascent onto the stage of imperial world 
powers. He recognized this fact in his 1905 inaugural address, affirming that the country 
and its citizens had been given much and, thus, that “much will rightfully be expected 
from us.” America, TR said, had “become a great nation, forced by the fact of its 
greatness into relations with the other nations of the earth” and we should recognize our 
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“duties to others and duties to ourselves.”34 This declaration amounted to a justification 
for the actions he had taken in foreign affairs during the first four years of his 
administration. Under the motto of “speak softly and carry a big stick,”35 the President 
asserted American influence in Latin America through his “Corollary” to the Monroe 
Doctrine, spearheaded the construction of the Panama Canal, and mediated peace 
between Russia and Japan. Moreover, Roosevelt sought to flaunt American greatness by 
undertaking a build-up of the U.S. navy and then by subsequently sending the “the Great 
White Fleet” on a voyage around the globe. While an enhanced naval presence 
represented a direct manifestation of American defensive strength, the President also 
understood the nation’s commitment to nurture “human and natural resources” as a form 
of domestic preparedness.
36
 
On the domestic front, Roosevelt pursued his “Square Deal,” a program generally 
concerned with conservation efforts, consumer protection, and the reigning in of 
corporations or “trusts.” He was successful in gaining passage of the Hepburn Act which 
strengthened the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Pure Food and Drug Act 
which led to food labeling and, on one particular occasion in March 1907, he set aside 16 
million acres of public land as a nature reserve before Congress was able to limit his 
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ability to do so. In this instance, one author suggests that “the Square Deal matched the 
big stick in substance and show”37  
Roosevelt’s actions reflect his belief that nothing could be more glorious than to 
demonstrate the prowess of the presidency in both domestic and foreign policy by 
carrying forward the torch of the national interest. As Blum argues, it was this “strenuous 
leadership at home and abroad [which] gave substance to his vision of his stewardship.”38 
More often than not, the President’s vision was infused with appeals to the “warlike spirit 
of sacrifice and common purpose.”39 The most direct metaphor in this case was the 
“heroic struggle” of the Civil War. Nowhere was this imagery clearer than during his 
return to politics under the Progressive mantle, in which he called for a “New 
Nationalism.”  
In 1910, the former president addressed a contingent of the Grand Army of the 
Republic in Osawatomie, Kansas, the site of a John Brown anti-slavery raid in 1856. In 
this speech, Roosevelt put forth a new vision that professed the object of government to 
be “the welfare of the people.” Invoking the war against the states, he argued that “civil 
life [should] be carried on according to the spirit in which the [Union] army was carried 
on.”40  With references to the ‘mightiest nation,’ Theodore Roosevelt sought “a spirit of 
broad and far-reaching nationalism.”   Echoing his sentiments about the ‘president as 
steward,’ he argued that  
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the national government belongs to the whole American people, and 
where the whole American people are interested, that interest can be 
guarded effectively only by the national government.  The betterment 
which we seek must be accomplished, I believe, mainly through the 
national government.
41
   
 
Roosevelt continually invoked the linkage of war and nationalism throughout his 
unsuccessful insurgency campaign for the Presidency in the election of 1912. Moving 
beyond sectionalism and trying to win support in the South in his last major speech of the 
campaign he professed, “We appeal to the sons of the men who followed Lee no less than 
to the sons of the men who followed Grant; for their memory of the great deeds of both is 
now the common heritage of honor which belongs to all our people, wherever they 
dwell.” Moreover, re-asserting his commitment to American greatness on the 
international stage, he made passing references to “Uncle Sam’s interests abroad” and the 
need for yet a bigger navy and the fortification of Panama Canal.
 42
 
Ultimately, as president, Roosevelt “made apparent the significance of American 
military strength” but governed during a period when the majority of the American 
population was indifferent to the state of global affairs.
 43
 This fact is reflected in his own 
recognition that his ability to promote the national interest was constrained by the 
undemanding times in which he governed. In a speech honoring the birthday of former 
President McKinley, Roosevelt remarked:  
If during the lifetime of a generation no crisis occurs sufficient to call out 
in marked manner the energies of the strongest leader, then of course the 
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world does not and cannot know of the existence of such a leader; and in 
consequence there are long periods in the history of every nation during 
which no man appears who leaves an indelible mark in history.
44
 
 
For Roosevelt, great leaders were given wars and crises to prove their mettle, but 
as he saw it, few executives were given the opportunity to exert such leadership. His 
admiration for President Lincoln and the Civil War is a case in point. Roosevelt desired 
the type of crisis that he felt forged Lincoln into the historical icon he became, once 
observing that “…a man has to take advantage of his opportunities, but the opportunities 
have to come. If there is not the war, you don’t get the general; if there is not the great 
occasion, you don’t get the great statesman; if Lincoln had lived in times of peace, no one 
would have known his name now.”45 While his own ‘great opportunity’ never came, in 
the end, President Roosevelt would leave his own indelible mark on the boisterousness of 
the American executive. 
 
Domestic Ambitions, International Necessities: Woodrow Wilson, the New Freedom, 
and World War I  
The presidency of Woodrow Wilson foreshadows the challenges that subsequent 
executives would come to face in trying to pursue domestic reform amid times of war. 
Wilson was foremost concerned with achieving his ambitious domestic agenda, the New 
Freedom, once remarking to a friend that “it would be an irony of fate if my 
administration had to deal with foreign problems, for all my preparation has been in 
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domestic matters.”46 Unfortunately the onset of war in Europe made this exact state of 
affairs a reality. At first, Wilson was successful in navigating the emerging politics 
around the condition of the nation’s defenses with his re-tooled progressive domestic 
agenda by articulating a vision of American idealism that associated peace, prosperity, 
and preparedness. As one historian has written, Wilson’s idealism was founded on a 
belief in “the special virtue and mission of the American people.” 47  However, the United 
States’ official entry into World War I, and the ensuing mobilization effort led by Wilson, 
presented various ideological, institutional, and political challenges to the credibility of 
this linkage, ultimately foreclosing this progressive moment by ushering in a conservative 
‘Return to Normalcy.’ 
Wilson’s presidency began with the enactment of one of the most impressive 
legislative programs in history, called the “New Freedom.” This program represented a 
set of victories bested only by Roosevelt’s early New Deal and Johnson’s Great Society. 
In contrast to Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism,” the philosophy behind Wilson’s “New 
Freedom” suggested that they best way to handle corporate trusts was by weakening them 
so as to promote greater economic competition. Broadly, the program was centered on 
three areas of reform: tariff, banking, and business.  Thus, Wilson signed into law such 
policies as the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, the Federal Trade Act, and the Federal Reserve 
Act. In addition, he was successful in gaining legislation aimed at helping farmers, 
laborers, and the general health and welfare of Americans.  
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Such a determined pursuit of domestic reform has been described by one scholar 
as evidence of Wilson’s “one-track mind” prior to World War I. 48 Even the war’s 
outbreak did not initially disrupt this particular mindset. For example, this was apparent 
to Colonel Edward M. House, an American diplomat and close confidant to the President, 
who noted at the time that Wilson “seems more interested in domestic affairs, and I find 
it difficult to get his attention centered upon the one big question.”49 However, soon his 
attention would be drawn toward that “one big question,” particularly as the national 
agenda was being directed toward a debate about the state of the nation’s military 
preparedness.
50
  
After weathering some criticism of the nation’s defenses from opposition 
politicians, most prominently former President Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson finally called 
upon Congress to increase military preparedness in the fall of 1915. Speaking before the 
Manhattan Club in New York, Wilson referred to “the mission of America” and the 
nation’s need to speak the escalating global language of “force.” Americans should be 
made aware, he argued, of “what our own force is [and] how far we are prepared to 
maintain ourselves against any interference with our national action and development.”51  
The immediate challenge for the President was to square his plan for preparedness 
with an anxious political coalition of Democrats and Progressives. Where the former 
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group had a history of opposing prior Republican efforts at military buildup going back to 
1900, the latter camp feared that the preparedness issue would snuff out any and all 
movement on the reform front. In an effort to blunt progressive criticism, particularly 
from William Jennings Bryan, Wilson spoke of the relationship between domestic reform 
and the preparedness effort in his December 1915 State of the Union.  
The President wanted Americans to know that “While we speak of the preparation 
of the nation to make sure of her security and her effective power, we must not fall into 
the patent error of supposing that her real strength comes from armaments and mere 
safeguards of written law.” There was much more that went into developing the nation’s 
strength, ranging from “her people, their energy, their success in their undertakings… [to] 
the organization and freedom and vitality of our economic life.” From this perspective, 
Wilson argued that 
The domestic questions which engaged the attention of the last Congress 
are more vital to the nation in this its time of test than at any other time. 
We cannot adequately make ready for any trial of our strength unless we 
wisely and promptly direct the force of our laws into these all-important 
fields of domestic action (emphasis added).”52 
 
Having expressed to Congress his commitment to build the nation’s defenses, 
Wilson returned to the rhetorical presidency employed during the early years of the New 
Freedom by embarking on a speaking tour to take his case for preparedness directly to the 
people. His nine-day tour comprised eleven speeches of which “preparedness to defend 
both peace and national honor” were a prominent theme.53 Events abroad were happening 
beyond America’s control, yet, as Wilson told one group of gathered citizens, “America 
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cannot shut itself out from the rest of the world because all the dangers at this present 
moment – and they are many – come from her contacts with the rest of the world.”54 His 
appeals worked. By the end of that summer, Congress authorized a preparedness program 
which included an increase in army and navy personnel and established a civilian 
mobilization agency, the Council of National Defense.  
While the preparedness issue had been at the fore of the national agenda for the 
better part of the year, as historian Arthur Link contends, “Wilson, even though diverted 
and distracted by unending foreign complications, had neither abandoned leadership nor 
plans for far-reaching new measures to complete his reform program.”55 In fact, with the 
1916 presidential election on the horizon, Wilson sought to recommit himself to domestic 
policy by adopting a more progressive platform. During the previous year he had changed 
his position on women’s suffrage, led a fight to confirm Louis Brandeis to the Supreme 
Court, and backed progressive policies such as child labor legislation, workmen’s 
compensation, and a nonpartisan tariff commission.
56
 Wilson’s support for such issues 
was critical to his re-election, to be sure, but so was his sustained public opposition to 
sending troops to fight abroad. This is reflected perfectly in the campaign slogans “He 
kept us out of war” and “War in the East, peace in the West, thank God for Wilson.”  
Republicans, for their part, tried to make a partisan issue out of the preparedness 
debate in the lead up to the election by portraying Wilson as weak and uncommitted to 
the nation’s security. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Roosevelt attacked the President’s failure in 
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promoting the nation’s prestige, claiming that Wilson “ha[d] dulled the national 
conscience and relaxed the spring of lofty, national motives by teaching our people to 
accept high sounding words as the offset and atonement for shabby deeds.”57 John Hays 
Hammond, a prominent businessman, wrote an article, which was later circulated as a 
campaign document for the Republican nominee, Charles Evans Hughes, challenging the 
progressives’ argument that the cost of defense preparedness would divert “enormous 
sums of money from the alleviation of human suffering to which it could otherwise be 
applied.” Given the “existing conditions,” Hammond found such reasoning 
“indefensible,” maintaining that it would be “execrable parsimony to oppose national 
defence solely because of the expense involved (sic).” The nation must carry out a 
sustained program of national defense so as “to enable our Nation to exercise an 
influence in the Council of Nations commensurate with our position among the nations of 
the world.”58 Try as they might, the Republicans’ attempts to make the war and 
preparedness partisan issues were to no avail. However, in short time preparedness would 
turn into full war mobilization, shifting politics anew. 
In response to the Germans’ resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare against 
American shipping vessels, President Wilson went before members of Congress in April 
of 1917 to ask for a declaration of war, which they granted him shortly thereafter. 
Famously, the President called upon the United States to “make the world safe for 
democracy,” arguing that our purpose in joining the war should “not be revenge or the 
victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, 
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of human right, of which we are only a single champion.” 59 For the remainder of his 
term, President Wilson would be primarily devoted to pursuing what he termed “peace 
without victory” and committing the U.S. to the League of Nations.  
Confronted with the realities of a wartime leader, Wilson’s domestic ambitions 
became a secondary priority on the national agenda and his prior vision of progressive 
reform took on a more “idealistic language of disinterestedness and sacrifice.” 60 That is, 
the president sought to remain above the political fray, arguing that “every program must 
be shot through and through with utter disinterestedness” and that neither party should 
“try to serve itself, but every party must try to serve humanity.”61 However, in the 
midterm of 1918, Wilson undercut his own argument by mixing patriotism with 
partisanship. Confronted with increasing Republican opposition to American entrance 
into the League of Nations, Wilson made a last minute appeal to voters: “If you have 
approved of my leadership and wish me to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs 
at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourself unmistakably to that 
effect by returning a Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives.”62 He argued that returning a Republican majority back in Congress 
would “certainly be interpreted on the other side of the water as a repudiation of my 
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leadership.”63 His appeal failed, with Republicans winning a majority in both chambers 
of Congress.  
The implications of Wilson’s political failure would only be heightened during 
the 1920 presidential election. Together with the President’s display of wartime 
partisanship, the Progressives’ embrace of government intervention during the war was 
viewed by many as a sign of potentially dangerous times to come. For a nation 
traditionally unaccustomed to such governmental involvement, agencies like the War 
Industries Board, the War Finance Corporation, the Committee on Public Information, 
and the Food Administration smacked of ‘Prussianization.’64  
Moreover, as historian Robert H. Ferrell writes, many Americans came to 
disapprove of Wilson’s “constant summoning of the country to idealism. For eight years 
the nation had listened to calls for Progressivism, a New Freedom, New Diplomacy, 
Making the World Safe for Democracy, Preserving the Heart of the World.”65 In the end, 
Republican Warren G. Harding would be elected to the presidency on a platform that 
rejected Wilson’s support for the League of Nations and his broader vision of domestic 
reform. After all, voters were sensitive to Harding’s, and by extension, the Republicans’ 
campaign vision: “America’s present need is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums, but 
normalcy; not revolution but restoration.”66   
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The Great Depression-as-War: The Nation in Crisis and the Contrasting Visions of 
Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt 
With the end of World War I and the Return to Normalcy, the United States 
would enter a sustained period of isolationism from events abroad and would 
dramatically scale back its military preparedness. However, even the walls of Fortress 
America could not shield the nation from the pending international crisis of the Great 
Depression and the unresolved economic tensions stemming from the Great War.
67
 While 
the country’s international and military prestige may have been in a holding pattern, 
visions of American resolve and national purpose linked to hardships of war resonated 
with citizens, and thus, were ripe for articulating how the nation should respond to the 
economic crisis. In this section of the chapter, I illustrate the two competing visions 
offered by President Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt, his Democratic 
challenger in the 1932 election.  
 
Hoover, the War for Confidence, and the Shift from Voluntarism to Government 
Intervention 
The implications of the Great Depression for the presidency of Herbert Hoover 
represent what political scientist Stephen Skowronek calls a “great misfortune” and speak 
to the contextual challenges of political leadership. As Skowronek notes, where Theodore 
Roosevelt believed true misfortune for a president was governing in a crisis-free era, 
Hoover, a man of “broad national vision,” was a case in point for how the presence of a 
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national crisis posed severe limits to articulating such vision.
68
 Hoover had come to office 
with great hopes of bringing the new science of economic management to bear on the 
philosophy of governmental intervention. With the coming of the Great Depression, 
Hoover would soon face the need to put such philosophy into practice, but ultimately 
failed in justifying such action to the American people.  
At the beginning of the crisis, President Hoover sought to instill confidence in the 
economy and criticized any call for direct government relief that would weaken “the 
sturdiness of our national character.”69 To Hoover, such action on the part of government 
put the nation’s “moral strength” at stake. According to one scholar, Hoover’s initial 
response to the Great Depression was to employ economic “rhetoric of recovery that 
conjoined warfare and spiritualism,”70 speaking of the nation’s gift of “spirit and 
strength.”71 
In October 1931, the President spoke before an audience of bankers and finally 
made his case for direct relief. As Davis W. Houck argues, Hoover kept up his “warfare 
dramatization” by justifying “the federal government’s intervention into private finance 
by analogy.”72 Hoover’s plan for relief was to put in place a Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC); an agency, he noted, that was “similar in character and purpose” to 
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the War Finance Corporation that had been in operation during World War I.
73
 He would 
continue this theme in his December 1932 State of the Union.  
Hoover had employed a similar metaphor in another speech to Detroit’s American 
Legion. Advocating for the Legion to recognize the needs of the government’s financial 
stability, Hoover invited them “to enlist in that fight. The country’s need of this service is 
second only to war.”74 Shortly after, Hoover expressed this theme in a national radio 
address: “This broadcast tonight marks the beginning of the mobilization of the whole 
Nation for a great undertaking.” We were in the midst of a “national suffering” but the 
president’s plan was to ask for voluntary relief from individuals and direct federal relief 
to bankers via the RFC.
75
 As Houck puts it, “Not to participate in the relief campaign 
was, therefore, to ignore a patriotic call to arms…”76 Hoover himself said “no one with a 
spark of human sympathy can contemplate unmoved the possibilities of suffering that can 
crush many of our unfortunate fellow Americans if we shall fail them.”77 
As the Great Depression dragged on, Hoover decided to convene a White House 
meeting to discuss the RFC and the success, or rather failure, of his planned “war against 
a lack of confidence.” During that meeting, General Dawes, head of the RFC, expressed 
great fears about the situation and criticized the Hoover administration’s response. The 
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problem as he saw it was twofold: the tendency of individuals to hoard their money and a 
general distrust of the banks. Hoover responded to such claims, noting that he told 
reporters “that we were not undertaking this as a bank relief program; we were 
undertaking it as a patriotic program…[one meant to] appeal to the community to put its 
money to work.”78 
Taking yet again to the airwaves, Hoover sought to mobilize support for the 
campaign against hoarding. In his broadcast, Hoover renewed his call for the people to 
act voluntarily but noted that the federal government should take the lead because only it 
could “liberate the inherent resources and strength of the American people.” He 
continued: 
To join in this effort and to respond to this appeal becomes a measure of 
your faith in our country; it will be the touchstone of your loyalty and of 
your sense of individual responsibility for the welfare of the whole 
community; it is your opportunity to prove again that the private citizen of 
the United States in the exercise of his own independent judgment and his 
own free will, coerced by no authority save his conscience and moved only 
by his own patriotic pride, can be counted upon to meet every emergency 
in the Nation's economy and to rout every foe of the Nation's security 
(emphases added).
79
 
 
 Turning away from his earlier calls for voluntarism as the sole solution to the 
economic crisis, Hoover tried to explain to the American people his program of direct 
relief to the banks, asking them to envision the nation at war. Just as the government was 
necessary in mobilizing for war, so would it be necessary in responding to the Great 
Depression. As would be demonstrated a month later, Hoover’s Democratic rival in the 
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1932 campaign, Franklin D. Roosevelt, would articulate a similar argument, but in a 
much more visionary manner. 
FDR, National Purpose, and the “Analogue of War” 
On April 7, 1932, candidate Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave a campaign radio 
address that set the tone for his increasing appeals to what one historian has described as 
a “vision of united action and transcendent purpose.”80 In the address, Roosevelt made an 
impassioned call for collective action against the war-like crisis of the Great Depression.  
Overcoming such a conflict, he argued, required a response analogous to that of World 
War I, in which “the generalship of that moment conceived of a whole Nation mobilized 
for war.”  Harkening back to his days as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt 
contended that “the nation faces today a more grave emergency than in 1917…It is high 
time to get back to fundamentals.  It is high time to admit with courage that we are in the 
midst of an emergency at least equal to that of war (emphasis added).”81  
 Of course, as noted above, Hoover himself was also employing the imagery of 
war during the election, so Roosevelt looked to turn the President’s own metaphor against 
him in order to heighten their contrasting visions of governmental intervention. For 
example, in a speech at a Jefferson Day Dinner that spring, candidate Roosevelt took aim 
at Hoover by asking Americans to 
Compare this panic-stricken policy of delay and improvisation with that 
devised to meet the emergency of war fifteen years ago. We met specific 
situations with considered, relevant measures of constructive value. There 
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were the War Industries Board, the Food and Fuel Administration, the 
War Trade Board, the Shipping Board and many others.
82
 
 
Historian William Leuchtenburg has famously referred to Roosevelt’s expression 
of the need for warlike, common purpose to respond to the Great Depression as “the 
analogue of war.” As such, it signifies the adoption of both the imagery of war and the 
specific mobilization model of World War I.  According to Leuchtenburg, “in the New 
Deal years, the two strands were inseparable.”83 Upon his stunning victory in the 1932 
presidential election, Roosevelt would re-deploy the ‘analogue’ toward mobilizing the 
nation during his achievements of the New Deal’s “First Hundred Days.” 
Roosevelt began by invoking his campaign’s vision in his inauguration as the 32nd 
President of the United States.  He took to the podium like a general addressing his troops 
and delivered an address that was laden with rhetoric and imagery of a great battle for the 
economic and civic soul of the American nation.  Taking up “the leadership of this great 
army of our people dedicated to a disciplined attack upon our common problems,” the 
new President began the process of setting forth a new vision of what basic needs 
government would protect for its citizens.
84
  Just as he had done in his ‘forgotten man’ 
speech, Roosevelt laid claim to the federal government’s “social duty” to look after the 
common man.   
Certain New Dealers hoped that the use of the war metaphor would bring about a 
return to the ‘war collectivism’ that they felt had existed during the days of World War 
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I.
85
 In short order, Congress delegated authority to the President to develop a host of 
agencies, soon to be referred to as the Alphabet Soup. Take for instance the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC), which earned the nickname ‘Roosevelt’s Tree army,’ the 
National Youth Administration (NYA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA).
86
  
Throughout the prime years of the New Deal, agencies such as the WPA, CCC, and NYA 
contributed vastly to the efforts to ensure economic security for those most desperate for 
relief.  
Writing about the relationship of the early New Deal and the “war as analogue,” 
Leuchtenburg suggests that, in some ways, both the metaphor and the invocation of 
World War I “proved invaluable” for Roosevelt by “provid[ing] a feeling of national 
solidarity that made possible the New Deal’s greatest achievement: its success in ‘nation-
saving,’ in mending the social fabric.”87 Yet, a very real war would soon supplant 
Roosevelt’s metaphor and its intended vision of national purpose. 
 
FDR’s Linked Program: The New Deal, World War II, and the Institutionalization 
of National Strength as a Political Vision 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s overwhelming re-election to the presidency in 1936 was 
interpreted as the nation’s ringing endorsement of the early reform measures of the New 
Deal.  The political winds appeared to be at the backs of New Deal supporters who hoped 
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to further consolidate the gains of Roosevelt’s first four years.  In his 1937 inaugural 
address, the President reflected back on those first four years reminding the American 
public, that “we of the Republic sensed the truth that democratic government has innate 
capacity to protect its people against disasters once considered inevitable, to solve 
problems once considered unsolvable.”  The past years of governmental action had been 
in service to American democracy; but more needed to be done.  Viewing the New Deal’s 
work far from over, Roosevelt would not forget that there was still “one-third of [the] 
nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.”  Addressing this problem was Roosevelt’s 
“challenge to democracy.”88  
The struggle that democracy faced at home continued to animate Roosevelt’s 
mobilization of the New Deal agenda.  However, the prospect of further reform soon 
faced numerous constraints.  On the legislative front, Roosevelt witnessed the defeat of 
his Supreme Court bill (court-packing plan), the defeat of his first executive 
reorganization bill, and the defeat of two wage bills.  Politically, the President failed in 
the 1938 purge of conservative Democrats and saw the conservative coalition gain 
additional seats in the House.  On top of this, the economic woes of 1937-1938 were 
being labeled the ‘Roosevelt Recession.’   
While Roosevelt faced troublesome times at home, the machinations of Germany 
increasingly pervaded conversations about the priorities of the president’s agenda. With 
the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, it seemed as if the New Deal would suffer 
the same fate Wilson’s New Freedom had during World War I. It is this exact “end of 
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reform” narrative that scholars ascribe to Roosevelt’s disinterest toward his domestic 
program during the war.
89
 For instance, historian David Brody has argued that “to the 
last, Roosevelt adhered to his wartime strategy of compartmentalizing social reform, and 
of keeping the door locked so long as defense needs remained paramount.”90  
However, as I detail below, Roosevelt navigated the ideological and political 
commitments of the New Deal with the increasing demands of World War II, never fully 
giving up one for the other on the national agenda. What emerged during both the defense 
period of 1939-1941 and the ensuing wartime years was a political vision articulated by 
FDR and supporters of reform that linked domestic initiatives with the growing 
movement to build up our national defense. There were setbacks, to be sure. But building 
from the prior visions of the progressive presidents, Roosevelt envisioned the nation 
drawing upon its strength to successfully wage the war: strength comprised of our 
domestic aims, productive capacity, and military might. It was through this vision that the 
President was able to set the post-war agenda. 
 
The Gathering Storm in Europe and FDR’s Linkage of the New Deal-as-Preparedness on 
the National Agenda 
During the first five years of Roosevelt’s administration, international events 
rarely competed with the ongoing concerns about Americans’ economic security for 
attention on the national agenda.  To be sure, the mood of isolationism that had fallen 
over the country after World War I remained relatively strong during this period and 
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awareness about the happenings abroad were often understood in terms of their impact on 
the American economy.  But by the end of 1936, the president decided to test the bonds 
of American isolationism by suggesting a ‘quarantine’ of aggressor nations.  Received by 
a fairly hostile audience, this speech was peppered with aggressive images of a “reign of 
terror” abroad and an “epidemic” of “world lawlessness.”  Roosevelt alerted the public to 
what he saw as a “growing ill will…[that led to a] marked trends toward 
aggression…increasing armaments…shortening tempers – a situation which has in it 
many of the elements that lead to the tragedy of general war.”91  His forewarnings about 
increasing international lawlessness were ultimately confirmed by 1938 with Germany’s 
occupation and annexation of Austria (the Anschluss) and Hitler’s designs on the 
Sudetenland amid the Munich Conference.   
The recent developments abroad led Roosevelt to dramatically alter his 
administration’s position on global affairs.  By the time of his 1939 Annual Message to 
Congress, Roosevelt officially elevated foreign policy and concerns over preparedness on 
the national agenda.  He began the address with a warning of “disturbance abroad and the 
need of putting our own house in order in the face of storm signals from across the sea.”  
Hope of world peace could no longer survive when “all about us rage undeclared wars – 
military and economic. All about us grow more deadly armaments – military and 
economic.  All about us are threats of new aggression.”   
Associating both military and economic types of aggression, Roosevelt 
established a theme of which he would continually return.  For the President, just as the 
United States had responded vigorously to the economic crisis of the Great Depression 
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with the policies of the New Deal, it was now time to show the same resolve in the face 
of a military crisis.  The key was to develop a program of national defense and 
preparedness.  
 Roosevelt prefaced the section of his message to Congress on the nation’s state of 
preparedness by suggesting that, in contrast with the events unfolding in Europe, Africa, 
and Asia, the “pattern of what we have accomplished since 1933 appears in even clearer 
focus.”  That pattern involved the “united strength of a democratic nation (emphasis 
added)” that stood by the “conviction that they are receiving as large a share of 
opportunity for development, as large a share of material success and of human dignity, 
as they have a right to receive.”  Because of this, the “Nation’s program of social and 
economic reform is therefore a part of defense, as basic as armaments themselves.”  
Roosevelt went on to list the accomplishments of the New Deal, such as natural 
resource conservation, agricultural support, labor reforms, youth work programs, and aid 
for the aged, helpless, and needy.  When considered as a whole, these “piecemeal 
struggles” of the last few years added up to “realistic national preparedness.”  The 
president then boasted that “never have there been six years of such far-flung internal 
preparedness in our history.” 92 
With this address, Roosevelt had brought newfound concerns over our nation’s 
defense to bear on the current domestic policies of the New Deal.  This association was 
not missed by journalists of the day.  The New York Times reported a conversation 
between some Democrats, who, having been left out of crafting the President’s message, 
surmised a bit of “strategy” on the part of Roosevelt in linking “his account of domestic 
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necessities to the dramatic and impressive passages on international affairs.”  According 
to these Democrats, “nearly everyone thought this well, subtly and effectively done.”93  
Others saw in Roosevelt’s address the origins of a “linked program,” prefaced on the 
claim “that national security and the preservation of American democracy depend on the 
continuation of his economic and social policies.”   The President’s argument was made 
“plausibly and [he] forged [the] link between foreign and domestic policy with rare 
craftsmanship.” 94  In articulating this vision of the New Deal-as-national--preparedness, 
Roosevelt sought to balance his domestic program with his belief in the need to develop 
America’s military defenses.  However, as Germany’s true intentions became realized, 
the United States quickly shed its isolationist past and began a massive military buildup 
that posed significant political and economic challenges to the feasibility of this linkage. 
 
National Strength, Politicizing Defense, and Building the Arsenal of Democracy 
 While not officially at war, during the years1939-1941 the United States was in 
the midst of a “defense period” in which the politics of the national agenda increasingly 
reflected the turbulent events in Europe. Not long after his 1939 State of the Union, 
President Roosevelt called upon Congress to appropriate an additional $500 million to the 
existing defense budget, which was already at $1.2 billion, a record high for a time of 
peace. At the time, many Americans were still committed to the perspective of 
isolationism and questioned Roosevelt’s preparedness drive and the necessity of 
rearmament. Yet, this state of affairs would start to shift with Germany’s blitzkrieg 
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through Poland in September of 1939 and its subsequent invasion of France and the 
Lowlands that following May. In response to the latter, the President spoke directly to the 
people about the state of the nation’s defenses in one of his famed “Fireside Chats.”  
Addressing the claims of his critics that the nation was “defenseless,” Roosevelt 
asserted the need to “match the strength of the aggressors.” Americans, he urged, should 
ignore the “kinds of stories [being] handed out…about our lack of preparedness” and 
“not be calamity-howlers and discount our strength.” Echoing his vision of the New 
Deal-as-preparedness, he continued 
But as this [defense] program proceeds there are several things we must 
continue to watch and safeguard, things which are just as important to the 
sound defense of a nation as physical armament itself. While our Navy 
and our airplanes and our guns and our ships may be our first line of 
defense, it is still clear that way down at the bottom, underlying them all, 
giving them their strength, sustenance and power, are the spirit and morale 
of a free people (emphases added).
95
 
 
Just as Wilson had maintained during the First World War, Roosevelt suggested 
that the nation drew additional strength from a second line of defense beyond our 
military. Continuing this argument, it was imperative that the nation 
 
…make sure, in all that we do, that there be no breakdown or cancellation 
of any of the great social gains which we have made in these past years. 
We have carried on an offensive on a broad front against social and 
economic inequalities and abuses which had made our society weak. That 
offensive should not now be broken down by the pincers movement of 
those who would use the present needs of physical military defense to 
destroy it (sic) (emphasis added).”96 
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Even though the nation should brace itself for the needs of defense, Roosevelt 
reiterated that nothing would “justify a retreat from any of our social objectives -- from 
conservation of natural resources, assistance to agriculture, housing, and help to the 
underprivileged.”97 In fact, the President had stressed this exact point just days earlier in a 
press conference following an address to Congress in which he called for a new defense 
appropriation of over $1 billion. Congress was set to take up the defense bill at the same 
time that it was currently debating legislation for further economic relief, leading one 
reporter to ask FDR if he preferred the defense appropriation bill “to take precedence 
over the relief bill which is now pending?”  The President replied that “Of course relief 
has got to go through just as soon as it possibly can… I do not think the country can 
afford to cut more people off relief…Personally, I should like to see the amount increased 
so that we could take care of all needy families.”98 
Roosevelt’s comment was aimed at preempting a general argument that began to 
emerge in some circles regarding the ability of defense jobs to replace the government’s 
responsibility for providing economic security. For their part, advocates of social welfare 
made their thoughts clear on this line of reasoning. Take for instance a statement released 
by an inter-faith conference on unemployment that warned of “The danger that a nation 
which has not solved its own economic problem may be tempted to divert attention 
toward a war psychology and armament economics.” Similarly, the unofficial House 
unemployment conference released a message stating that “military expenditures may 
temporarily ease the relief burden to some extent but their nature is such that they should 
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not be considered a solution of our problem.”99 This overall perspective is summed up 
well in a remark made by Stuart Chase, an economist and one of Roosevelt’s advisers. In 
presenting an award to Eleanor Roosevelt in May 1940 for her work in helping social 
progress, Chase thought it stood repeating that “the New Deal is supposed to be fighting a 
war, too, a war against depression.”100 
As historian Joseph P. Lash has shown, there were some within the administration 
that took this belief to heart by “argu[ing] the New Deal case for butter as well as guns.” 
In a memo titled “National Defense and Fiscal Policy,” one New Dealer wrote to Harry 
Hopkins, former administrator of the Works Progress Administration and close Roosevelt 
confidant, to make the case that “We may later be obliged to pull in our belts—all the 
more reason why today we should raise living standards as far as possible. Later we may 
demand unprecedented sacrifices—all the more reason why today everyone able and 
willing to work be given immediate opportunity to do so.” The memo’s author, Richard 
Gilbert, went on to press the need to expand production even further. “It is not debt, but 
idleness—factories unbuilt, resources undeveloped—which undermines our strength, 
which diminishes our capacity to meet the emergencies of the future...”101 
To conservatives and anti-administration politicians, such a linkage of New Deal 
reform and national defense was spurious and exploitable. For example, after the 
President appointed a seven-man National Defense Commission to oversee the 
preparedness effort, future Republican presidential nominee Thomas E. Dewey, accused 
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Roosevelt of “playing cheap politics” with the defense program. Dewey went on to 
suggest that the commission’s members were no better than “messenger boys for New 
Deal politicians who insist on keeping politics in the defense job.”102 During the 1940 
presidential election that fall, Republicans would expand on this criticism. William 
Leuchtenburg writes that GOP nominee Wendell Willkie, “cleverly related his assault on 
the President’s failure to restore prosperity to the current uneasiness over the state of our 
defenses.” In this manner, “The New Deal, critics charged, had left the nation vulnerable 
by promoting internal disunity, squandering billions on unproductive projects, and 
shamefully neglecting defenses.”103 But for all his attacks, Willkie’s support for the 
general direction of FDR’s policies, both foreign and domestic, failed to grab the 
electorate and Roosevelt was re-elected to an unprecedented third term.  
Assured another four years in office, and having recently concluded a deal with 
the British to swap naval destroyers-for-military bases, Roosevelt sat down in the winter 
of 1940 to deliver another fireside chat to the American people in which he described the 
nation as “the great arsenal of democracy.” The country now faced “an emergency as 
serious as war itself” and, thus, “We must apply ourselves to our task with the same 
resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we 
would show were we at war.”104 Again invoking the linkage between defense and reform, 
Roosevelt spoke of the contradiction that would exist were he to ask citizens “to defend a 
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democracy which in turn would not defend everyone in the nation against want and 
privation.” He went on to assert that “The strength of this nation shall not be diluted by 
the failure of the Government to protect the economic well-being of its citizens.”105  
In a year’s time, the United States would be reeling from the Japanese attack at 
Pearl Harbor and the nation would undertake a full-scale mobilization to fully implement 
the “arsenal of democracy.” To do so, the Roosevelt administration turned to business for 
help mobilizing the economic resources needed to reach full production, leading to what 
historian Alan Brinkley as termed the “end of reform.”106 Reflecting the conventional 
wisdom of this period, he argues that the emergent reform liberalism of the late New 
Deal, with its potential for a centrally-planned, social-democratic welfare state, was 
ultimately lost in the shadow cast by wartime mobilization. However, as I suggest in the 
following section, while winning the war was paramount in the short run, it was still 
imperative to plan for the return to peacetime. President Roosevelt would see to it that 
there would be no return to normalcy as had happened after World War I.  
 
Dr. New Deal, Dr. Win the War, and Setting the Postwar Agenda 
As the defense period wore on, Roosevelt set out to explain to Americans why the 
war was being fought and how American war aims should be perceived on the home 
front. This culminated in his January 1941 state of the union in which he expressed the 
“Four Freedoms.” They were: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from 
want, and freedom from fear.  Overall, as one historian notes, the address conveyed “an 
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unerring sense of priorities” and offered “words of vision” (words which were dictated by 
FDR himself).
107
 For those liberals and New Dealers who had to confront the constraints 
of war, the message “reconciled them to their role as soldiers in the ranks” but calmed 
some of their concerns. As they saw it, the President had laid down a marker for the 
pursuit of victory by rearticulating anew the linkage of the New Deal and war effort. For 
instance, not long after the message Harry Hopkins wrote that triumph in the war could 
come “By the new order of democracy, which is the New Deal universally extended and 
applied.”108  
Of course, Roosevelt’s opponents responded to this connection just as they had to 
his invocation of the “arsenal of democracy.” As a writer for the magazine Coronet put it, 
this vision represented a new phase and new approach: “The New Deal of War.” 
Raymond Moley, who had previously published a scathing book on Roosevelt’s 
administration, saw this new linkage as an attempt to establish “throughout the world a 
still more radical New Deal.” And for Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), this meant the 
inevitable: “Entrance into the European War will be the next great New Deal 
experiment.”109  
As the 1942 midterm elections drew closer, conservatives kept up this line of 
attack hoping to “win the war from the New Deal.”110 In that election, Republicans 
picked up 44 seats and several prominent New Dealers lost their seats. Contemporary 
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observers drew a parallel with Wilson’s 1918 midterm defeat, viewing the election as a 
referendum on Roosevelt’s wartime policies. Unfortunately, it was politics-as-usual 
during the war, with FDR ultimately giving an “honorable discharge” to New Deal 
programs and agencies such as the Works Progress Administration, the National Youth 
Administration, and the Civilian Conservation Corps. In this manner, according to 
historian Richard Polenberg, the exigencies of the war “obliged reformers to grant 
priority to military objectives, provided an excuse to liquidate certain New Deal 
programs ...”111   
Speaking to reporters in December 1943 about the apparent change in his 
administration’s priorities, President Roosevelt proclaimed that “Dr. New Deal” had 
given way to “Dr. Win the War.”112  Good old Dr. New Deal’s patient, the United States, 
had previously been afflicted by an internal disorder.  But upon December 7
th
, 1941, the 
patient now suffered more severe wounds needing the attention of Dr. Win-the-War’s 
surgical expertise.  Critics from both the left and the right interpreted this supposed shift 
as the critical period in the relationship between the war and the New Deal.  For example, 
Chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, Congressman Charles 
A. Halleck of Indiana, gladly stated that the President had “finally been forced to admit 
that it is the New Deal’s mixing of social pipe dreams with the realism of war that breeds 
confusion on the home front.”113   
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While anti-New Dealers rejoiced, contemporaries on the left, such as the editorial 
board of The New Republic, bemoaned the president’s assumption that the New Deal and 
the war were unrelated. As they saw it, “the conduct of the war…is an expression of the 
same national mentality which fashions our domestic policy.  America entered under the 
New Deal into what was, for us, in essence a New Deal war…”114 Reflecting upon the 
accusation of The New Republic, Eleanor Roosevelt argued in an unpublished letter that 
the news journal and like-critics want to 
interpret [the press conference about Dr. Win-the-War] as meaning the 
President fails to recognize the inter-connectedness between the domestic 
situation and foreign policy. I don’t agree with them in their interpretation 
of the significance of the President’s remarks, nor in their belief that it 
really represents a retreat...  The question of what slogan [future reforms 
are] done under seems to me insignificant.
115
 
 
The President himself had made this exact point during the press conference in 
which he used the “two doctors” metaphor. As he explained to the journalists present “we 
must now plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in 
more security, in more employment, in more recreation, in more education, in more 
health, in better housing for all of our citizens.” Doing so would ensure “that the 
conditions of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 won’t come back again.”116 Reporting on 
his comments, The New York Times noted that Roosevelt “hinted at the idea of an 
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international New Deal by stating that post-war domestic policies would have to be 
formed in the light of what was going on in other countries.”117 
Roosevelt’s commitment to setting the post-war agenda found full expression in 
his 1944 address wherein he outlined a Second “Economic” Bill of Rights. Circling back 
to the origins of the New Deal, he professed the nation’s duty  
…to begin to lay the plans and determine the strategy for the winning of a 
lasting peace and the establishment of an American standard of living 
higher than ever before known. We cannot be content, no matter how high 
that general standard of living may be, if some fraction of our people—
whether it be one-third or one-fifth or one-tenth- is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill 
housed, and insecure. 
 
The United States had reached its “present strength” by protecting and promoting 
“certain inalienable political rights.” Over time, though, the “Nation ha[d] grown in size 
and stature” and Americans needed to re-envision those rights on the “new basis of 
security and prosperity.” 118 Commenting on the import of this speech, James MacGregor 
Burns sees a culmination of the prior ideals and commitments of past progressives and 
liberals “evoked by depression, hardened by war.”119 Moreover, as historian James 
Sparrow argues, the speech reflects Roosevelt’s efforts to “set the liberal agenda for the 
postwar world.”  His wartime addresses, and the vision he articulated, “resonated so 
widely because they articulated the fictive social contract on which so much of the war 
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effort depended in order to justify the exertions of mass participation in the mobilization 
for total war.”120 With his death at the tail end of the war, Roosevelt would leave it to his 
Vice-President, Harry S Truman, to see to it that the post-war agenda was carried on. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided an account of how American presidents began to 
navigate the emerging commitment of pursuing domestic reform while simultaneously 
grappling with the rise of the United States on the world stage. More specifically, I have 
shown that two critical developments were on display as early as the presidency of 
Theodore Roosevelt. First, over time, presidents have articulated visions of national 
strength. Such visions often linked themes of warfare, nationalism, and common purpose. 
Second, at times, the political demands of war, including concerns about the nation’s 
defense preparedness were prominent on the national agenda, compelling presidents to 
make choices about how they would continue to promote their domestic program.  
In the case of TR, he anxiously hoped to achieve success in both domestic and 
foreign affairs, reflecting his commitment to assert American strength and greatness and 
the role of the presidency in realizing these ends. Unfortunately, from his perspective, he 
was never given the national crisis he desired to fully affirm his vision for the nation and 
for the presidency. For Woodrow Wilson, his preference for ambitious domestic reform 
was severely foreshortened due to the challenges of mobilizing for World War I. 
Wilson’s presidency offers an early glimpse of the problem modern presidents would 
come to face in needing to square domestic policy with the warfare state; but the military 
                                                 
120
 James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 3. 
48 
 
rollback and return to normalcy after the war delayed this development. The contrasting 
appeals of Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression suggest 
that, even absent a strong military presence, appeals to war and sacrifice resonate as 
visions of national purpose.  
The presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt represents a critical juncture for the 
intersection of domestic reform and warfare on the president’s agenda; the politics of 
guns and butter. Through Roosevelt’s actions in responding to the events of the Great 
Depression and World War II, a political vision of national strength was institutionalized 
in the presidency. In this specific case, in trying to project his commitment to national 
preparedness, and finally war mobilization, FDR linked his prior domestic reform agenda 
as vital to the strength of the nation. That is, as he saw it, the objectives of New Deal 
liberalism would not only outlast the war but, more importantly, would aid directly in the 
effort to defeat the Axis powers. 
For starters, Roosevelt told the nation that earlier New Deal legislation like the 
Social Security Act and the Wagner Act set a foundation of preparedness from which the 
nation could weather the gathering storm clouds in Europe prior to the United States 
entry. Beyond weapons of war, the President maintained that totalitarianism and fascism 
were threats that would be staved off at home through such legislation. When America 
finally entered the war, he asserted that, in our mobilization effort to build the Arsenal of 
Democracy, the nation could draw upon the strength of New Deal reforms and the 
security which they afforded. While many of the early programs of the New Deal would 
receive an “honorable discharge” during the war, and the scope of the program would be 
49 
 
“redefined,”121 President Roosevelt’s political vision of national strength was realized in 
other ways; most directly through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, the GI Bill.122 
Additionally, as Jytte Klausen argues, the New Deal’s original concern with planning 
shifted toward demand management and found full expression in the post-war.
123
 
Moreover, in declaring an economic bill of rights during the war, Roosevelt set 
the political agenda for his successor, Harry S Truman. In the following chapter, I 
examine President Truman’s inheritance of this agenda and his re-working of Roosevelt’s 
vision of national strength from the era of Reconversion to the Korean War. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NECESSITY OF “INTERNAL STRENGTH”: 
A BALANCED AGENDA, COLD WAR IDEOLOGY, AND TRUMAN’S VISION 
FROM RECONVERSION TO THE FAIR DEAL  
 
Reflecting on the immediate post-war years of his presidency and the 
responsibilities the country faced, both at home and abroad, former President Harry S 
Truman wrote that it was a time of “transformation” with the United States becoming “a 
nation of unprecedented power and growing capacity.”124 Furthermore, he recalled that 
“as a leading nation,” America “had an obligation…to build a firm foundation for the 
future peace of the world. The future of the country was as much at stake as it had been in 
the days of the war.”125 Early in his administration, Truman had invoked a similar theme 
when he went before Congress to give his first official State of the Union message. The 
President expressed hoped that the trials of the future would not be “more difficult” than 
the challenges faced during the war. “But if they are, then I say that our strength and our 
knowledge and our understanding will be equal to those tasks.”126   
To be sure, one of the immediate decisions to which Truman referred was the 
nation’s willingness to come together to ensure a successful demobilization and domestic 
reconversion from the politics and economy of World War II. Yet, he also understood 
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that the United States had assumed the position of a great military and diplomatic power 
and, thus, would need to choose its path as a world leader. While Truman envisioned the 
nation summoning its “strength” to balance the coming domestic and foreign challenges, 
the reality of partisan politics and emergence of the Cold War would threaten this 
conception. 
A self-proclaimed “New Dealer from the start,” Harry S Truman was first elected 
to the Senate in 1934 and quickly became a trustworthy loyalist of the Democratic 
agenda.
127
 Having inherited Roosevelt’s torch of liberalism upon the President’s death, 
Truman entered the White House seeking to move beyond the New Deal by advancing a 
liberal agenda with its own distinct bent.
128
 Consisting of quality of life issues, such as 
medical care, education, housing, and slum removal, Truman’s Fair Deal was a clarion 
call for liberalism in the post-war era. However, the program’s advancement was 
consistently challenged by a coalition of conservative Republicans and southern 
Democrats that seized any opportunity to limit New Deal liberalism.
129
 Whether it was 
the 80
th
 “Do Nothing” Congress or the 82nd “National Defense” Congress, President 
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Truman’s advancement of the Fair Deal was constantly under siege and never fully 
realized during his tenure. 
Alongside his commitment to fulfill the domestic legacy of Roosevelt, Truman 
also inherited the newly-minted international objectives stemming from the Allied victory 
in World War II. Of course, while Truman rose to the presidency near the end of the war, 
he was responsible for significant decisions, none more so than the dropping of the 
atomic bomb and the diplomatic mission to Potsdam; decisions that shaped the contour of 
the post-war world. In this regard, Truman was the first Cold Warrior.
130
 It was during his 
time in office that the capacity of the warfare state was constructed through the creation 
of the National Security Council, the unification of the armed services, and the passage of 
foreign aid and development programs such as the Marshall Plan.
131
  
For most scholars of the Truman administration the relationship between the 
president’s commitment to domestic policy versus that of foreign and national security 
policy was one of a zero-sum situation; time and again the latter trumped the former.
132
 
This dominant narrative is illustrated best by historian William E. Pemberton who argues 
that Truman “frequently sacrificed the Fair Deal to get his foreign policy legislation 
through Congress.”133 This interpretation, however, fails to appreciate the relationship 
Truman and his administration perceived between the daunting task of continuing the 
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domestic legacy of the New Deal and simultaneously leading the emergent defense and 
security policies of the warfare state.  
As I argue in this chapter, just as President Roosevelt had done during the war, 
Truman advocated that our domestic programs comprised the nation’s “internal strength” 
and therefore, were the foundation of the country’s strength abroad. I begin by examining 
how Truman’s vision of national strength spoke to the changing landscape of domestic 
reconversion, the need to project world leadership, and the impact of Cold War ideology. 
Next, I analyze how Truman sought to balance these two commitments in the face of the 
emergent budgetary politics of the warfare state. Having inherited both a domestic and 
foreign agenda, Truman tried to reconcile both amid attempts by military interests trying 
to put even more distance between social investment and defense spending.  The chapter 
then turns to the efforts of the Truman administration to reassert its commitment to 
fighting for domestic progress and New Deal liberalism amid the growing specter of 
communism on the home front.  
 
The Cold War Necessity of “Internal Strength”: President Truman’s Post-War 
Vision and the Linkage of Peace, Prosperity, and American Leadership  
Truman had entered the presidency at one of the most unenviable times in 
America’s history. Memorably, as the story goes, upon hearing from Eleanor Roosevelt 
about FDR’s death, Truman asked if there was anything he could do for the new widow. 
She calmly replied, “Is there anything we can do for you? For you are the one in trouble 
now.”134 With World War II and the legacy of FDR’s New Deal thrust upon him in April 
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of 1945, Truman not only had to bring the war to a successful end and prepare for 
American post-war leadership, he also had to formulate a domestic agenda that 
established the priorities and necessities of reconverting the nation back to peacetime. 
Complicating matters even more, he had to contend with the political and economic 
challenges that emerged with the beginning of the Cold War.  
As I show in this section, President Truman viewed these various commitments as 
interrelated and, moreover, continually advocated that his administration’s domestic 
objectives, our “internal strength,” were the foundation of our objectives abroad. To this 
point, according to one historian, in Truman’s “way of thinking, the national welfare and 
national security, domestic and international programs, were inextricably linked.”135 
More specifically, I argue that this linkage was built upon the vision of national strength 
that had emerged out of World War II. At first, the Truman administration thought it vital 
for the nation to be strong internally so as to establish economic stability, project 
leadership on the world stage by promoting American ideals, and realize national 
preparedness for the uncertainties of the future. Yet, this conception of “internal strength” 
took on new purpose, and become more problematic, as the political, ideological, and 
military perspectives of the Cold War became more defined. 
Once the Allied victory in World War II was assured, President Harry Truman 
began preparing the country for the critical job of reconverting back to the politics and 
economy of peacetime. In a January 1946 radio broadcast, the President addressed the 
progress of his administration’s efforts and offered a report on the general state of the 
nation. He declared that the upcoming year was “our year of decision” and, invoking the 
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triumphs and challenges of the war, advised the nation of the difficulties that lie ahead. It 
was imperative that Americans “decide whether or not we shall devote our strength” to 
meeting the needs of a post-war economy. Most importantly, the approaching months 
would entail “decisions which will determine whether or not we gain that great future at 
home and abroad which we fought so valiantly to achieve.” 136  
Truman echoed this vision of strength in his subsequent State of the Union 
address in which he explained his desire to recommit political and financial resources to 
social investment and progress at home. As I explain in the following section of this 
chapter, this commitment was one of the cornerstones of Truman’s program during the 
first few years of his presidency. In all, a version of the term “strength” appeared 17 
times through the course of the President’s 1946 address. In one such example, after 
providing a survey of our military strength, Truman summed up what the nation had been 
through over the past few years.  
We have won a great war- we, the nations of plain people who hate war. 
In the test of that war we found a strength of unity that brought us through 
- a strength that crushed the power of those who sought by force to deny 
our faith in the dignity of man.
137
 
The president’s central theme about the linkage between our domestic and 
international objectives, and the need for strength, was not lost on the press. In a New 
York Times editorial, Arthur Krock remarked on the state of the Truman administration’s 
belief that “the delay in solving many pressing home problems will, it is feared, weaken 
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our influence abroad.”138 This concern over the United States’ international influence 
reflected the leadership position that the country, and specifically the president, had taken 
up in the post-war era. Paramount to holding such a seat of power was the importance of 
pursuing the objective of peace. As Truman saw it, America’s resolve in realizing this 
profound obligation was founded on our existing national strength. Yet, this sentiment 
took on new meaning as the Truman administration’s and the public’s perception of the 
emerging Cold War and the threat of Soviet ideology began to solidify.  
A critical moment in this process came in February of 1946, when George 
Kennan, an American diplomat, delivered his “Long Telegram” laying out, in stark terms, 
the ideological objective of Soviet Communism. Broadly, the telegram compared the 
rival national outlooks of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and, 
specifically, offered potential implications that the Soviet outlook had for U.S. policy-
making during the evolution of the Cold War. As Kennan argued, this Soviet fanaticism 
thought it “desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, 
our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be 
broken…” One constructive approach the United States could adopt in response to this 
conflict of ideological perspectives, and the Soviets’ desire to disrupt our country’s 
“internal harmony” was for the nation to address its “internal problems.” As one of five 
general observations offered as to how the Soviet problem was “within our power to 
solve,” he suggested that  
Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism 
is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point 
at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and 
incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve 
                                                 
138
 Arthur Krock, “Disturbing Facts Seen in State of the Union,” New York Times, May 5, 1946. 
57 
 
self confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own 
people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic 
notes and joint communiques. If we cannot abandon fatalism and 
indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will 
profit—Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies 
(emphasis added).
139
 
In July of 1947, the core argument of Kennan’s Long Telegram was published in 
the national magazine, Foreign Affairs, under the title “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” 
Although written under a pseudonym, he again stressed the potential danger of the United 
States not “coping successfully with the problem of [its] internal life.” The disastrous 
effects of “exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within [America 
would] have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement.”140 To wage the 
Cold War successfully, the nation needed to be strong internally. 
This new ideologically-based perspective of the nature of the Cold War led 
Truman to reaffirm his vision of national purpose that fused domestic and international 
objectives. In his 1947 State of the Union, for example, he proclaimed that  
Progress in reaching our domestic goals is closely related to our conduct 
of foreign affairs. All that I have said about maintaining a sound and 
prosperous economy and improving the welfare of our people has greater 
meaning because of the world leadership of the United States. What we 
do, or fail to do, at home affects not only ourselves but millions 
throughout the world. If we are to fulfill our responsibilities to ourselves 
and to other peoples, we must make sure that the United States is sound 
economically, socially, and politically. Only then will we be able to help 
bring about the elements of peace in other countries--political stability, 
economic advancement, and social progress. 
141
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Most significantly, as Mary Dudziak has masterfully shown, this vision of the 
interconnectedness of domestic and foreign policy and the ideological impact of the Cold 
War manifested itself most significantly as part of Truman’s justification in pursuing civil 
rights reform, however minimal those efforts may have been.
142
 But, as I illustrate in a 
later section, this perspective was also reflected in the social policies of Truman’s Fair 
Deal. For instance, during the administration’s preparation for the 1948 State of the 
Union, Oscar Ewing, the head of the Federal Security Agency, affirmed that “We must 
spare no effort in providing our people with the fundamental services which can fit them 
to play their role in strengthening our own Nation and in preserving world peace… We 
can have no real national security if millions of our people are unprotected against the 
fear of want.” 143 Directly invoking the vision of national strength, Ewing thought it 
should be made clear that “A Nation’s strength and its capacity to work for world peace 
rests (sic) in large measure upon the health, education and economic security of its 
individual men, women, and children…There is urgent need for strengthening these 
foundations as a secure defense of peace.”144 The commitment to building up the nation’s 
internal strength which Ewing touched upon, and Truman’s broader linkage of domestic 
and foreign affairs, would take on heightened significance after a rash of international 
crises in 1948 and 1949 stirred up the national agenda. 
The politics of the Cold War began to shift dramatically, when in February of 
1948, a Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia brought Communists to power; and event 
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that set off a ‘war-scare’ across the globe.145 Although the immediate fears of the crisis 
dissipated, President Truman, upon his re-election to the presidency, took the opportunity 
to address the state of peace in the world and the international leadership of the United 
States. As he had over the course of his tenure, he reiterated his vision that “Our domestic 
programs are the foundation of our foreign policy.”146 The drafting of this address 
provides insight into this particular line of reasoning. In an earlier outline, one of 
Truman’s main speechwriters, David Lloyd, emphasized that “Peace is objective of 
Foreign Policy.” Specifically, there were three “main lines of peace policy.” While the 
first two dealt with the strength of the United Nations and the broader community of 
nations, the third “main line of peace” was premised on a “Strong U.S.” Therefore, 
promoting social security, middle-income housing, aid to education, and a health 
program, were “Essential” and such “domestic measures will affect not only U.S. but 
whole world – will strengthen hand of freedom – lovers everywhere and enable U.S. to 
play full part in crucial decisions of next 50 years.”147 
The direct relationship between Truman’s domestic program and United States 
foreign policy would find ultimate expression in the President’s 1949 inaugural address. 
Referencing the events abroad, he recognized that “The peoples of the earth face the 
future with grave uncertainty, composed almost equally of great hopes and great fears. In 
this time of doubt, they look to the United States as never before for good will, strength, 
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and wise leadership.” Furthermore, he promised that America would “devote our 
strength, our resources, and our firmness of resolve” to helping other nation’s achieve 
“justice, harmony, and peace.”148 This commitment took the form of technical assistance. 
Under this program, commonly referred to as Point IV (the fourth point in his inaugural 
address), the United States provided scientific and industrial aid to foreign nations. In 
reporting on President Truman’s pledge for such assistance, The New York Times dubbed 
the program a “World Fair Deal” by noting that “… the Fair Deal cannot exist in 
isolation, it must be extended to the world…” The newspaper went on to capture the 
essence of Truman’s vision of strength and his linkage of domestic and foreign policy as 
they discussed his “philosophy”: 
With global complexity has come, almost paradoxically, global unity; 
foreign problems and domestic problems are parts of the same great 
whole. This becomes quickly apparent when you talk with the President 
about the pressing issues of the moment: a discussion of Russia, for 
example, soon becomes a survey of our domestic economy. When you 
seek some clues as to Mr. Truman’s overall aims you soon discover that 
the key word is ‘peace.’…[He] makes plain his hope that he will be known 
in history as the President who made the peace—peace among the nations 
and peace within the nation.
149
 
While Truman’s commitment to peace remained steadfast, by the end of 1949, 
however, his particular vision of a peace linked to a nuanced version of internal strength, 
increasingly became politically and economically untenable as the stakes of the Cold War 
heated up. In the following sections of this chapter, I trace the development of Truman’s 
vision of national strength as it is reflected in key dynamics of the programmatic agenda 
and budgetary politics of his administration prior to the Korean War. 
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The Fair Deal as Internal Strength: New Deal Liberalism, the Specter of 
Communism, and the Politics of Truman’s Domestic Agenda  
Addressing Congress at the start of 1950, President Truman asserted that the 
United States’ “success in working with other nations to achieve peace depends largely 
on what we do at home. We must preserve our national strength. Strength is not simply a 
matter of arms and force. It is a matter of economic growth, and social health, and 
vigorous institutions, public and private.”150 As the New York Times put it the following 
morning in their publishing of the President’s address, those particular remarks suggested 
that our “National Strength Must Be Preserved.”  
In this section I provide evidence that Truman and supporters of his social 
policies viewed his domestic program as important to building internal strength. Initially, 
their commitment to expanding New Deal liberalism was borne directly out of the needs 
of helping Americans re-adjust to life after World War II. But as the Cold War became 
more distressing and uncertain, there arose a strategy to link the long-term health and 
strength of the nation should be preserved. Unfortunately, enactment of Truman’s 
domestic program, termed the Fair Deal, encountered two main roadblocks: a 
conservative Congress opposed to any further social gains and the emergence of the 
previously mentioned Cold War crises on the national agenda. Moreover, these 
challenges were not exclusive, with the troubling machinations of the Soviet Union 
feeding into conservatives’ specter of socialism’s and Communism’s advance on the 
home front. 
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On September 6, 1945, four days after the celebration of V-J day, President 
Truman sent Congress a message outlining twenty-one points of domestic legislation. 
The platform included many proposals and initiatives that would eventually come to 
comprise the Fair Deal, such as housing, health insurance, a permanent Fair Employment 
Practices Committee, farm price supports, and full employment legislation.  As the 
President later described it, the Twenty-One Point Program was meant to “set the tone 
and direction for the rest of my administration and the goals toward which I would try to 
lead the nation.”151 Similarly, Samuel Rosenman, who was tasked by Truman to 
coordinate the speech, recalled that the platform “contained…the general spirit of what 
[the President] wanted to do.”152 Truman’s promotion of the Twenty-One Points was 
meant to follow what one historian calls the “direct blood line” of FDR’s wartime call for 
an Economic Bill of Rights.
153
 In fact, as the President asserted in his address, attaining 
those rights should be “the essence of postwar American economic life.”154 
One of the most pressing issues of the reconversion period was the availability of 
housing and the need for slum clearance.  Speaking specifically about the issue, Truman 
made it clear that “this is an emergency problem which calls for an emergency method of 
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solution.” Recalling the national unity of the war, he argued that “We must utilize the 
same imagination, the same determination that back in 1941 enabled us to raise our sights 
to overcome the Nazi and Japanese military might.” If the country were to do so, “we can 
mobilize our resources here at home to produce the housing we require.”155 In addition, 
upon learning that the House of Representatives was set to take up the Housing Act of 
1949, Truman sent Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn (D-TX), a message of 
encouragement, noting that the legislation would “greatly promote the general welfare” 
and that such an effort “To strengthen the whole fabric of our American society is to 
strengthen all of its several parts.”156 
This image of “strengthening” the “fabric of American society” extended to a 
range of programs from health care (as I discuss in detail in Chapter 4), education, and, 
even to free school lunch. For example, upon signing the National School Lunch Act, 
Truman expressed pride that Congress had “acted with great wisdom in providing the 
basis for strengthening the nation through better nutrition for our school children…In the 
long view, no nation is any healthier than its children or more prosperous than its 
farmers.”157 Likewise, supporters of such policies within the administration, particularly 
at the Federal Security Agency, further articulated this vision of national strength. In 
regards to promoting the President’s health program, FSA acting administrator, Watson 
Miller argued that “Our national security makes it imperative that our nation protect and 
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preserve the health of its people.”158 Miller’s successor, Oscar Ewing, staunchly 
supported the administration’s call to promote the FSA to a cabinet level agency. In 
Ewing’s view: “If the health, education, and security or our individual citizens is a 
bulwark of our national strength and a defense of world peace, then this area must be 
represented in the highest councils of Government.” 159  
Such a vision, however, was repugnant to most Republicans and conservative 
Democrats. Without missing a beat, just as they had during the New Deal and World War 
II, the conservative coalition in Congress hammered away at the ‘socialistic’ measures of 
the Truman administration and took every opportunity to exploit the public’s uneasiness 
with the reconversion process. From the perspective of House Minority Leader Joseph 
Martin (R-MA), Truman’s program during the post-war period represented nothing more 
than “a plain case of out-New Dealing the New Deal.”160 Yet, while averse to the 
administration’s social policies, the seventy-ninth Congress did pass several pieces of 
legislation, most of which were directly or indirectly related to defense or the war. For 
example, an early victory for Truman came with the passage of the Employment Act 
which created the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), providing the presidency with 
an institution for economic policy formulation. The Atomic Energy Act authorized 
civilian control over nuclear technology and established the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC). Finally, the Hospital Construction Act provided federal grants for 
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revitalizing the nation’s hospital system, sorely needed after the war, and the Veteran’s 
Emergency Housing Act put in place controls and devices for the administration to 
channel building materials toward middle to low-income housing for veterans.
161
  
In the 1946 midterm elections, the Republican Party captured the majority in the 
House behind a campaign slogan of “Had Enough? Vote Republican!” Faced with the 
“Do Nothing” Congress, as Truman un-lovingly referred to them, the President’s 
program remained stalled. In an effort to shake things up, particularly for the upcoming 
1948 presidential election, he called Congress into a special summer session and urged 
them to take up “important legislative measures on which delay would injure us at home 
and impair our world relations.” While seeking immediate action on inflation and 
housing, he invoked a broader theme that spoke to the Soviets’ desire to see our “present 
prosperity turn[ed] into a depression.” He also renewed his call for federal aid to 
education, raising the minimum wage, and a national health program, among others. In 
doing so, he argued that 
The vigor of our democracy is judged by its ability to take decisive 
actions--actions which are necessary to maintain our physical and moral 
strength and to raise our standards of living. In these days of continued 
stress, the test of that vigor becomes more and more difficult. The 
legislative and executive branches of our Government can meet that test 
today.
 162
 
 
Perhaps to no one’s surprise, the Republican Congress refused to take up any of 
the President’s proposals. Yet, upon his surprise re-election in 1948, Truman would re-
articulate his vision of the Fair Deal-as-internal strength.  In his 1949 State of the Union, 
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he again renewed his domestic proposals, officially using the term ‘Fair Deal’ to promote 
them. In concluding his address, he remarked that “The strength of our Nation must 
continue to be used in the interest of all our people rather than a privileged few. It must 
continue to be used unselfishly in the struggle for world peace and the betterment of 
mankind the world over.”163  
Later that year, in an address to the New York Herald-Tribune Forum, FSA 
administrator Oscar Ewing would elaborate on the President’s linkage of the Fair Deal, 
the struggle for peace, and the role of the United States in promoting freedom. As he told 
the gathered crowd, “We know that today, largely as a result of the depression and the 
war, our own people are deeply disturbed with anxieties… What does tomorrow hold? 
What about my job? What would happen if serious illness strikes me or my family? Can 
my children get a decent education? Can I save enough for a respectable old age?” He 
continued, “If a free society is to win the battle for men’s hearts and souls, it must furnish 
some surcease from the apprehensions and anxieties that lead men to surrender their 
freedom for the phantom promises of totalitarianism. The Fair Deal is doing this by 
furnishing certain minimum basic securities.” Ewing then went on to describe the ways in 
which social security, health insurance, housing laws, and aid to education could 
“strengthen the ring of freedom that centuries of struggle has (sic) drawn around Western 
man.” Most importantly, he argued, “The opponents of the Fair Deal fail to comprehend 
today’s problems…They do not realize that a free society must offer positive answers to 
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the haunting anxieties that beset modern man or else he is left vulnerable to the 
blandishments of totalitarianism.”164 
The contrast between freedom and totalitarianism of which Ewing spoke was also 
a prominent theme used by conservatives; yet, they drew the complete opposite 
conclusion about the social reforms of the Fair Deal, and New Deal liberalism, more 
broadly. Throughout Truman’s presidency, they invoked the specter of Communism to 
disregard and discredit Fair Deal measures. In particular, they assailed the ‘socialism’ of 
the Brannan farm plan, the ‘socialized medicine’ of the national health program, and the 
‘un-Americanism’ of federal aid to education.165  
Of course, the conservatives’ fear of the Communist menace intensified as events 
like the ‘war-scare of 1948’ emerged on the agenda, reaching a fever pitch with the onset 
of the Korean War. Not only would this make claims of ‘statism’ against the Truman 
administration more potent (as I discuss in Chapter 4), but the notion that American 
military spending should be ramped up would severely limit the President’s commitment 
to a balanced strength. 
 
The Value of Balanced Strength: Truman’s Commitment to Balancing Social and 
Defense Spending during the Emerging Politics of the Warfare State 
In the immediate post-war period, President Truman recognized that there would 
be no “return to normalcy” in regard to the state of our national defense spending. Unlike 
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the interwar years of the 1920’s and 1930’s, the growth of military institutions and the 
United States’ international obligations made it politically necessary that the defense 
budget be funded at non-negligible levels. At the same time though, Truman did not want 
the United States to succumb entirely to a garrison state in which the needs of military 
preparedness undermined traditional commitments to economy. Such a turn of events 
would mean foregoing re-investment in domestic programs that had been neglected for 
far too-long through the course of World War II. The warfare state must not subdue the 
welfare state. Most importantly, Truman viewed the need to balance our domestic needs 
with that of national defense and security as essential to maintaining the nation’s strength. 
Through his attempts to bring such balance, however, Truman had to navigate vested 
military interests intent on blocking any cuts to defense spending.
 
 
       
Demobilization and International Crises, 1945-1948 
By early fall 1945 just as the war was coming to an end, President Truman’s 
immediate budgetary concern was to coordinate a massive demobilization of the armed 
forces and a reduction in the military budget, which was an incredible $50 billion at the 
time of V-J day (see chart 3.1). Initially, Truman was overly optimistic, telling Bureau of 
the Budget Director, Howard Smith, that he hoped to eventually see the peacetime federal 
budget pared down to $25 billion, with defense taking up no more than 20-25% of that 
total. Together, Truman and Smith represented the ‘economizers’ in the administration 
who were dismayed at the disparity that had emerged between domestic and defense 
spending since the start of the war. In preparing the budget for fiscal year 1947, both 
were strong advocates for a reduction in defense expenditures. On the other end of the 
69 
 
spectrum were supporters of the emerging ideology of national security, primarily in the 
armed forces, who rejected calls for economy and, instead, pushed for an increase to the 
military’s budget.166 Truman and the economy perspective would win out during the first 
few years of his administration. 
 
Chart 3.1. National Defense spending proposed by Truman Administration 
 
 
In January of 1946, the President announced his administration’s $35.8 billion 
budget for the upcoming fiscal year. Of that, $15 billion accounted for national defense 
and other war-related costs, which was significantly lower than those in the armed forces 
had sought. Additionally, the budget called for slight increases to domestic programs 
such as education, farm supports, social security, and other non-defense related areas as 
Truman and Smith had planned.
167
 While the Navy, in particular, was none too happy 
with the budget ceiling imposed on them, in the end, the President was able to keep 
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defense spending down. In conjunction with larger than expected tax-revenues, Truman’s 
stance against those defense interests in the administration lead to a balanced budget for 
the  1947 fiscal year. However, both the War and Navy departments would take up this 
struggle in the next budgetary go-round. 
In the planning stages of the fiscal year 1948 budget, the military again pressed 
Truman and the Budget Bureau for higher defense expenditures. This prompted the new 
Budget director, James E. Webb, to complain that “In such a budget…very little room is 
left for such purposes as education and general research, public health, housing, and 
development of industry, agriculture, transportation, and our national resources.” 
Affording such “trivial amounts” would injure our “national objectives, including 
military strength.” 168 Similarly, as Truman noted in his message accompanying the 
administration’s $37.5 billion budget, the nation had “commitments, both international 
and domestic, that must be honored” and, thus, the current program was “designed to 
meet these needs, and to execute every program with strict economy.”169   
As he had done before, the President was able to fight back against the military’s 
demands; reflected in the administration’s proposed budget of $11 billion for national 
defense, which represented a reduction from the previous year. Alternatively, domestic 
programs such as social welfare, education, housing, and agriculture saw slight increases. 
Together, with other non-defense expenditures like resource conservation, 
communications, and transportation, the budget allocated over $6 billion. Another $7.3 
billion went to Veterans’ services to fund education and benefits “which will add to our 
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national strength and prosperity.”170 At the end of the1948 fiscal year, President Truman 
announced another balanced budget with a $5 billion surplus. In a press conference 
announcing the surplus, he argued that “The international situation has also made it 
imperative” to achieve a sound budget that will act as “a reserve against emergencies, 
whether at home or abroad.” For Truman, it was necessary that the surplus be put toward 
the national debt and re-invested in domestic programs.  
For the 1949 fiscal year, the President unveiled a budget totaling $39.7 billion. 
The portion allocated for defense practically mirrored the previous budget of $11 billion. 
Similarly, the budget planned for another $5 billion surplus and called for increase 
spending on education, housing, health insurance, resources conservation, and farm 
supports. As he put it in the accompanying budget message, “All these programs directly 
support the twofold objective of building economic and individual strength and health in 
this nation, and of better preparing the nation to discharge its increased responsibilities in 
the family of nations.”171 While Truman had hoped to see another balanced budget, a turn 
of events in Eastern Europe foreshadowed the coming challenge to his desire for 
continuing a balanced strength of economy and domestic development.  
For the first few years of his administration, Truman had been successful at 
fending off calls from the military to provide additional defense funds. But, with the 
Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia and the ‘war-scare’ of 1948, Congress would pass a 
subsequent defense appropriation of $3.1 billion, creating a deficit for the 1949 fiscal 
year. In conjunction with the President’s announcement of the ‘Truman Doctrine,’ 
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pledging that the United States would provide $400 million in economic aid to Greece 
and Turkey to combat the spread of Communism,
172
 and the Marshall Plan, which called 
for economic recovery to help rebuild Europe, the Czech crisis signaled a shift in the 
politics of budgeting for national strength.  
 
The Defense Program, Congressional Conservatives, and Budgeting for Permanent 
Preparedness, 1949-1950 
Looking to move past the budgetary effects of the war scare of 1948, President 
Truman renewed his commitment to rein in defense spending and to provide additional 
funding to domestic programs as his administration prepared the budget for fiscal years 
1950 and 1951. In doing so, he continued to articulate his vision that the nation’s 
preparedness and position of strength in the Cold War was determined by the sound 
budgeting of both social investment and national defense. There was reason to be hopeful 
given Truman’s re-election in 1948 and his improved domestic standing. Unfortunately, 
as events of the early Cold War began to unfold and came to envelop the national agenda, 
there emerged a new perspective on the usefulness of building up America’s military 
strength.  
Tensions concerning the Czech crisis had eased considerably when President 
Truman presented his administration’s budget for fiscal year 1950, thus, he hoped to 
return to the balanced approach he had implemented during his first few years. Moreover, 
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during the prior year, he had instituted a $15 billion cap on defense spending.
173
 Given 
these two developments, he reiterated a desire to reinvest in domestic programs. The total 
budget called for $41.9 billion in total expenditures, a little less than $2 billion above the 
previous year. National defense spending was set at $14. 3 billion, compared to $11.8 for 
fiscal year 1949. In reference to the defense budget, Truman argued that “The principal 
objective we should have in mind in planning for our national defense at this time is to 
build a foundation of military strength which can be sustained for a period of years 
without excessive strain on our productive resources, and which will permit rapid 
expansion should the need arise.”174 
This was a critical period for the budgetary politics of the Truman administration, 
specifically, and for the warfare state, more broadly. In placing a cap on defense 
spending, the President, along with Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Edwin 
Nourse, and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, recognized the long-term implications 
of national preparedness. For example, speaking to the National War College in June 
1949, Secretary Johnson remarked that the political commitment of the defense program 
was now “a major factor in the fiscal life of the nation,” going up against “revenues with 
measures dedicated to the health, progress, and social welfare of the American 
people.”175 More directly, Nourse once asserted that “The country that advances the 
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welfare of the nation, lays a foundation of preparedness that the garrison state never 
can.”176 In essence, Johnson and Nourse spoke to President Truman’s vision of a 
balanced national strength. 
While events abroad clearly posed a significant challenge to the maintenance of 
this vision, the determination by conservatives in Congress to cut taxes applied additional 
pressure. In the prior year, Republicans had successfully overridden the President’s veto 
of a tax cut bill, and, desperate for additional revenue, Truman proposed a $4 billion 
revenue bill in response. He addressed this state of affairs in his 1950 State of the Union. 
At present, largely because of the ill-considered tax reduction of the 80th 
Congress, the Government is not receiving enough revenue to meet its 
necessary expenditures… To meet this situation, I am proposing that 
Federal expenditures be held to the lowest levels consistent with our 
international requirements and the essential needs of economic growth, 
and the well-being of our people. Don't forget that last phrase.
 177
  
The President continued, by noting that “At the same time, we must guard 
against the folly of attempting budget slashes which would impair our prospects 
for peace or cripple the programs essential to our national strength (emphasis 
added).”178 Again, Truman had stressed the need to think about budgeting in 
relational terms. 
For the fiscal year 1951, the administration planned total expenditures at 
$42.7 billion. Reflecting what the Bureau of the Budget called a “trend towards 
economy at the expense of national security programs,” defense spending was set 
                                                 
176
 Ibid, 173. 
  
177
 Harry S. Truman, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 4, 1950, The 
American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13567. 
 
178
 Ibid. 
 
75 
 
at $13.9 billion. Spending on social welfare programs was set at $2.7 billion with 
general domestic spending seeing an increase of $1 billion over the prior fiscal 
year (see table 3.1). If granted the increase, Truman hoped to invest the funds in 
housing, health care, social security, and education. In presenting the budget, 
Truman stated that it was “not [a question] whether we are doing too much, but 
whether the budgetary requirements of the major national security and war-
connected programs have constrained us to undertake too little toward supporting 
and stimulating the realization of our country’s great potential development.”179 
In the end, however, Congressional conservatives eliminated the President’s $1 
billion increase. What is more, when an additional $385 million defense 
appropriation was passed, Republicans were able to offset the cost by cutting non-
defense spending by $550 million.
180
  
 
Table 3.1. Defense vs. Welfare Spending 
 (*in billions) Proposed* Proposed* 
 Nat'l Defense Social Welfare 
FY 1947 15 3.0 
FY 1948 11.25 1.7 
FY 1949 11.8 2.38 
FY 1950 14.3 2.35 
FY 1951 13.5 2.7 
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Although conservatives kept up their fight against an ever-increasing budget, a 
shifting perspective within the Truman administration in regards to the defense program 
brought the President’s earlier position on a balanced strength into question. More 
specifically, the Soviet Union’s successful nuclear test and the Communists’ takeover of 
China in 1949 led the National Security Council and others with defense interests, to re-
consider the state of America’s military strength. According to the release of the 
document known as NSC-68, the United States should undergo “a more rapid build-up of 
political, economic, and military strength and thereby of confidence in the free 
world….”181  
While the policy recommendations in NSC-68 were never officially adopted, the 
onset of the Korean War only a few months later would necessarily realize the military 
buildup envisioned by its architects of new the defense perspective. As I discuss in the 
next chapter, the budgetary politics of the Korean defense effort officially re-militarized 
the vision of national strength put forth by President Truman.  
 
Conclusion 
The presidency of Harry S Truman was foundational for the politics of national 
strength. As the first president to govern in the shadow of the warfare-welfare state 
nexus, he was tasked with balancing both the commitment to New Deal liberalism and 
the responsibility of military and world leadership that he inherited upon the death of 
FDR. Just as Roosevelt had linked the domestic objectives of the New Deal with the 
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wartime purpose of the Allied cause by articulating a vision of national strength, Truman 
advocated that his reconversion and Fair Deal programs comprised an “internal strength” 
that represented the foundation of our foreign policy objectives in the immediate post-war 
era. But with the emergence of the Cold War, and the United States’ objective of peace, 
Truman envisioned a nuanced conception of strength. While military strength was 
essential, there was equal importance in sustaining vigorous national strength, which 
meant much more than our defensive prowess. 
From President Truman’s perspective, to be strong internally the nation had to 
bring balance to the disparity between defense and social spending, while also being wary 
of an over-extended budget. Of course, the immediate challenges he faced were the 
demands of post-war demobilization and the domestic politics of reconversion. The 
budgetary battles he would endure during his first few years in office presaged the similar 
political obstacles that subsequent presidents would confront in taking on entrenched 
military interests. But he found early success in balancing the budget on multiple 
occasions, in spite of, and sometimes due in part to, the efforts of congressional 
conservatives to push back against domestic reinvestment.  
Truman’s leadership of the warfare state had a lasting legacy both institutionally 
and ideologically. Not only did he unify the armed services into a single Department of 
Defense and oversee the emergence of the National Security Council, but he pursued a 
Cold War agenda that fused New Deal liberalism with a vigorous stance against Soviet 
communism. As part and parcel of his vision of national strength, this Cold War 
liberalism would have a profound effect on politics for the next several decades. 
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Truman’s support for New Deal liberalism during this era was critical in his 
articulation of national strength as a political vision. As I have shown, specific social 
policies of the Fair Deal were viewed as important to building internal strength, 
particularly in hopes of aiding the reconversion effort and sustaining health, welfare, and 
prosperity during the indeterminate nature of the Cold War. This linkage of social welfare 
and strength was evident as early as the end of World War II. Unfortunately, success in 
his domestic agenda was hard to come by given the Republican led 80
th
 Congress and the 
consistent opposition of congressional conservatives. Yet, legislation was passed in the 
form of the Housing Act of 1949, the Social Security Amendments of 1950, and various 
actions to aid veterans and hospital construction. Together, federal action in these areas 
represented means of strengthening the nation.  
Beginning with the era of reconversion, the warfare state dominated the national 
agenda with concerns about national defense and international crises crowding out much 
of Truman’s program. While the 1948 election and the Fair Deal re-invigorated the 
liberal cause, the onset of the Korean War, and the continued resistance of conservatives 
in Congress, would dampen any hopes of domestic success. However, as I show in the 
following chapter, President Truman would re-imagine his vision of “internal strength” 
during the Korean War by articulating the linkage of the Fair Deal and the defense 
preparedness effort. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
BUILDING STRENGTH AT HOME:  
REASSERTING TRUMAN’S PRESIDENTIAL VISION THROUGH THE LINKAGE 
OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE KOREAN WAR DEFENSE EFFORT  
 
On December 16
th
, 1950, following a downturn of events in Korea, President 
Truman officially proclaimed that the United States was in a state of national emergency. 
The increasing Communist menace, not only in Korea but around the globe, required that 
“the national defense of the United States be strengthened as speedily as possible.” 
Truman stated that achieving this new national objective meant Americans would have to 
“make a united effort for the security and well-being of our beloved country.” If citizens 
came together and put the country’s necessities “foremost in thought and action,” the 
President believed that “the full moral and material strength of the Nation may be readied 
for the dangers which threaten us.”182 
In a corresponding radio and television address explaining the extent of the 
national emergency, Truman assured the American public that “We have the strength and 
we have the courage to overcome the danger that threatens our country.” At the core of 
“Our great strength” was a willingness to “pull together when we are in trouble,…not out 
of fear, but out of love for the great values of our American life, that we all have a share 
in.” The task of “building a stronger America” was a joint effort undertaken “on our 
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farms, in our factories, and in our homes.” In the end, Truman urged each and every 
American “to put aside his personal interests for the good of the country.”183 
During the preparation phase of this particular address, chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisors, Leon Keyserling, argued that the President’s emphasis on the 
nation’s domestic productive strength could be used to introduce “a ray of hope into a 
dreary situation…[a] ray of hope [which] is most important at this time.” There was great 
significance in highlighting our potential economic strength, Keyserling stressed. As he 
put it,  
Nothing could be more important than to tell the people that, while we are 
girding ourselves for defense, we are by the same effort building a 
structure which will enable us to resume our social progress and move on 
to new attainments when the immediate struggle is over.
184
 
 
The suggestion offered by Keyserling reflected a larger viewpoint that emerged 
among architects and supporters of President Truman’s domestic program. Offering a 
nuanced answer to the question, “What will the war in Korea do to the Fair Deal?”, as the 
The New York Times inquired in the fall of 1950
185
,
 
 many argued that while the needs of 
the defense effort were paramount, we must not give up the fight for the betterment of 
our nation’s health and welfare. Truman himself addressed this question in a press 
conference following his January 1951 State of the Union address. While the President 
recognized that “first things come first, and our defense programs must have top 
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priority,” this did not mean a retreat from his commitment to liberal, domestic reform. As 
he told the reporters that day, “There has been a great deal of conversation about the Fair 
Deal, lots of comment on it since the Message. I want to get it straight… , because there 
has been a lot of speculation about whether I am going back on the Democratic Platform 
or not. I am not.” 186 
Only a few years removed for the demobilization efforts of World War II, the 
Truman administration was faced yet again with the politics of wartime. Capping off 
what historian Bert Cochran calls Truman’s “crisis presidency,” the Korean War 
threatened to become a political albatross around the neck of the President.  Most 
notably, scholars point to the collapse of the Fair Deal agenda upon the beginning of the 
Korean War and its attendant military buildup. One of the foremost scholars of the 
Truman presidency, historian Alonzo L. Hamby, refers to this period of defense 
mobilization as the “end of fair deal liberalism.”187  
Following this traditional narrative of the “disappearance of the Fair Deal from 
the political agenda,” political scientist Benjamin O. Fordham examines the political 
bargaining undertaken by interests of both social welfare and national defense and 
concludes that “The administration valued its national security program more highly than 
it valued its social welfare agenda.”188 Offering a more favorable account of this 
dynamic, presidential scholar Richard E. Neustadt, who served as a member of the 
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Truman administration during this period, recalls that the president “was shifting 
emphasis, relegating most welfare measures to some secondary order of priority, without 
quite ceasing to be their advocate. It was too subtle a performance for the press; the 
distinctions much too fine for headlines or wide public notice…”189  
In this chapter, I take seriously Neustadt’s notion that the Truman administration 
did not cease to be an “advocate” for social welfare measures during the period of the 
Korean War and analyze the politics behind the president’s “subtle performance” in being 
such an advocate. Yet, I challenge Neustadt’s suggestion that such measures were of 
secondary priority. Moving beyond the traditional narrative, I argue that proponents of 
the Fair Deal and Truman’s domestic objectives did not see the Korean defense effort as 
the end all of social investment. Rather, they viewed it as on opportunity to re-articulate 
and renew the fight for policies and programs which they saw as inherently linked to the 
mobilization drive for national preparedness. Moreover, just as the administration’s 
program helped build national strength after World War II, that strength was doubly 
needed as the country braced itself once again for wartime. 
This chapter begins by examining how members of the Truman administration 
viewed the relationship between their domestic programmatic agenda and the needs of 
the Korean defense effort in a way that reimagined and reaffirmed their prior vision of 
national strength. In the second part of the chapter, I demonstrate how this vision was 
reflected in the politics of the president’s health program during the defense mobilization 
period. Finally, I analyze the limitations of Truman’s linkage of social welfare and 
national defense and the politics of wartime budgeting. 
                                                 
189
 Neustadt, “Congress and the Fair Deal: A Legislative Balance Sheet,” 36. 
83 
 
Reimagining the Nation’s Internal Strength: The Truman Administration’s Vision 
of Social Welfare-as-Defense Preparedness during the Korean War 
Truman’s proclamation of a national emergency solidified the politics of the 
national agenda around concerns regarding the need for preparedness and the state of the 
nation’s defensive strength. But, even in the light of defense mobilization, Truman and 
his liberal supporters were determined not to give up their commitment to New Deal 
liberalism. Rather, it was because of the prospect of a sustained mobilization effort that 
the nation needed to keep up the fight for social welfare. This was particularly the case 
given the uncertain duration of the current effort and the importance of planning for the 
post-emergency era.   
Throughout the final years of Truman’s presidency, key advisers, executive 
officials, and liberal interest groups expressed a firm belief that the administration’s 
domestic program was vital to national preparedness. Invoking earlier calls for “internal 
strength,” Truman’s wartime presidential programs linked Fair Deal domestic reform 
with the mission of defense preparedness by maintaining the necessity of “building 
strength at home.” In this section of the chapter, I detail how this reimagining of 
Truman’s prior vision of national strength was understood and constructed through the 
administration’s efforts to maintain support for its programmatic agenda. 
 
“Building Strength at Home” 
Amid the shadow of the United States’ involvement in Korea, Truman, acting as 
“a very active team captain,” worked with his advisers to prepare his annual messages 
84 
 
outlining the president’s program.190 As with every major address, the administration 
received advice and suggestions from interested parties about how best to formulate and 
articulate the programmatic agenda to the American people. During the final years of 
Truman’s tenure, the reality of the defense effort informed both the drafting of the 
messages conveyed and the purpose of the vision promoted by the President in his 
wartime program.  
The administration’s supporters stated their cases. For example, Hoyt Haddock of 
the AFL-CIO’s Maritime Commission, proposed language for the 1951 State of the 
Union that linked the struggle against Communist aggression in Korea to the need to 
fulfill President Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms.  In Haddock’s view, Truman should tell the 
American public that  
it is an illusion to believe that military might will give us, or the world, the 
four freedoms which represent mankind’s hope…Today, I am confronting 
you with the conviction that unless we supplement the military program 
with a positive program of achieving the “four freedoms” on a world wide 
basis, under our leadership and through the United Nations, we will lose 
the leadership of the world.”191 
Faced with the fact that the “nation is neither at war nor at peace,” a Mr. 
Flanagan,
192
 suggested “a stirring and authoritative call to action.” Such an expression 
could be partly grounded in the belief that “The State of the Union is the State of the 
World.” Under this premise, the President could declare that “Within its borders the 
Republic continues to increase in [the] strength of its institutions and the enjoyment of 
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freedom among its citizens. We have made notable progress abroad and at home toward 
strengthening the foundation and encouraging the growth of a free world.”193 
In some instances, direct legislative recommendations were made by liberal 
supporters of the president’s program. During the lead up to the 1952 legislative session, 
Emil Rieve, Administrative Chairman, of the CIO’s Committee on Economic Policy 
offered his organization’s thoughts on the importance of pursuing progress on the 
domestic front. Their letter stressed that “While we move forward in our defense program 
and meet the daily developing problems resulting from the disturbances created by 
shifting some of our civilian production to military production, we cannot lose sight of 
maintaining and developing many of our social welfare measures.”  Rieve and the CIO 
urged Truman “with all the conviction possible” that he and the administration “continue 
to advocate and support good, sound domestic legislation designed to aid and strengthen 
our own country and our democratic institutions.” 194 
Oscar Ewing, as administrator of the Federal Security Agency, made his thoughts 
on the relationship between the war effort and the fight for social progress very clear 
when submitting his legislative recommendations to the President. There were different 
conceptions of strength, according to Ewing. He described how “…the nature of modern 
warfare is such that although conventional military strength is imperative there are many 
essential elements of security other than those included in the armed forces.” In his view, 
the Nation understood that “Certain basic goals of American society are the same in 
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peace and in war...”  Echoing back to George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and the 
accepted view of Soviet ideology, Ewing argued that 
The communists delight in depicting us as a materialistic and militaristic 
nation. Proper emphasis upon our concern for the well-being of our 
citizens as a goal in itself as well as a vital part of our national strength 
against Communist aggression, is therefore doubly necessary.
195
 
 
The president’s advisers were tasked with collecting such suggestions and then 
preparing notes on general themes which could be communicated through the president’s 
wartime programmatic messages. Charles Stauffacher, an official with the Bureau of the 
Budget, felt that “all of the specific points on the Fair Deal…could probably be 
compressed and be more in the setting of the central theme of the speech…” The theme 
he proposed was for Truman to maintain that the administration was “continuing the 
program we have…building up our own strength as a basis for peace…”196  
Future presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, a Truman aide at the time, 
submitted an early state of the union draft which offered a more direct link between the 
policies of the Fair Deal and the war effort: “Therefore, part of the task of building up our 
defense of freedom is to keep up the fight for social welfare.”197 Along the same lines, the 
unknown author of another draft, thought it constructive for Truman to “state his case in 
terms which carry the defense effort and the Fair Deal forward as a one-package policy.” 
The author offered a “rough idea” of what the president could say”    
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Because defense and welfare are world-wide problems, the whole Free 
World is being knit together in a single united effort to achieve the goal. 
And because defense and welfare are equally essential over the long pull, 
the policy of this Nation is to provide for the one and to promote the other 
– and do both these things at the same time. This is a one-package 
policy.
198
   
 
The eventual theme that came to comprise Truman’s wartime messages was that 
of “Building Strength at Home.” The development of this vision can be traced through 
the original sketches for what became the 1951 and 1952 State of the Unions. David 
Lloyd, one of Truman’s key advisors, drafted an early outline emphasizing that the 
“nation faces a test,” specifically “an external threat,” but in our favor, “Internally the 
nation is in good shape.”  To engage this threat, the United States was putting forth a 
“program to meet the danger” that fully utilized “our means and measures.” The first of 
the program’s six points was our “strength at home.” 199 
This general theme was seconded by Marshall Shulman, a close adviser to 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In a memo to the President’s secretary, Shulman 
suggested that the State of the Union message “should strive for a major impact” on 
several main points, which included “Inspiring statement of goals  (‘Four Freedoms’ 
effect),” and “Confidence – awareness of our sources of strength.” Moreover, the foreign 
policy section of the address could incorporate the administration’s plan for “dealing with 
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the domestic measures planned” by framing home-front policies as a national effort at 
“Building our strength.”  
In January 1951, Truman went before Congress and described how the nation 
could “succeed in the great task that lies before us.” To be sure, much of the address 
focused on the administration’s plans for building up our military and economic strength, 
but, as the President noted, we also drew a “great part of our strength” from “Our 
common ideals.” Unifying our sources of strength was critical, for the Soviets had “made 
it clear that we must have strength as well as right on our side. If we build our strength--
and we are building it--the Soviet rulers may face the facts and lay aside their plans to 
take over the world.” To build this necessary strength at home, Truman called for 
legislative action in areas such as agriculture, defense housing, medical education, and 
federal aid to the states for elementary and secondary schools.
200
 
Reaffirming this vision a year later, the President’s 1952 address acknowledged 
that “We cannot do all we want to in times like these--we have to choose the things that 
will contribute most to defense--but we must continue to make progress if we are to be a 
strong nation in the years ahead.” We must renew our commitment to progress internally, 
Truman noted, stressing that   
Our strength depends upon the health, the morale, the freedom of our 
people. We can take on the burden of leadership in the fight for world 
peace because, for nearly 20 years, the Government and the people have 
been working together for the general welfare. We have given more and 
more of our citizens a fair chance at decent, useful, productive lives. That 
is the reason we are as strong as we are today. 
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While the present period was trying, and some domestic actions would be limited, 
if not halted all together, we should not “give up the things that are vital to our national 
strength (emphasis added).
201
 
 
Social Welfare, Liberals, and Mobilizing the Vision of National Strength  
During the mobilization period, Truman and key executive officials, especially 
FSA Administrator Oscar Ewing, articulated the administration’s vision of national 
strength to groups of liberal supports and social welfare organizations. Together, their 
arguments spoke to the idea that the circumstances of defense mobilization meant that the 
commitment to social welfare was critically important, now more than ever. Recalling the 
experience of World War II and reconversion, we needed to maintain the objective of 
social progress so that, once the Korean War came to an end, the nation would be better 
prepared for its return to peacetime. And, more directly, Truman and his supporters saw 
social welfare itself as vital to the defense effort.   
Addressing the sixth annual meeting of the President’s Committee on National 
Employ the Physically Handicapped Week in August of 1950, just weeks after the start of 
the Korean War, Truman expressed that, while “some people may feel that [the 
committee’s] work is now overshadowed by the important events which are occurring in 
the struggle for a just and lasting peace,” this was clearly “not the case.” He noted that 
during the present struggle “our national strength is the chief reliance of the free world in 
its effort to overcome the forces of tyranny and aggression.” The mission of the 
committee to find productive employment for the physically handicapped was in service 
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of “strengthening our nation.” Promoting such employment was important because “Our 
Nation is strong because it is loved by its citizens. We love our country not as an 
abstraction or a theory, but because it offers us the chance to lead useful lives, and to do 
what we can for those around us.” In this manner, the committee’s work was “not only 
humanitarian,” it was “also patriotic, because it strengthens the ties that bind us all 
together in loyalty to our country.”202 
Of course, Truman also expressed gratitude to those in his own administration 
who served the nation by overseeing the health and welfare of the American people, the 
men and women of the Federal Security Agency. Unable to attend one of the FSA’s staff 
conferences in late 1951, Truman had a letter sent to Administrator Ewing wishing to 
extend his greetings to the attendees present. Admittedly, recent events had led to “set-
backs and disappointments” and, moreover, required defense expenditures had limited 
our social investments for programs at home. The current circumstances, however, were 
“nothing to be discouraged about.” Rather, as the President’s letter read, the “defense 
effort itself is creating all sorts of special health and welfare and education problems in 
hundreds of communities across the country.” The present work of the FSA was vital: 
their efforts were “helping to keep our mobilization program moving forward.”203 
In many ways, Oscar Ewing, as head of the FSA, led the national strength-
mobilization effort on the ground. Given his deep, ideological ties to New Deal 
liberalism, the rallying came natural. For instance, serving as vice-chairman of the 
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Democratic National Committee in the lead up to the 1948 election, Ewing held regular 
strategy meetings with prominent liberals in the federal government.
204
 During the 
defense period, he demonstrated the same commitment to advance the liberal cause of 
health, education, and welfare.  
In the immediate months following the crisis in Korea, Ewing fervently 
articulated the administration’s vision of strengthening the nation, in front of both liberal 
and defense interests. Speaking before the annual convention of the American Federation 
of Teachers in August of 1950, Ewing discussed the need for a continued “framework 
and philosophy of social progress” and touted the Social Security Act amendments205 
which had been passed the week prior. This legislation was “part of the social program 
which the American people desire” and Ewing rejected the calls of those who felt that 
“we must stop working for this kind of progress because of the international situation.” 
Ewing went on to invoke the vision of building strength at home: 
Certainly our primary effort must be on the strengthening of our country to 
meet whatever demands may be placed upon us. Nobody who understands 
the difference between democracy and Communism, between freedom and 
the police state, will challenge this. What we must continue to remember, 
however, is that our country is strong only if our people are strong – and 
that our people are strong only if our education, our health, and our 
family security are maintained and strengthened. There is no conflict here. 
There is merely the interplay of needs for the making of a powerful 
American in a turbulent world (emphasis added).”206 
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Not long after visiting with the American Federation of Teachers, Administrator 
Ewing sounded a similar message to a very different audience at the Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces in which he reaffirmed the policies and vision of President Truman’s 
domestic program. Again referencing the recent SSA amendments, he noted that those 
who “been the most active in the struggle to strengthen and expand” the safety net were 
simply reflecting their concern “with the essential strength and morale of the Nation as a 
whole.”207 Finishing his speech to the assembled military officials and students, Ewing 
wanted to “add just one point.”   
In outlining what the government now does for health, education and 
family security – and what still needs to be done – I have tried to suggest 
some of the ways in which it directly affects your immediate concern with 
national security. These relationships are not dragged in by the heels. They 
are not far-fetched. The strength of the people is, quite simply and 
literally, the strength of the Nation. But I want also to make it plain that I 
do not justify these measures solely – or even mainly – on grounds of 
national defense. They justify themselves – as necessary and practical 
elements in the kind of government and the kind of peace-loving society 
we believe in. They represent democratic self-government at work in the 
best interests of – and by direction of – the citizens themselves (emphasis 
added).” 208 
 
Another administration official that often invoked the administration’s vision of 
national strength was CEA Chairman Leon Keyserling. However, as I explain in more 
detail below, Keyserling’s primary concern for economic strength made him a less 
idealistic advocate. Nevertheless, he spoke to the true linkage of social welfare and 
national defense. For example, speaking to the conference of the American Public 
Welfare Association weeks before the national emergency was declared, he counseled 
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that social workers “not regard themselves as being relegated to the sidelines by the new 
turn of national and world affairs.”  Those in the audience, along with their fellow 
citizens, “should realize that some of the things which some people have called ‘reform’ 
or ‘social’ as distinguished from ‘economic’ measures, have really been a great source of 
our economic strength and, consequently of our defense strength.”  Invoking the recent 
memory of World War II, he suggested that the nation’s economic front and production 
line were made strong by, not only New Deal reforms in health, education, and housing 
but also “the sense that the nation existed for the welfare of the people instead of the 
people existing only for the service of the state.”209  
 In articulating the Fair Deal domestic program as foundational to the nation’s 
strength, Truman and administration officials helped to reaffirm the objectives of liberal 
progress, in both peace and war. As I detail in the following section, this vision of 
strength was premised on advancing the health of the American people, leading Truman 
to endorse anew his administration’s health program.   
 
The Health and Strength of the Nation: The Experience of World War II, the 
Defense Emergency, and Truman’s Health Program 
Near the end of World War II in the fall of 1945, President Truman was sent a 
copy of a proposed plan, “The Government’s Responsibility for the Health of the Nation” 
written by Colonel W. Paul Holbrook, regarding the reorganization of medical military 
services and their coordination with civilian medical services. In his proposal, Colonel 
Holbrook noted that concerns over the government’s role in public health were 
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“necessarily much stimulated by the outbreak of [World War II].” What became evident 
was that the nation was “profoundly shocked by the high percentage found physically 
defective among the inductees.” To Holbrook, it was “necessary and urgent that 
something definite…be done to centralize all government policies effecting the nation’s 
health (sic).”210  While President Truman received many documents from “nearly every 
fellow” with interests in education, public health, and public welfare, he appreciated 
Holbrook’s comments and felt the plan would be “very helpful in creating a policy on 
public health.”211  
Less than two months after receiving Colonel Holbrook’s comments, President 
Truman made history by sending a special message to Congress outlining his proposal for 
a comprehensive health program. Directly referencing Roosevelt’s wartime call for an 
Economic Bill of Rights, Truman reiterated the right of every American “to adequate 
medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health.” As proposed, the 
comprehensive health proposal consisted of five major parts: hospital construction; 
expansion of public health services; medical education and research; prepayment of 
medical costs through compulsory insurance; and protection against loss of wages due to 
sickness and disability. The President’s call to arms for such a program reflected the fact 
that, although the country had “made great strides” in medical and scientific progress, 
“each year we lose many more persons from preventable and premature deaths than we 
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lost in battle or from war injuries during the entire war.”212 The experience of World War 
II (not just the memory of the war, given its immediacy in the minds of the public), was 
critical in both formulating and promoting the president’s health program. 
While Cold War politics would quickly infuse the debates concerning passage of 
some of Truman’s proposals, the events in Korea and the proclamation of the national 
emergency heightened the terms of contestation. However, building from the 
administration’s vision of social welfare as a cornerstone of national strength, Truman 
and his administration officials used the moment to further state their case for the 
importance of the nation’s health towards the defense mobilization effort. 
 
Truman’s Health Program Prior to the Korean War 
Mere weeks after Truman’s initial proposal in November of 1945, Federal 
Security Agency Acting Administrator Watson Miller touted the health program in a 
speech to the New York County Medical Society, a speech which Truman read “with a 
lot of interest.”213 Speaking with authority as a top policy-maker and administrator in the 
field, Watson proclaimed health as a “national asset” and a right afforded to the people by 
the government. The issue of health as an “old fact” had been given “fresh meaning,” 
particularly “seen in the new and lurid light of this post-war world.” Recounting a 
statistic often cited by supporters of the president’s program, the Acting Administrator 
noted that “The 5 million or so young men who failed to measure up to health standards 
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for military service [during the war] bid us look to the morbidity of our whole people.” 
But he did not want to “belabor… these frequently discussed military findings.” While it 
was imperative that we draw a lesson from the dangers of ill health on our preparedness, 
there were positives to note from the experience of war, as well. In regards to the need for 
expanded research, Watson expressed “hope that the benefits of wartime cooperation 
between Government, universities, hospitals, and foundations may be extended to the 
even larger tasks of peace.”214 
In a rather short amount of time, the first plank of the health program came into 
being with the Hospital Construction Act of 1946, known popularly as the Hill-Burton 
Act. However, the congressional hearings on legislation for national health insurance 
became bogged down in a testy debate about the threats of “socialized Medicine”; a 
threat made more visceral by the assumed machinations of Soviet ideology.  
In an effort to show his continued commitment to the issue, President Truman 
sent a special message to Congress in May 1947 proclaiming that the health program was 
“crucial to our national welfare.” Without compulsory health insurance as “a part of our 
national fabric, we shall be wasting our most precious national resource and shall be 
perpetuating unnecessary misery and human suffering.”215 With little movement on the 
legislative front, Truman asked the Federal Security Agency to review how best to 
advance the nation’s health over the next ten years. Oscar Ewing, who had taken over the 
job of FSA Administrator, would present the report, The Nation’s Health, during the tail 
end of the 1948 presidential election. 
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With Truman’s upset victory over Thomas E. Dewey in that campaign, the 
President renewed his fight for a comprehensive health program. Addressing Congress in 
April of 1949, Truman offered four recommendations: separate legislation for national 
health insurance and expansion efforts for medical schools; and increased aid for hospital 
construction and public health services. The administration would be successful in getting 
increased funding for hospital construction and research grants. But, as I describe below, 
they were unable to find support in the conservative House of Representatives for aid to 
medical education and increased funding for local health services. Amid the backdrop of 
the international events of 1949 and the emergence of McCarthyism, Truman’s efforts to 
achieve national health insurance were tainted by the specter of Communism. Reflecting 
back on his efforts, Truman could never quite “understand all the fuss some people make 
about government wanting to do something to improve and protect the health of the 
people.”216 Yet, with the onset of the Korean war, Truman’s commitment to improving 
and protecting the nation’s health became imperative, not in spite of the war, but because 
of its demands. 
 
Korea, the National Emergency, and the President’s Committee on the Health Needs of 
the Nation 
While claims of “socialized medicine” were used against Truman’s health 
program prior to the Korean War, afterwards the evocation of such attacks took on much 
greater meaning. By the fall of 1950, the American Medical Association launched a one-
million dollars - in - one month advertising campaign aimed at countering any efforts 
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towards compulsory health insurance. Through this coordinated campaign, the AMA and 
its affiliates distributed pamphlets and flyers to businesses and individuals decrying the 
“creeping socialism” of the Truman administration. As one such advertisement put it, 
“We all know that in times of emergency, temporary controls sometimes become 
necessary – and are loyally accepted. But State Socialism is not for us!”217  
While such attacks gained steam during this period it would not deter the 
President from his commitment to advance the nation’s health.  For example, during one 
particular meeting with his principal advisers Truman argued that there would be “No 
Backing Off” from his support for a national health program.218 This sentiment was 
seconded by the liberal organization, the Committee on the Nation’s Health. 
Immediately after Truman’s declaration of national emergency, Michael Davis, a 
member of the group’s Executive Committee, offered the president and his staffers some 
thoughts on the importance of staying committed to the advancement of health. They 
hoped to reaffirm the President’s vision that   
We must look forward to meeting the health needs of the people by a 
workable nation-wide health insurance system and we must take action 
immediately in this national emergency to meet the needs created by our 
enlarged armed forces, by industrial mobilization and by the requirements 
of civilian defense. The federal government, therefore, must supply aid for 
training more doctors and allied personnel and for ensuring requisite 
public health and hospital facilities in all parts of our country.
219
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Conveying his vision to the American people, Truman declared in his 1951 State 
of the Union that although the nation was facing a “critical time” it nonetheless stood “in 
a healthy condition.” While there was no reason to fear a weakening of our condition in 
the immediate future, the country’s citizens should keep in mind that “in a long-term 
defense effort like this one, we cannot neglect the measures needed to maintain a strong 
economy and a healthy democratic society.” In calling once again for government 
insurance “against the loss of earnings through sickness, and against the high costs of 
modern medical care,” the President advocated for policies that were needed for “the long 
pull” in order to maintain a “healthy society.”220 
As before, however, Congress was unresponsive to Truman’s proposals. But as 
the Korean War dragged on, concerns over the nation’s health increased. On October 12, 
1951, one of Truman advisers, David Stowe, sent the President a memo titled 
“Administration’s Health Program.” Stowe felt compelled to write, noting that he and the 
President had, on several occasions, discussed the “desirability of taking action to push 
the Administration’s health programs” and thought he should be frank about the current 
state of affairs. Based on “general agreement among the White House staff and interested 
private persons,” it was believed that Truman’s health program, and specifically, “plans 
for financing costs of medical care,” would be an issue in the 1952 election “whether by 
choice of the Democratic Party or not.” Stowe went on to suggest that 
As a result of the effective propaganda machine of the AMA, the 
Administration’s efforts in the health field have been distorted and made 
to appear as socialistic devices. This line is almost certain to be taken 
anew against Democratic candidates in 1952. Moreover, there are many 
who believe that a comprehensive health program, including at the 
                                                 
220
 Truman, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1951. 
100 
 
minimum some plan to bring adequate medical care within the means of 
the low income groups, will prove a desirable issue in 1952, particularly in 
view of available documentation pointing out the need for some action in 
the health insurance field.
221
 
 
In response to this situation, and, “without further delay,” it was recommended 
that President Truman choose one of three “course[s] of action.” Stowe expressed that the 
first course of action, “soft pedaling the health issue,” was politically dangerous because 
it “would put the Administration on the defensive for failing to achieve more of its 
objectives in this field.” Yet, the second course of action, “an all-out effort for a 
comprehensive program,” was not well developed, and would meet “increased pressure at 
this time” given “the present situation in Congress.” In light of these two political 
challenges, the White House staff informed the President that the third course of action 
was “the most desirable.” This plan called for the appointment of a presidential 
commission that would “Initiate a comprehensive study of the health needs of the nation 
as a means of re-evaluating the Administration’s program in light of the impact of the 
mobilization effort upon civilian health requirements and long-range health 
objectives.”222  
Upon reading Stowe’s memorandum, and the draft language of the executive 
order that would establish such a commission, Truman offered a brief reply: “I think the 
best thing to do is to go ahead with it.”223 And go ahead, he did. On December 29, 1951, 
the President issued Executive Order 10317 “Establishing the President's Commission on 
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the Health Needs of the Nation.” The first line of the executive order plainly stated that 
“our Nation's strength is directly dependent upon the health of its people.” Operating on 
funds from an appropriation titled, “Emergency Fund for the President, National 
Defense,”224 the commission’s task was to study and report on a range of issues related to 
the administration’s health program. 
Invited to speak before the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of the State of 
Maryland, Chairman of the commission, Dr. Paul Magnuson, explained the impetus for 
its creation. Chairman Magnuson remembered being called up “without a word of 
warning” to meet with Truman in Washington. The President, it seems, “was deeply 
concerned with the health of the American people in these trying days of all-out 
mobilization.” Truman expressed that, prior to the defense period, “he had made certain 
proposals to bring more and better medical care to the people, but these proposals had 
precipitated an emotional argument which had clouded the issue.
225
 The President’s 
Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation was meant to simplify this issue by 
addressing the critical preparedness concerns brought on by the war.  
Yet, “emotional arguments” against the administration’s health program were not 
laid to rest. Two days after Truman’s announcement of his executive order, John W. 
Cline, president of the AMA, denounced the White House’s “brazen misuse of defense 
emergency funds for a program of political propaganda, designed to influence legislation 
and the outcome of the 1952 election.” Furthermore, Cline felt that there was “no health 
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emergency in this country to require such an investigation or to justify the use of defense 
emergency funds by such a commission.”226 
To supporters of the Truman administration, however, the president’s bold action 
was made necessary by the defense emergency. For instance, shortly after announcing his 
executive order, Truman received a letter from William Green, the President of the 
American Federation of Labor. In the letter, subsequently made public on Green’s 
request, the AFL commended the president on his appointment of the commission. 
Reflecting the dominant vision Truman had been promoting, Green and the AFL 
recognized that  
Communist aggression has thrust upon the American people a heavy 
burden of defense and rearmament. In building up the nation’s defensive 
strength, health is a foremost factor. The defense effort has made 
especially urgent the task of providing effective remedies for the grave 
problem of inadequate health services and facilities… 
 
...These are immediate steps. They constitute an indispensable part of 
America’s preparedness effort. The Commission should be in a position to 
assemble the main facts bearing upon these current emergency needs and 
provide firm recommendations for the guidance of the present session of 
Congress for action.
227
 
 
The commission’s final report was finished and presented to Congress near the 
end of Truman’s time in office. In an accompanying message, the President expressed 
great appreciation for the work of the commission and their efforts at dealing  
with one of the most valuable resources of our Nation--the health of our 
people. At a time when we are devoting our energies to strengthening our 
country in the world-wide struggle against communist aggression, we can 
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ill afford to neglect the essential needs of our people in the protection and 
improvement of their health.
228
 
 
In the end, however, Truman’s appointment of the commission was not enough to 
spur Congress into action on the administration’s health program. Together, the 
continued opposition of congressional conservatives and the lobbying efforts of the AMA 
exhibited a legislative and political firewall against any and all efforts to reform the 
nation’s system of health insurance. In the following section, I provide evidence of this 
resistance against the President’s wartime legislative push for increased aid for local 
public health units and a commitment to provide federal funds for medical education. 
 
Defense Preparedness, Public Health Funding, and Aid to Medical Education  
As I have mentioned, the mobilization effort for Korea was understood to be truly 
national in scope, involving many sectors of the home front. Given the experience of 
World War II, there were direct concerns about the state of the nation’s public health 
services and the limited number of students in medical school during the defense period. 
At the start of the Korean War, there were bills related to both issues lingering in the 
House of Representatives, having previously passed the Senate. It was under these 
circumstances that the Truman administration reiterated its previous support for increased 
funding for public health and aid to medical education, believing that both were essential 
to national preparedness.  
In his budget message for fiscal year 1952, Truman argued that “If we are to meet 
successfully the challenge that confronts this Nation, we can less than ever afford to 
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waste the good health of our people. But the present emergency makes even more 
difficult the maintenance of good health.” The proposed budget called for $25 million for 
scholarships and other aid for increasing the training of doctors, dentists, and nurses, and 
$5 million for local health services (along with $300million for grants to states for 
education).
 229
  
The federal government’s promotion of public health extended as far back as a 
1798 law providing relief for sick and disabled sailors, making it one of the oldest areas 
of responsibility.
 
By the start of Korea, the government’s role in public health had come 
to include grants in aid for general health services, education for maternal and child 
health, hospital construction, the treatment of communicable diseases such as 
tuberculosis, and sanitary inspection for food and water supplies. Unfortunately, at that 
time, about one-third of the nation lacked access to such local health facilities. Because of 
this, Truman stressed that many local communities would face “added health burdens 
arising from defense needs” and therefore needed strengthening through increased 
Federal grants.
 230
  
In regard to aid for medical education, President Truman highlighted the “chronic 
shortage” of trained health professionals.231 Or, as William Green of the AFL put it in his 
letter of praise for the President’s Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, the 
country must “prevent [this] acute shortage… from developing into a far-reaching 
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national crisis.”232 Because of this, Truman repeated his administration’s call for new 
legislation to address this problem. With bills addressing both issues stuck in the House, 
the task fell to Oscar Ewing to attempt to reinvigorate the legislative effort.  
In testimony before various congressional committees Ewing stated the 
administration’s case that increasing public health funding and providing aid for medical 
education would constitute “major step towards the strengthening of the Nation’s 
essential health defenses.”233 Speaking before the Senate Appropriations Sub-Committee 
on Labor and Federal Security, Ewing wanted it known that the push for such legislation 
was not a case of simply “tagging everything one does as an emergency or defense 
program.” While some programs may be deferred during the present defense period,  
it would be shortsighted to postpose if the postponement were to be for a 
generation. A child does not stop growing when an emergency is 
proclaimed; people do not stop being sick because there is an emergency; 
nor do human beings suspend the calendar and defer old age by virtue of 
the international situation.
234
 
 
As Ewing noted, the Federal Security Agency had played a vital role on the home 
front during World War II,
 235
 and now, as before, was committed to helping the 
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mobilization effort by surveying the state of our health defenses. He reported on the need 
for full extension of aid to local public health units, telling the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce that “Our most immediate objective is to increase our 
industrial production. This calls for an able-bodied and productive working force. During 
an emergency such as this, there is inevitably a substantial movement of workers.” Along 
with this industrial migration came communicable diseases and the like and “The best 
weapon we have for fighting these emergency health hazards is the local health 
departments, who apply their skills to [such issues, as well as,] the assurance of sanitary 
environments, and to other emergency health problems.”236 Our commitment to medical 
education was just as vital. As Ewing noted, the nation’s “rapid mobilization [was] 
intensifying the needs” of defense and the military had just “announced that by the end of 
the current fiscal year [1952] they will need a total of 17,500 physicians…”237 
Unfortunately, legislative action in these two areas of the nation’s health remained 
stalled in the House throughout the rest of the war. As I describe in the following section, 
this congressional inaction, while nothing new, was reframed as a refusal to consider 
funds for any programs deemed as “non-defense expenditures.” This general position is 
summed up best by Senator Robert Taft, who had previously supported aid for medical 
education. Taft believed the country “reached a point in the mobilization program where 
we cannot afford to undertake any new program unless its emergency character can be 
shown beyond any question of doubt.” The Senator’s stance reflected perfectly the 
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political limitations of linking domestic programs with national strength in light of the 
emerging concern over the country’s economic strength. 238 
 
The Political Economy of Strength: The Defense Effort, Partisan Politics, and the 
Limits of Linkage in Wartime Budgeting, 1951-1952  
 In his “Special Message to the Congress Reporting on the Situation in 
Korea,” President Truman asserted the need to increase the country’s “enormous 
economic strength.” However, engaging this force toward our military strength 
would “require substantial redirection of economic resources.” Additionally, the 
nation “must recognize that it will be necessary for a number of years to support 
continuing defense expenditures.”239  
Less than five years removed from demobilization, the nation once again found 
itself in the throes of an immense rearmament phase and Truman faced the wartime 
dilemma of weighing defense spending vs. social spending, guns vs. butter (see table 
4.1). What became politically problematic was Truman’s claim, in declaring a national 
emergency, that nonmilitary expenditures be reduced to a minimum so that the Federal 
budget could “give effective support to the defense effort.”240 What emerged was a 
political space upon which the debate over what constituted “nonmilitary expenditures” 
and what was “vital to the defense effort” became contested. In this manner the President 
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engaged a conservative bloc in the 82
nd
 “National Defense” Congress intent on cutting 
any and all domestic expenditures they could during the Korean defense effort. 
Moreover, the political economy of the rearmament period re-militarized the vision of 
national strength, leading to an emphasis on our military and economic strength at the 
expense of our internal strength. 
 
Table 4.1. Truman Proposed Budget 
 FY1952 FY1953 
Defense and International Affairs $48.9 
billion 
$60.6 
billion 
Economic (finance, commerce, labor, transportation, communication, 
natural resources, and agriculture) 
$7.4 
billion 
$6.7 
billion 
Social Welfare $7.9 
billion 
$8.7 
billion 
Total (including additional interest payments, governmental operating 
costs, etc) 
$71.5 
billion 
$85.4 
billion 
         
 
Congressional Conservatives and the Debate over “Non-Defense Expenditures” 
Surveying the shifting political landscape in early 1951, Cabell Phillips of the 
New York Times noted the likelihood that “Each item on the [administration’s] domestic 
program… will be subjected to the coldy realistic test, ‘Is this necessary?’”241 In the same 
vein, Frank R. Kent, writing for The Los Angeles Times, opined that President Truman 
would have to offer “concrete assurances” to the people, most importantly, that “no 
unnecessary dollars will be spent for domestic purposes.” For Kent, there could be 
nothing worse for the nation’s preparedness than to fail to make the necessary sacrifices 
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for our defenses. In the upcoming budget and appropriations negotiations, “No patriotic 
man in either party wants to be…reluctant about the cost of carrying the Korean conflict 
to a complete victory against the Soviet-encouraged North Korean aggression.”242 
Unfortunately, as former Truman aide Ken Hechler recalled, while there was an “early 
semblance of national unity” during this defense period, it “later crumbled in the face of 
Republican attacks on ‘Mr. Truman’s War.’”243 In part, the attacks were drawn along 
contestable lines of what was, and was not, essential spending in the defense effort.  
For instance, during the initial start of the war and the accompanying escalation in 
military expenditures, Senator Harry Byrd (D-WV), the Chairman of the Joint Committee 
on Reduction of Non-essential Federal Expenditures, demanded that, “With a war on our 
hands,…[domestic expenditures] must be cut unless we are going to spend ourselves into 
the kind of bankruptcy the Russians are counting on.”244 Chairman Byrd’s sentiment 
reflected the broader stance of the conservative coalition in Congress.  
Only weeks into the war, the Truman administration was already feeling the 
pressure from this bloc. In an August 1950 cabinet discussion regarding the relationship 
between regulatory agencies, the mobilization effort, and Congressional politics, one 
Truman adviser remarked that “It is amazing how these agencies have been gutted by 
Congress by reductions in appropriations.” To this notion, Stuart Symington, Chairman 
of the National Security Resources Board, seconded, arguing that “Congress should be 
reminded that some of these agencies are participating in war effort and that 
Congressional cuts are impeding the war effort.” Truman was blunt about his perspective 
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on the issue; as he saw it, “This action by congress is a deliberate and planned program of 
the Right Wing Democrats and the Republicans.”245 
In January of 1951, Truman presented his administration’s $71.5 billion budget 
for fiscal year 1952, a budget drawn up “for our national security in a period of grave 
danger.” As a whole, “the requirements of national security [were] reflected in every 
major function,” including those domestic   
expenditures for programs which will maintain and develop our national 
strength over the long run, keeping in mind that the present emergency 
may be of long duration and we must therefore be prepared for crises in 
the more distant as well as in the immediate future.
246
 
 
Those domestic programs that help “maintain and develop our national strength” 
included housing and community development, education and general research, social 
security, welfare and health. Altogether, the administration’s proposal on this set of 
domestic expenditures totaled $7.9 billion, comprising about 11% of the total budget. As 
Truman noted, this was a reduction of close to one billion dollars from the current year’s 
projections. Unfortunately, such a reduction was not enough for the conservative bloc in 
Congress. 
Summarizing the general reaction of conservatives to the President’s proposed 
budget, The New York Times reported a shared belief that “the Fair Deal, instead of being 
relegated to the background for the emergency, had been let in at the back door to join in 
the expenditure of defense billions.” According to Senator Byrd, President Truman 
“failed to keep his pledge” on the reduction of non-defense spending by presenting a 
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budget that “represents the very height of fiscal irresponsibility.” House Republican 
leaders made it clear that they intended “to scrutinize every defense and nondefense item 
that is sought. We are agreed that military security is the first consideration. We are in 
disagreement with the Administration that ‘spending-as-usual’ on nondefense items must 
continue.” From their perspective, Truman’s assertion that domestic programs were 
requisite for national strength was just a plea for expenditures “brazenly sought amid 
trumpet calls for stronger national defense.”247 
However, as I have illustrated above, this linkage was more than a rhetorical ploy. 
Throughout the Truman administration, the issue of what constituted “non-defense 
expenditures” was contemplated and debated. For example, Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget, Frederick Lawton discussed this exact issue while going over the 
administration’s proposed $85 billion 1953 fiscal year budget. Of that amount less than 
$10 billion was to go toward “the so-called, ‘non-defense’ and ‘non-essential’ activities 
of the Government we are urged so often to cut.” Lawton went on to ask: 
But what is non-defense and what is non-essential? Defense housing? The 
Coast Guard? The FBI? Forest protection and management? The Post 
Office? Undoubtedly, many regular governmental activities could be 
abandoned or severely curtailed in all out war effort. But what about the 
long pull? Can we afford to abandon or cripple some of these programs 
during a prolonged defense effort?... As you can see the problem of 
WHAT and WHERE to cut is not an easy one?
248
 
 
Striking a similar note, a working group of the Council of Economic Advisers 
expressed an opinion that “[certain] programs, it should be recognized, are equally 
essential for defense and for nondefense purposes.” The group was tasked with surveying 
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proposed development and welfare programs during the ongoing defense effort. 
According to their memo on the subject, the government 
should not feel that simply because budget categories separate defense 
from other expenditures, we are therefore barred from other approaches 
which recognize that most so-called nondefense development programs 
are vital to long-range security. A particular…public health item…, may, 
for example, be more necessary for defense than a particular military 
expenditure.”249 
For Truman and his administration, the importance of their domestic programs to 
the ongoing defense effort was undeniable. However, the debate about defense and non-
defense expenditures was particularly pronounced given what Korea came to symbolize 
about the long-term need for military strength. While the immediate concern was for a 
successful mobilization effort for the Korean War, a more daunting task was to 
effectively build the economic strength needed for the Cold War. 
 
Economic Strength, “the Guns and Butter Approach,” and LBJ’s Preparedness 
Subcommittee 
 
This shifting politics in the vision of ‘national strength’ is captured perfectly by 
the debate over the guns-and-butter approach of Truman’s rearmament program. The 
most important assumption made by those in the administration was that the extent of the 
defense mobilization period was uncertain and, therefore, the government should manage 
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to provide enough defense materials (guns) without disrupting the civilian economy 
(butter). For instance, CEA Chairman Leon Keyserling, writing in Opportunity magazine, 
explained how the current mobilization period differed from that of World War II and 
what implications this had for the political economy of wartime. For starters, the prior 
war had been “an all-out war” and in such “a short race, you have to reach your 
maximum strength very quickly.” Previously, this strength had been attained by “drawing 
down” our industrial strength and civilian strength, which had a potential “weakening 
[effect] in the long run.” But our current mobilization effort was different. The nation was 
“not in a short spurt…[but] a long, hard pull.” Keyserling went on to note what this 
“long-pull” meant for the nation’s economic policy and our various forms of strength. 
Given the “indefinite nature” of defense mobilization, we should be “very much more 
careful of the balance among our industrial strength and our military strength and our 
civilian strength” than we were at the onset of World War II.250 
However, the administration’s guns-and-butter approach came to be criticized by 
the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Preparedness and its Chairman, Lyndon B. 
Johnson (D-TX), who would be on the other end of such criticism as President himself 
fifteen years later. Tasked with investigating the rearmament program, the committee 
pointed to a “lack of sense of urgency” among the chief planners of the defense program, 
implicitly referring to President Truman and Charles Wilson, Director of the Office of 
Defense Mobilization. As stated in a committee report filed in March of 1952, to date, the 
mobilization efforts had supplied “a small number of guns and a great amount of butter, 
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with a considerable number of lollipops thrown in.”251 This general line of criticism 
particularly irked President Truman, who had led his own investigation of the defense 
process during World War II, for which he was widely respected and was a significant 
factor for why he was originally chosen to be Roosevelt’s vice presidential nominee.252  
In response to Johnson and the committee, Keyserling and the Council of 
Economic Advisers sided with ODM and the administration’s approach. They reiterated 
the administration’s emphasis on the long-pull, arguing that “In a race which promises to 
be more a marathon than a sprint, good diets, health shelter education recreation and the 
good morale that depends upon all of these, are essential for endurance in our national 
security effort…Striking a balance between our needs in these respects and for primary 
defense is a vital problem.”253  
To efficiently strike that balance, Truman proposed increasing taxes to help pay 
for the defense effort without having to unnecessarily cut into domestic programs that 
were vital to the defense effort, thus protecting butter. However, congressional 
conservatives successfully fought to limit the scope of the taxes, thereby using a 
reduction in non-defense expenditures in order to pay for defense.
254
  
As the Republican presidential nominee in 1952, General Eisenhower attacked 
Truman’s guns-and-butter approach in an effort to paint the Democrats and their 
nominee, Adlai Stevenson, with the same wide tax-increasing brush. Speaking to 
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supporters in Los Angeles, Candidate Eisenhower argued that “our security and progress 
in well-being have only one source; a strong economy that is growing daily in strength.” 
To further unleash that strength, the government needed to “take the hobbles off 
American enterprise...[and] the blinders off American vision.”255 
Truman fired back at the General while making a campaign pitch for Stevenson 
by portraying Eisenhower and the Republicans as making “political capital” with a 
“deceitful implication” about the usefulness of the administration’s tax program. As he 
saw it, Eisenhower was trying “to win votes by asserting that the standard of living in this 
country” had stagnated due to the defense taxes, but as Truman noted, Eisenhower 
himself “was a strong supporter of the defense program.”   Such claims, flew in the face 
of the reality that, “By common consent, including the consent of both parties in the 
Congress,” the government had “given up some of our ‘butter’ for ‘guns’” during the 
present emergency.
256
 
  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how President Truman and his administration 
rearticulated their vision that the earlier domestic objectives of the Fair Deal should not 
be abandoned because the nation once again faced war. Rather, building from the belief 
that our nation drew great strength from the health and welfare of our people, they 
asserted a wartime commitment to build strength at home. This manifested itself through 
a renewed push for developing the president’s health program and striking a balance 
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between the need for national defense and the need for domestic spending. Throughout 
the war, however, this vision of national strength was continually challenged by a 
conservative bloc in Congress and was significantly constrained by the necessity of 
building up our military and economic strength. 
While very little of the Fair Deal agenda was achieved during the war, Truman’s 
linkage of social welfare and health as vital to the strength of the nation was incredibly 
important for future political developments. Many scholars have noted the significance of 
Truman’s administration in the maintenance of the New Deal. What is often overlooked 
though is how the Korean War, rather than sinking the liberal agenda, provided a space in 
which Truman could reimagine the cause of liberalism. Invoking the experience of World 
War II, and the shared mission of Roosevelt, Truman and others understood the 
importance of social progress to both the defense mobilization effort and the reconversion 
back to peacetime. 
What is more, some of the most critical domestic policies advocated by the 
Truman administration came to fruition less than twenty years later as part of the Great 
Society and the War on Poverty, from Medicare, Medicaid, and federal aid for education. 
After all, in his budget message for fiscal year 1953, Truman hoped that one day we 
would “cast off the heavy burden of armaments and devote our full energies to fighting 
the only war in which all mankind can be victorious--the war against poverty, disease, 
and human misery.”257 
 Truman’s metaphor of a “war against poverty” speaks to another political 
development from this era: the emerging institutionalization of presidential invocations of 
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nationalism, war, and strength. As I have shown in chapter 1, previous presidents have 
articulated such visions, yet Truman was the first to govern in the shadow of the warfare 
state. The institutions of national security and the worrisome international context 
provided a very real conviction to such discourse. This development did not go unnoticed 
at the time. In reading over a draft of Truman’s 1952 State of the Union, Harold Enarson, 
one of the President’s advisers, criticized the speech’s constant use of “strength.” While 
the term only appeared 13 times, Enarson complained that invoking it “30 or 40” times 
was problematic, and potentially counterproductive. He found  
such repetition tiresome but probably that’s because I have grave doubts 
about the policy of ‘strength.’ The American people are, willy nilly, seeing 
‘strength’ as A-bombs, Napalm, tanks and guns. I don’t see how a 
Christian nation can continue to place reliance in its strength – in physical 
power—and retain its integrity or even its supremacy. If we live by power, 
we shall die by power.
258
 
 
While Enarson was specifically criticizing the nation’s vision of military strength, 
his point suggests that the line was becoming indistinguishable to the American public. 
As Michael Hogan has argued, the increasing concern with this conception of strength 
allowed congressional conservatives to carry out an “assault on New Deal social 
programs and on the notion that such programs were actually essential, not only to the 
country’s democratic mission but also to its long-term military strength.”259 As I show in 
the following chapter, President Eisenhower would utilize a vision of national strength 
that emphasized military and economic strength to pursue his agenda of reigning in the 
budget and promoting national security. 
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CHAPTER V 
SECURITY, ECONOMY, AND STRENGTH: 
EISENHOWER, THE COLD WAR, AND NEW DEAL LIBERALISM 
 
In the 1956 presidential election, President Dwight Eisenhower faced off once 
more against Adlai Stevenson, just as he had in 1952. But unlike the prior campaign the 
specter of the Korean War was a non-factor. Instead, what took its place was the question 
of which candidate could best maintain peace while also exhibiting the leadership 
qualities needed to confront the potential challenges that lay ahead in the Cold War. 
Studies of Eisenhower’s rhetoric during the 1956 campaign show that the President 
continually refuted claims -- made by Stevenson and the opposition -- about his 
commitment to peace. Turning the tables, Eisenhower emphasized Governor Stevenson’s 
own lack of the “wisdom and strength” required of a Commander-in-Chief. In this 
manner, Eisenhower repeatedly implied “that anyone who would undermine national 
strength was not wise enough to lead the country.”260  
 Four years later, on the morning after his Farewell Address -- most notable for its 
warning of the “military-industrial complex” -- Eisenhower spoke at length about the 
importance of strength as it related to his vision of the nation. Asked at his final news 
conference to “sum up for us your idea of what kind of United States you would like your 
grandchildren to live in,” Eisenhower expected that they, and all Americans, would be 
living  
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in a peaceful world…enjoying all of the privileges and carrying forward 
all the responsibilities envisioned for the good citizen of the United States, 
and this means among other things the effort always to raise the standards 
of our people in their spiritual,…intellectual,…[and] economic strength. 
That’s what I would like to see them have.261  
 
As Eisenhower recalled in his memoirs, the answer he gave to journalists that 
morning “summed up all [he’d] been trying to do for eight years” as President of the 
United States.
262
  
Upon taking office, Eisenhower inherited the Korean War, the Truman defense 
budget, and a Cold War consensus that stressed the criticalness of ensuring a stout 
national security and defense program.
263
 Furthermore, his own programmatic agenda 
reflected an ambitious commitment to international affairs. As a five-star general and 
former Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, Eisenhower was most comfortable in 
his leadership position atop the warfare state. As summed up by one of his former 
advisors, it was in the area of foreign policy that the President “knew exactly what he 
believed and where he was going. In the domestic arena, however, he was admittedly 
inexperienced.”264 However, according to political scientist Fred Greenstein, Eisenhower 
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strategically shunned the public and domestic face of the office, utilizing instead a 
“hidden-hand” style of leadership that made him appear apolitical.265 
In contrast to his objectives in defense and foreign policy, Eisenhower had a much 
less ambitious domestic agenda. Elected as a moderate Republican, he advocated a 
philosophy of governing that sought moderation and balance which has come to be 
known as “the middle way.”266 The President found such a position useful at times, 
having come to office amid the height of the New Deal Democratic political order.
267
 In 
all but the first two years of his presidency, he faced a Democratically-led Congress that, 
while not entirely cohesive in its stance on New Deal liberalism, to be sure, had 
prominent leaders who were more or less intent on entrenching the social welfare policies 
of the 1930s and 1940s.
 268
 
For President Eisenhower, there was an obvious interconnection between the 
politics of national security and domestic policy; yet, this linkage served to advance the 
former general’s primacy of foreign affairs and defense policy on the national agenda. It 
should not be at all surprising that Eisenhower’s top priority would be in the realm of 
national security and defense. While much has been written on the foreign and defense 
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policies of the first Cold War Republican,
269
 there is little that appreciates how 
Eisenhower’s disposition towards, and concern for, such issues shaped his domestic 
political and policy leadership. Moreover, scholars fail to explain how he strove to 
navigate their often intersecting political commitments.  
As I argue in this chapter, Eisenhower articulated a vision of national strength that 
fused his ideological and programmatic objectives in both foreign and domestic policy, 
just as FDR and Truman had done during their presidencies. Eisenhower’s dedication to 
providing and ensuring strength was more than a simple rhetorical ploy meant to stir up 
patriotic passions about American greatness. As evidence, the chapter begins by detailing 
the various ideological commitments that made up this vision: none more significant than 
the administration’s perspective on the stakes of the Cold War and the need to ensure the 
nation’s security. I then explain how this vision was realized in the budgetary program 
and policy agenda pursued in the first few years of Eisenhower’s presidency. The chapter 
then turns to a significant moment for the Eisenhower administration and its agenda: the 
launch of the Sputnik satellites. In the wake of the Sputnik crisis of 1957-1958, a 
legislative breakthrough in the field of federal aid for education demonstrates the reach of 
national strength as a shared political vision. Unfortunately for the President, the Sputnik 
crisis also exposed the limits of this vision, particularly Eisenhower’s soundness in 
linking the concepts of economy and security. What emerged was a sharp turn towards 
partisanship and the success of rival Democrats in exploiting the politics of national 
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strength, as highlighted in the budget battles of the late 1950s and the 1960 presidential 
election. 
 
Eisenhower’s Vision of National Strength: The Cold War Linkage of Economy, 
Security, and the National Interest 
In this section of the chapter, I briefly describe the themes which encompassed 
President Eisenhower’s vision of national strength. First, was a prevailing view that the 
politics of the Cold War framed domestic policy. Second, this vision of the Cold War 
required economic strength and security founded on a sound budget and economy. Third, 
the achievement of strength through security and economy should be a bi-partisan 
endeavor and certain governmental actions were necessary to promote the national 
interest. 
Time and again, Eisenhower was known to contemplate how best to square his 
Cold War defense and foreign policy commitments with a programmatic domestic 
agenda that emphasized the need for balance and moderation of federal responsibility and 
spending. For instance, early in his first administration the president sat down for an 
interview with journalist Merriman Smith and was questioned about the current trajectory 
of his administration’s program. As reported by his secretary, Eisenhower emphasized 
“that the great problem of the day [will be] foreign. Here it is a thing which I have lived, I 
have spent many of my years abroad. I believe we have got to do certain 
things…Everything you do at home is colored by the foreign picture.” The President 
continued,  
[n]ow at home your great object is to be stronger in every way in order to 
carry out that work abroad in confidence, so that people will follow along. 
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So all of your work, on farm program, on labor and management, and all 
of the rest of the things you do, is to keep as good a (balance?) as you can, 
into the normal economic life of this nation.
270
  
 
Eisenhower would relay a similar outlook almost a year later while discussing his 
“philosophy” and “platform” with a group of advertising executives who sought to 
“brand” Eisenhower’s politics. Eisenhower reiterated that foreign policy framed his 
program. As found in a memorandum of his meeting with the ad men, the President noted 
that one reason he “talked so much about the foreign situation” was because “every 
foreign problem colors every domestic situation.”271 
Quite obviously the “foreign problem” of the day which “colored” Eisenhower’s 
approach to domestic policy and politics was the Cold War and the United States’ 
perceived strength relative to the Soviet Union. Central to this concern over strength was 
the prevailing view, established during the Truman administration, and held by elites and 
the public alike, that the Cold War was a long, drawn out battle between two military and 
economic powers. In this way, the Eisenhower administration’s perspective on national 
security and defense policy was to be calculated in years, not months. This meant 
establishing a defense and security program that, as Eisenhower put it “can be carried 
steadily, consistently, and progressively.” Reiterating this view during a cabinet meeting, 
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Eisenhower once declared that “We’re not in a moment of danger, we’re in an Age of 
Danger.”272  
In the ‘Afterthoughts’ section of his memoirs, Eisenhower went on at great length 
about his “observations” on the all-encompassing nature of the Cold War. As he and his 
administration understood, Communists were prone to think  
in terms of decades and generations, rather than merely in months or 
years. They hope that over the long term, selfishness, fear, or complacency 
will cause us to fail to sustain essential internal balance…thus bringing 
about a deterioration of the strength and resolute leadership which now 
faces them. If this should occur, the consequences for us would be 
disastrous. We, therefore, must likewise think in terms of decades and 
generations. Long-sustained military power, economic health, moral and 
intellectual vitality, dependable Free World cooperation, eternal vigilance, 
and informed and resolute leadership – these are the ingredients of 
ultimate success (emphasis added).
273
 
 
The “selfishness, fear [and] complacency” that Eisenhower worried would 
bring about “a deterioration of [our] strength and resolute leadership” concerned, 
first and foremost, the economic health of the federal budget.
274
 
 The health of the federal budget preoccupied the political commitments of 
President Eisenhower. As he once noted to Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, 
Eisenhower felt that “nothing [was] more necessary in our domestic affairs than to 
examine, each day, our economy, as well as our government receipts and expenditures, 
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and to act prudently.”275 At the heart of his cautious approach to the budget was the fear 
that profligate spending was a danger to the economy and could severely weaken the 
strength of our economic warfare being waged against the Soviet Union. Early in his 
administration, Eisenhower summed up this relationship between national security and 
the economy when he warned fellow Republicans that there was a “dual threat facing the 
United States: the external threat of Communism and the internal threat of a weakened 
economy.”276 Or, as he was known to pronounce loudly and often, “There is no defense 
for any country that busts its own economy.”277 
Reflecting on this “delicately balanced and complex problem” in his 
memoirs, Eisenhower wrote that “the security of a nation depends upon a 
balanced strength comprised of morale, economic productivity, and military 
power (emphasis added).” While there is always a need for “an adequate defense” 
we must be vigilant that “every arms dollar we spend above adequacy has a long-
term weakening effect upon the nation and its security.”278 
While a commitment to economic strength may have been central to the 
Eisenhower administration’s construction of national security, the tenets of Cold 
War ideology often led to a more encompassing perspective on security and 
strength that went beyond traditional views of defense and military policy.  
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In addition to the indefinite length of the Cold War, the administration’s thinking 
was framed by the perception that the eventual victor would hold more than just a 
military advantage. While military expenditures obviously reflected a traditional defense 
posture, Eisenhower felt “there [was] great importance attached to the economic and 
spiritual values in the totality of our posture rather than merely to defense.”279  
Often, achieving a total posture meant advancing certain initiatives that 
were in the national interest. This is illuminated well in a letter Eisenhower sent to 
GOP House Leader Charles Halleck after a meeting of legislative leaders.  In his 
view, the President felt “[we] must by all means quickly show our readiness to 
cooperate in every decent way, and particularly in those areas where bipartisan 
action is vital to the national interest.”280 To fully appreciate the extent to which 
Eisenhower was committed to ensuring strength and promoting the national 
interest, we can turn to the budgetary and programmatic objectives he sought. The 
following sections of the chapter explore critical moments and dynamics which 
are evidence of the president’s attempts to realize his vision of national strength.  
 
“The Patriot Today Is the Fellow Who Can Do the Job with Less Money:” 
Budgeting for the Cold War and the Quest for Economic Strength, 1953-1957 
As FDR and Truman before him, Eisenhower was faced with the challenge of 
weighing defense spending with spending on domestic initiatives. But unlike FDR and 
Truman, Eisenhower’s fiscal conservatism heavily influenced his perspective on the 
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linkage between national security and budgetary policy which led him to consistently 
prioritize guns over butter.   So, where Truman saw social spending and defense spending 
as interrelated, Eisenhower saw too much of either as weakening our national strength, 
and, ultimately, a threat to our national security. It was in the nation’s interest, and the 
patriotic thing to do, to focus on defense spending at the expense of social spending.  
 
Economic Warfare, the Truman Budget, and Congressional Conservatives 
In the fall of 1954, Roland Hughes,  Director of the Bureau of the Budget, sent 
President Eisenhower a memo with some general thoughts on the administration’s 
economic outlook vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In his view, Hughes felt that  
[i]f we accept the hypothesis that general war is not imminent our basic 
problem is one of avoiding precipitous actions which, while strengthening 
us temporarily, so over extend us as seriously to weaken our long-term 
strength. Our objectives, as you have stated so clearly in your speeches, 
must be to maintain a continuing posture of strength both militarily and 
economically, with concomitant moral and spiritual stamina. We may, of 
course, expect irritations and provocations in many forms which will try 
us to the utmost while we are maintaining such strength (emphasis added). 
 
The immediate “irritations and provocations” that tried the Eisenhower 
administration’s maintenance of national economic strength in its early years were first 
and foremost centered around the inheritance of the Korean War and Truman’s enlarged 
defense budget. In his final year, President Truman had submitted a $79 billion federal 
budget for the fiscal year 1954, which included a projected $10 billion deficit. Finding 
himself in this budgetary straitjacket upon taking office, Eisenhower made clear his 
desire to roll-back the defense budget in his first State of the Union address to Congress.  
Given his views on the necessity of economic warfare towards victory in the Cold War 
the President warned that “[to] amass military power without regard to our economic 
128 
 
capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting 
another.”281  
The political challenge that Eisenhower faced regarding the inheritance of 
Truman’s 1954 fiscal year budget is perfectly evidenced by a heated exchange between 
the President, Treasury Secretary Humphrey, and ‘Mr. Conservative,’ Senator Robert H. 
Taft (R-OH). During his presentation about the state of the U.S. economy, Humphrey 
opined that not much could be done in the following months given the administration’s 
“inheritance” of its predecessor’s budget.  As he put it to the present group of Republican 
leaders, the current budget amounted to “a tremendous machine all geared up” and it 
would be quite the challenge to halt its momentum.
282
 Going on, however, the Secretary 
noted to those in the room responsible for negotiating the budget that they “cannot act 
fast on cuts which involve national security… [but they can] move fast on cutting out 
domestic programs with no fear of endangering national security.”283  
For his part, Senator Taft was none too happy with the lack of movement on 
decreasing military spending and the political hit that the Republicans could take for such 
resistance. As reported by Eisenhower’s legislative aid, Taft argued that the “[n]et result 
as far as public is concerned is that we haven’t moved an inch from the Truman program 
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– Democrats will exploit it.”284 Congressmen Taber, Bridges, and Budget Director Dodge 
agreed that it would be “good politics” to “operate against the Truman budget” by 
drastically reducing spending. Quick to respond, President Eisenhower noted “that 
national security must be the fundamental concern, and that no one should let the budget-
cutting principle override national security.”285 In the end, the administration reduced 
Truman’s fiscal year 1954 budget by $5 billion and reduced national security 
appropriations by $5.2 billion (see Chart 5.1).  
While Eisenhower faced scrutiny from some conservative politicians who hoped 
to see the defense budget slashed, he simultaneously confronted calls from other 
lawmakers and some in the military who demanded an increase to the amount of defense 
spending. Eisenhower could be terribly blunt in his view of the hypocrisy of such critics 
and their demands for a larger defense budget, as evidenced during a discussion with 
Republican legislative leaders early in his first term. When it came time to shift the 
meeting’s agenda to the topic of defense spending, “[t]he President commented, 
regarding Congressional proponents of heavy defense spending that he would tolerate 
these men if they were willing and courageous enough to cut domestic programs in order 
to pay for the larger defense they wanted.”286 Striking a similar note a few years later, 
Eisenhower argued that he wanted “to see the Defense Department cut down to [a] 
spartan basis. But he admitted that people he had known all his life were asking for more 
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and more.” Concluding his remarks, the President wanted it known that as far as he was 
concerned “the patriot today is the fellow who can do the job with less money.”287  
 
Chart 5.1. Eisenhower Proposed Defense Spending 
 
 
The Defense Program, Economic Strength, and Increased Spending 
In a December 1956 legislative meeting Eisenhower had to justify why the 
defense budget was higher than in had been in 1953. The President noted that, while 
some policy-makers felt that the defense budget could get down to $34 billion, the agreed 
upon amount of $38 billion ($2.5 billion of which was for foreign aid via the Mutual 
Security program) reflected the increasing cost to technology. He had actually 
recommended $39.5 billion but Congress had cut $1.5 billion out. Regardless, 
Eisenhower “felt that this higher level should certainly suffice, and that it must be 
remembered that national security depends upon basic economic strength as well as guns, 
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tanks, and planes, despite contrary assertions by demagogues,” concluding that “the 
nation could choke itself to death with military force as well as protect itself.”288  
At a bipartisan meeting of congressional leaders in January of 1957, the President 
remarked that “we as a government must not be competing for any more of the dollars 
than is absolutely necessary.” While there were those on both sides of the aisle and within 
his own administration who demanded more spending, he felt that the legislative leaders 
could all agree “in recognizing the importance to America of economic, spiritual, and 
moral strength as well as military strength, and that [the purposed budget] is as good a 
point of compromise as is possible in this free Nation.”289 
While Eisenhower could calm fellow Republicans and administration officials 
behind closed doors, it was another thing to convey this message to the American people. 
At a press conference on the fiscal 1958 budget, Director George Humphrey called for 
cuts in the budget the day it was sent to Congress. While considered a slip of the lips, 
Humphrey’s remark that the country could face “a depression that will curl your hair” 
became fodder for Old Guard Republicans bent on slashing domestic programs. In a 
televised address on May 14
th, the President argued that “the yardstick of national 
interest” was most important. “No great reductions [in the budget were] possible… unless 
Congress eliminates or curtails existing Federal programs, or unless all of us demand less 
service from the government, or unless we are willing to gamble with the safety of our 
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country.” Sacrifice “of our sons, our families, our homes and our cities to our own 
shortsightedness.”290  
Painted as a New Dealer, Eisenhower rebuked the criticism by arguing that the 
necessity of budgeting for social programs had “now become accepted in our civilization 
as normal, that is the provision of social security, unemployment insurance, health 
research by the Government, assistance where States and individuals are unable to do 
things for themselves.”291 
 
The “Middle-Way” Philosophy, New Deal Liberalism, and the National Interest 
As mentioned above, Eisenhower came to office with a relatively modest 
domestic agenda. Interestingly, as a fiscal conservative and general opponent of the 
“socialistic” measures of the 1930s and 1940s, Eisenhower governed over the 
entrenchment, rather than the retrenchment, of the New Deal. In part, this reflected the 
domestic political environment of divided government in which Eisenhower had to 
govern. But, in another sense, it reflected his “Middle-Way” philosophy and his vision of 
national strength. In an often cited quote, Eisenhower once wrote his brother, Milton, that 
“[s]hould any political party attempt to abolish social security and eliminate labor laws 
and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history.”292 
Additionally, Eisenhower was known to shrug off criticism as a New Dealer, noting on 
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one occasion that “the Administration had already done a lot of things for which it was 
being called ‘New Dealish,’ despite the fact those things were justified…”293 
In general, however, President Eisenhower adhered to Lincoln’s definition 
of the role of government: “The legitimate object of Government is to do for a 
community of people whatever they need to have done, but cannot do at all, or 
cannot so well do for themselves – in their separate and individual capacities.”294 
Given the ideological perspective of the Cold War as an all-encompassing war, 
Eisenhower was prone to seeing governmental action in some policy areas as 
necessary for the national interest. More specifically, it was in areas linked to 
defense and security policy that Eisenhower saw the federal government playing a 
role. In this manner, his preoccupation with national security and a commitment 
to national strength was often an area of refuge under such domestic political 
conditions. Historian H.W. Brands has referred to the particular aspect of 
Eisenhower’s philosophy in terms of “liberalism-as-national security.”295 
Take for instance, the Interstate and Defense Highway System created by 
an act of Congress in 1956. Recounting this behemoth undertaking by the federal 
government, Eisenhower reflected on the fact that “motorists by the millions 
would read a primary purpose in the signs that sprout up alongside the pavement: 
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‘In the event of an enemy attack…’”296 As reported in the unofficial minutes of a 
meeting with GOP legislative leaders in June 1955, Eisenhower was quite 
“discouraged… that such vital bills as those for highways and schools were turned 
into such political footballs.” The President had “hoped for a little more 
patriotism and public spirit on necessities.”297 Better yet, echoing President 
Truman’s linkage of public health and national defense, Eisenhower advocated 
for new federal health programs in 1955 arguing that “we as a people are guilty 
not only of neglect of human suffering but also of wasting our national 
strength.”298 
As Mary Dudziak contends, civil rights were another area where the 
national interest was at stake in the eyes of the President. While Eisenhower’s 
overall record on civil rights is questionable, he did act, in the name of national 
security, to give support to civil rights in areas directly under federal control and 
when it was appropriate for the executive to enforce rulings of the federal 
courts.
299
 Consider his radio address on the situation in Little Rock, Arkansas. 
At a time when we face grave situations abroad because of the hatred that 
Communism bears toward a system of government based on human rights, 
it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the 
prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the 
world. Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it everywhere 
to misrepresent our whole nation. We are portrayed as a violator of those 
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standards of conduct which the peoples of the world united to proclaim in 
the Charter of the United Nations (emphasis added).
300
 
 
Alongside viewing such issues as related to the nation’s strength and 
security, President Eisenhower felt that bipartisan cooperation was necessary for 
their support. He often stressed “the need for bipartisanship in matters of foreign 
affairs and national security” during meetings with legislative leaders from both 
sides of the aisle.
301
 Therefore, in the light of defense and security, he could try to 
mobilize political support for domestic issues that otherwise would be viewed as 
partisan objectives. After meeting with a group of legislative leaders across both 
parties, the President expressed that while they may treat each other as “legitimate 
political targets at times” there were certain subjects that they must come together 
for is we are “to do something for the country.”302 Outside of federal aid to 
education, which I describe in a later section, his vision of national strength and 
the linkage of domestic policy, security, and the national interest would begin to 
quickly crumble in the face of a Soviet technological feat.  
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Sputnik, Security, and Presidential Agenda-Setting 
In October of 1957, the USSR successfully launched the first satellite into space, 
thus beginning the age of Sputnik. While concerns of national security and defense had 
always held priority on President Eisenhower’s agenda, the launch of Sputnik became a 
significant focusing event for the administration (and also the nation, thanks in large part 
to the media). One of the President’s fellow Republicans called the satellite “the most 
serious challenge to us since the end of World War II.”303  Eisenhower’s presidential 
opponent in both 1952 and 1956, Adlai Stevenson, saw Sputnik as a development worth 
taking seriously, arguing that there was “nothing wrong in acknowledging Russia’s 
accomplishment. But I see a great deal wrong with kidding ourselves. Not just our pride 
but our security is at stake.”304 As evidenced by Stevenson’s argument, the launch of 
Sputnik, and the subsequent launch of Sputnik II, thrust an even larger spotlight on the 
Eisenhower administration’s defense program and its perceived success in promoting 
national security. What is more, the conceptualization and discursive boundaries of the 
President’s vision of national strength were more readily contestable by administration 
opponents. Sensing this potential challenge, Eisenhower, his staff, and administration 
officials sought to reiterate their commitment to national security. 
Speaking at the National Fund for Medical Education in New York, only days 
after Sputnik’s launch, Eisenhower recognized the need for his administration to address 
the potential debate over the level and manner of our nation’s security. In addition, he 
foresaw the need to protect against any weakening of our national strength which was 
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threatened by Sputnik and an ongoing recession. As he put it to the audience that night, in 
an effort to help Americans banish their “morbid pessimism” about the economic and 
defense situation the President announced a planned set of speeches that would “set out in 
proper perspective the truth and facts of these matters”; the ‘matters’ to which 
Eisenhower referred were “the methods of raising the level of our achievement in 
science, the character and power of our defense and economy, and our responsibilities 
abroad.”305 Such matters were “very much in [his] mind and heart.” Continuing, he 
stressed his administration’s commitment to  
[t]he continuing endeavor and progress of our people in fields of scientific 
achievement and methods of attaining even greater achievement; our 
responsibilities and our opportunities abroad; the strength and great 
capacity of our domestic economy; the character and power of our defense 
program, and the right of our people to confidence in these strengths.”306 
 
Immediately thereafter Eisenhower’s staff began preparations for what would 
come to be called the ‘Science and Security’ speech. Throughout the administration, 
members gave their two cents on how the President should respond. The launch of 
Sputnik primarily symbolized the Soviets’ lead in the Space Race and their broader 
developments in science and technology.  Expanding upon this image of the conflict, the 
Director of the National Science Foundation, Alan Waterman, urged the president to “lay 
emphasis [to the American people] upon the fact that this is more than a military 
conflict.” As such, Waterman felt that “whether a gun is fired or not” the USSR was “out 
to capture the world by preeminence in science and technology… by the economic 
strength which this policy will produce.” It was imperative that Americans appreciate that 
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“[t]his is a cold war in which we may be frozen out unless we show the determination, of 
which an aroused free people are capable.”307 
The initial outlines and drafts of the speech, written by Arthur Larson, 
Eisenhower’s chief speechwriter at the time, challenged the administration to answer 
Americans’ question regarding “Where do we stand on security.” To address this 
question, Larson laid out a list of primary points and issues. To begin, the purpose of the 
address was to “to get American posture calm, confident, and worthy of our real strength 
and position [vis-à-vis the Soviet Union].” Because of this, the administration needed to 
make it known that our nation’s “concern is ten years from now” and that the lesson to be 
learned from the Sputnik crisis is the necessity of having a “complete new look at the 
relation between science, government, education, spending policies, and security.”  
Larson also stressed in his outline that national security could only be achieved 
through “collective strength.” In achieving this new conception of the politics of security, 
harsh truths should be spoken and political challenges confronted. As he noted in his 
“Conclusion” to the speech, “Let’s set ourselves the tasks that need to be done, and show 
what a unified Free World can do. This will involve self-denial and hard work. Just as 
you can’t have both guns and butter, you can’t have both missiles and marmalade.”308  
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While Eisenhower chose not to make the missiles-marmalade reference in his 
address on November 7
th
, he did argue that “in spite of both the present over-all strength” 
of our defense “we could fall behind--unless we now face up to certain pressing 
requirements and set out to meet them at once.” Such requirements meant “selectivity in 
national expenditures of all kinds. We cannot, on an unlimited scale, have both what we 
must have and what we would like to have.” The president concluded his speech from the 
White House by noting that, while he stressed “the influence of science on defense,” we 
should not overlook that there is “more to science than its function in strengthening our 
defense.” More importantly, there is “much more to our defense than the part played by 
science.” This included “the spiritual powers of a nation--its underlying religious faith, its 
self-reliance, its capacity for intelligent sacrifice--these are the most important stones in 
any defense structure.”309 
The months following this speech, Eisenhower continually gave expression to this 
view of national strength. For instance, during an address to the National Food 
Conference in February 1958, he stitched together his administration’s economic, foreign 
and agricultural policies into one theme of ‘security.’ The President confided to the 
audience that “we have nothing to fear…[and] no reason for failing to go about our daily 
lives, doing our work as citizens, and by that much – by the individual efforts of each of 
us – to make this country still more strong, still more secure.” Eisenhower then pivoted in 
the speech and was more explicit about the value of national strength and security and its 
role in the long pull of the Cold War. As he saw it,  
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“[o]ur security does not lie, of course, in armaments alone. Indeed, 
armaments are nothing but a shield behind which we may work for those 
things that bring about permanent security – which means permanent 
peace… But with all the cost we must be sure there is not one unnecessary 
dollar. We must be concerned with what we are doing to our economy 
when such useless expenditures come about.
310
  
 
The post-Sputnik crisis illuminated more than ever Eisenhower’s vision of 
national strength and his linkage of economy and national security. More than anything, 
however, Sputnik altered the political landscape upon which the Eisenhower 
administration’s commitment to national strength was founded. While a major bi-partisan 
milestone would soon be reached in the area of federal aid to education, the increasing 
drive to make the concept of national strength a partisan issue was set in motion under the 
shadow of Sputnik. 
 
“Foundation for National Strength”: Sputnik and the Politics of Federal Aid to 
Education  
Traditionally, many Americans felt the federal government had no legitimate role 
to play in funding education, with opposition usually forming around issues of racial 
integration and threats to local control.
311
 Given this sentiment, which President 
Eisenhower himself ascribed to, federal aid to education was by no means a priority on 
his programmatic agenda.
312
 But he had a great appreciation for the value of education in 
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general. For example, while serving as a member of the Educational Policies Commission 
in 1949, Eisenhower, then President of Columbia University, contended in a promotional 
pamphlet that “our system of universal education provides a means of developing 
individual capacities. It strengthens the stamina and value of the individual citizen. It 
possesses a far greater potential for future development of America’s strength than has 
yet been realized.”313 While liberals had been pushing for federal aid to education for 
some time, the launch of Sputnik created a window of opportunity in which the President 
could forego his previous opposition to the policy by invoking his vision of national 
strength, thus providing his administration cover in supporting a traditionally partisan 
issue. 
 
Sputnik, Security, and Education 
President Eisenhower and his staff seized upon the ‘Sputnik moment’ to go before 
the country and announce a new concerted effort to promote scientific and technological 
advancement. As mentioned above, his nationally televised address, “Science in National 
Security,” the president recognized the “real military significance” of satellite technology 
and the steps taken by the Soviet Union to achieve the required training necessary.  Given 
this state of affairs, Eisenhower claimed that “one of our greatest, and most glaring, 
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deficiencies is the failure of us in this country to give high enough priority to scientific 
education and to the place of science in our national life.”314  
In preparing the speech, Eisenhower worked closely with Arthur Larson to ensure 
that education would be a point of emphasis. At one point, the President drafted a memo 
that quoted Lincoln’s view that the subject of education was “the most important subject 
which we as a people can be engaged in.”315 Inserting his own particular thoughts on the 
subject, Eisenhower wrote that  
in today’s complex and challenging world, we need stronger and bigger 
schools in which to train our children to accept their magnificent 
opportunities and grave responsibilities – opportunities for life even richer 
than ours, responsibilities for the defense of their homeland and 
strengthening of the free world (emphasis added).
316
 
 
For his part, Larson paid close attention to the particular section of the speech 
relating to education. Under the heading “Mistakes we have made,” he noted that, as a 
whole, the United States and its citizens continually “neglected education and its status in 
our culture.” It was not, unfortunately, “indicative of a large body of public opinion in 
this country” to hear “the disgraceful phrase, ‘Those who can, do; those who can’t, 
teach.’”317 Larson went on to list several points on education that he felt should be 
stressed. Of the “Things we need to do,” the most important was to “rethink” how our 
culture viewed “scientific endeavors and the pursuit of learning generally.” In this 
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manner, we must recognize the “teacher, the scholar, and the creative scientist … as 
national resources of the highest order.” 318 
Upon reading  an early draft of the President’s ‘Science and Security’ speech, 
NSF Director Waterman impressed upon Larson of the potential usefulness “in 
discussing our education and basic research needs and the importance of creating in this 
country an atmosphere in which intellectual and scientific activity can flourish.”  
Waterman believed that Sputnik had opened the nation’s eyes from a collective 
“blindness to some essential problems” and that we should alter “our national attitude 
toward education.” 319  
 
Education as a Weapon in the Cold War 
At the time, the relationship between war, defense, and education had a long 
history in the United States, ranging from the Morrill Land Grant Act during the Civil 
War to the recently passed GI Bill during World War II. In some cases, the relationship 
was direct. Congressman Lister Hill (D-AL), one of the strongest proponents of aid to 
education, pointed out in 1946 that America’s strength and experience in the Second 
World War was limited to the extent that two million draftees were rejected “because of 
educational deficiencies…which for the most part could have been prevented through an 
adequately supported public school program.”320 
 As the notion of war changed, so too did its presumed relationship with education. 
During a 1955-56 Congressional debate over scientific-manpower one witness who had 
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recently returned from the Soviet Union testified that he was “convinced that Russia’s 
classrooms and libraries, her laboratories and teaching methods, may threaten us more 
than her hydrogen bombs or guided missiles to deliver them.”321 In an address to the 
National Education Association just months before Sputnik, Eisenhower himself made 
the link, suggesting that, “our schools are strongpoints in our National Defense…more 
important than Nike batteries, more necessary than our radar warning nets, and more 
powerful even than the energy of the atom.”322 
But the reality of the Sputnik launch brought new context to such linkages. 
Congressman Clifford Case (R-NJ) from New Jersey, another ardent supporter of 
education noted in a speech that “[t]he shadow of Sputniks 1 and 2 hangs over the United 
States as Congress prepares to begin a new session.” Although the satellites posed a great 
challenge, if “[p]roperly examined and acted on, it should energize at least… a forthright 
attack on the growing inadequacies of our educational system.” Case was concerned 
however that the nation would “neglect to take the steps necessary to strengthen our 
educational system from top to bottom. A building is no stronger than its foundation.” 
The problem in education was “indeed a national problem and as much a part of our 
defense program as rockets and missiles. Unless we harness the educated intelligence of 
our young people, we will be wasting our greatest resource.” Case wondered aloud how 
the ramifications of inaction for our future. “It will not do to have the historians of a 
decade or two from now – if there are any – why even, from the narrow standpoint of its 
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defense, didn’t the United States put the same effort into education as it put into military 
hardware.”323 
In a similar vein, yet offered in a more private setting, Senator William Fulbright 
intimated during a bi-partisan legislative meeting on defense policy that the “country 
needed to take a more serious view of developments [such as Sputnik], to stop thinking 
that there was any safety in having more automobiles than do the Russians…[there is] a 
weakness in our school system and lack of incentive for young Americans to do their 
best.”324 The president himself “thought all high school students should concentrate on 
mathematics, one foreign language and English…[suggesting to HEW Secretary Folsom] 
‘you have got to get the American people to understand that a football player is no more 
important than a person who does well in mathematics, or a good well balanced 
student.”325 More directly, one of Eisenhower’s speechwriters bookmarked in his speech 
materials a Newsfront article titled “Students are New Soviet Weapon.”326 
 
The National Defense Education Act and Promoting Federal Aid 
Federal aid to education was now firmly on the national agenda. The 
administration’s forward march on education began that winter. Speaking at the annual 
meeting of the “Engineering and Scientific Education Conference,” Secretary Folsom 
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noted that the organization had chosen as its conference topic “a subject…which may 
involve no less than the survival of freedom.”327 As Folsom argued, the conference’s 
theme, “Foundation for National Strength,” was “really part of a shorter but broader 
theme: ‘Education – Foundation for National Strength.’”328 Folsom went on to ask a 
rhetorical question about why we should emphasize the link between education, strength, 
and the Cold War.  
[The] rigorous Soviet educational system gives great emphasis to those 
subjects which contribute directly to military power and to Soviet aims in 
the cold war – especially science, mathematics, engineering, and foreign 
languages…We would be foolish, therefore, to ignore any threat to our 
freedom posed by the ominous fact that Russians seem to be putting more 
emphasis on their education, for their purposes, than Americans are 
putting on our education for our purposes (underlining in original).
 329
 
 
For his part, Eisenhower articulated his vision of national strength to fellow 
Republicans during a speech to a GOP dinner in January of 1958. Discussing the 
importance of education to security, Eisenhower wanted it understood that  
we must be just as quick to respond to the less obvious demands of 
security and peace. Thus we know the need of improving educational and 
research facilities; strengthening mutual….. Now possibly armed strength 
alone might in a crisis defeat an attack, or even win a campaign. But it 
takes also – aside from military might – brains and understanding as well, 
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to remain secure permanently and to win the long struggle for a just 
peace.
330
 
 
While promoting the need for federal aid, the Eisenhower administration and 
members of Congress began formulating their respective education programs. On 
November 15
th, 
Secretary Folsom outlined a seven point plan to administration officials 
that emphasized a shift away from aid for construction toward more direct funding. 
Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks “thought that any scholarships should be limited 
to fields designated as essential to our national security,” which the President agreed to 
on subsequent occasions. Folsom countered that this “would arouse protests from 
supporters of general education.” But as the minutes from a December 4th legislative 
meeting on the topic point out, Eisenhower “favored restricting scholarships to the fields 
in which there was a national defense requirement…[and] stressed repeatedly the national 
security aspect of this requirement.”331 
What emerged was the National Defense Education Act (NDEA). The 
Eisenhower administration combined its legislation with the House bill drafted by 
Congressmen Hill and Carl Elliot (D-AL). The $1.6 billion dollar bill set up a four year 
period of scholarships for mathematics and science. In his address on the legislation, 
Eisenhower told the American public that it was vital “[b]ecause of the national security 
interest in the quality and scope of our education system in the years immediately ahead.” 
Making the defense linkage explicit, he pointed out that “[o]ur immediate national 
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security aims – to continue to strengthen our armed forces and improve the weapons at 
their command – can be furthered only by the efforts of individuals whose training is 
already far advanced.”332  
Political Scientist James L. Sundquist argues that the NDEA was monumental 
“not so much because of the specific provisions…but because of the psychological 
breakthroughs it embodied.”333 In no small way did the linkage of education and national 
defense help overcome traditional obstacles of race, religion, and localism. As a 
Congressional clerk to Lister Hill’s committee recalled, such a link not only helped “steer 
between the Scylla of race and the Charybdis of religion” but was done purposely so no 
one would think twice about voting against defense and education.
334
 Or, as Eisenhower 
admitted early on to Secretary Folsom, “anything you could hook on the defense situation 
would get by.”335 
 
The Decoupling of Economy and Security: Post-Sputnik Budgetary Battles and the 
Partisan Politics of National Strength, 1958-1960 
 
While the launch of Sputnik may have rallied both sides of the aisle together 
around federal aid to education, the larger question about government spending became a 
distinct partisan issue. In this new, heightened political context, Eisenhower’s opponents 
would criticize the modesty of his administration’s agenda and, more specifically, the 
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limited expenditures devoted toward domestic spending.  As illuminated above, 
Eisenhower’s concern over national security deeply shaped his view on budgetary policy. 
Viewing defense policy as a bipartisan effort and as an economic addendum, he had to 
fight off conservative calls for a tax cut and liberal calls for increased spending. During 
and after the Sputnik crisis, however, Eisenhower’s position in national security was 
criticized and liberals used partisan attacks on his record in defense spending. For 
Eisenhower, it was not a matter of spending too little domestically, but rather in 
comparison to defense and security spending. As he had done throughout his tenure, the 
President, now more than ever, stressed the need for bi-partisanship on matters of defense 
and security and warned of the dangers of “reckless and inexcusable demagoguery” over 
calls for increased spending.
336
  
 
Sputnik, the Gaither Report, and Recession 
In a January 1958 legislative meeting regarding the U.S. defenses vs. the Soviet 
Union, the legislative leaders present “urged the President to make a strong personal-type 
statement that would inspire the trust and confidence of the American people. The 
President replied that actually he had been trying to play down the situation, but perhaps 
he had been guilty of understatement in regard to the strength of the Nation’s defenses 
despite Sputnik.”337 Eisenhower, for his part, was “not impressed by the Soviet Fear” that 
others saw in the achievements of Sputnik.
338
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Not long after the launch, the President reassured his Cabinet that, “despite all the 
talk of satellites and guided missiles, the United States with its planes still retained the 
power of destroying Russia. [There was] a need, however, for convincing the world – 
presently scared by Russia – that the United States is doing what it should.” If push came 
to shove, this may mean “that the country would just have to do a little less ‘buttering’ 
and more ‘gunning’…”339 
As conveyed during this cabinet meeting, Sputnik reignited the post-Korean War 
debate, from the President’s first term, regarding the balance between defense and non-
essential, domestic spending. In the president’s view, “very important” issues such as 
civil defense would move ahead but “the Cabinet as a corporate body had to decide 
firmly which programs were necessary and merited expenditures and which did not.” As 
Eisenhower stressed repeatedly, “it [was] no longer a possibility of butter and guns, 
rather…one of butter or guns(emphasis in original document).”340 Even Marion Folsom, 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, understood that the necessity for “security 
planning” required “sacrifice by the American people.” Across the administration there 
was consensus about the need to “concentrate on essentials rather than non-essentials.”341  
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 If the crisis over Sputnik weren’t enough, the Eisenhower administration also 
faced a recession and a politically damaging report about the state of America’s defenses. 
The release of the Gaither Report warned of the inadequacies of the United States’ 
defense program and called for a $10 billion increase for defense spending and an 
additional $5 billion for fallout shelters. Democrats jumped on the report, most notably 
Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX). 
As he had in the past, Eisenhower responded by linking economy and security. 
Recalling this debate, the President writes in his memoirs that proponents of increased 
defense spending were asking for “astronomical amounts.” But  “[a]gain and again I 
reiterated my philosophy on the defense budget: Excessive spending helps cause deficits, 
which cause inflation, which in turn cuts the amount of equipment and manpower the 
defense dollar can buy. The process is circular and self-defeating.”342  
For the fiscal year of 1959, the Eisenhower administration would propose a 
balanced budget. In preparation for any proposed backlash to the budget, Eisenhower and 
his cabinet discussed how best to broach the subject in the 1958 State of the Union. 
Arthur Larson’s initial draft of the speech suggested stating that in order “to provide for 
this extra effort for security, we must apply stern tests of priority to other expenditures.” 
Reiterating the theme of Eisenhower’s approach to the budget and national security, 
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“[t]hese cutbacks and savings are essential for the elementary reason that a sound and 
sustained defense must rest on a sound economy.”343 
Eisenhower himself spoke to a meeting of the Republican National Committee in 
January of 1958 and reiterated his budgetary position. What is more, he touched upon the 
emerging partisan rancor over the level and amount of his administration’s defense 
program and budget. As he told his fellow Republicans:  
The sudden urge on the part of some, congregated in good measure in the 
political opposition, to pour billions more into our defense activities, as if 
the Soviet military menace had only now been discovered, is worse than 
unwarranted. That course is a return to government by cringe, crisis and 
crash. It weakens and distorts rather than helps essential security 
programs. It sows seeds of economic trouble that can badger our people 
for years ahead. Nor need I remind this audience that many now leading 
this onslaught for more, more, and yet more for defense were, only a few 
months ago, bent on slicing the defense budget I had submitted to 
Congress. So this I most earnestly urge you, my fellow Republicans, that 
all of us as Americans, be realistic about our defense needs. The future is 
not baneful. Let’s get sensibly on with the jobs to be done.344 
 
Addressing a GOP dinner in January 1958, Eisenhower reiterated that the nation’s 
“first objective – security and a just peace – is not a partisan or political matter at all. 
Americans must never and will never let the issue of security and peace become a pawn 
in anyone’s political chess game.” In crafting the speech with Larson, a memo was sent 
stating that any antagonistic language had been removed. 
345
 The draft language Larson 
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used: “The first thing we stand for is unselfish and patriotic bi-partisanship on all matters 
touching our defense and international affairs! I have always been proud of the bi-
partisan support that Republicans have given to Democratic administrations in time of 
international tension…..”346 Similarly, in preparation for a speech to the Republican 
National Committee in May 1958, Larson sent a memo to the President and Sherman 
Adams that touched upon an earlier conversation regarding the need to strike a non-
partisan tone. For his part, Larson let his superiors know that he had “tried to meet the 
problem [that was] raised with regard to the May 6 talk. As the draft now stands, I do not 
believe it could be criticized on the ground of injecting partisanship into the defense 
issue.”347 
The President’s warning was a sign of times to come. Senator, and future 
presidential hopeful, John F. Kennedy gave a speech on the Senate floor in the fall of 
1958 that summed up the Democratic opposition to the Eisenhower administration’s 
spending levels: “we have extended our commitments around the world, without regard 
to the sufficiency of our military posture to fulfill those commitments.” He argued that 
the blame lay with Eisenhower’s “willingness to place fiscal security ahead of national 
security.”348 
 
The Battle of the Budget and the Liberals’ Co-opting of ‘National Strength’ 
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It was the Democrats, particularly those with presidential ambitions in 1960, who 
increased the partisan attacks on national security spending. Senator Johnson, for 
instance, was “deeply concerned and somewhat disappointed to observe that in the field 
of military preparations they [the administration] are programming as if we were living in 
a static world rather than an exploding, expanding and developing world.”349 Senator 
John F. Kennedy (D-MA) described the Eisenhower era as “an era of illusion,” citing the 
failure “to build positions of long-term strength…”350The positions of these two future 
presidents represented the broader thought that too little money was being spent by the 
administration. As Eisenhower recounted in his memoirs, this “upward spiraling 
[political] influence” toward increasing expenditures was based on “the conviction held 
by so many politicians that more rather than less federal participation in education, health 
preservation, and housing was mandatory. Increased federal spending, they argued, was 
‘good for the country.’” 351 Yet, given his view of the relationship between national 
security and domestic affairs, Eisenhower continually pushed back on such critiques. 
Clearly the opposition’s argument needed to be rebutted so Eisenhower made a 
concerted effort to combat. According to a memo on the administration’s preparations for 
the 1959 State of the Union from Eisenhower’s secretary, Ann Whitman, “[the President] 
has decided that he wants first in the Message a discussion of the whole problem of 
security and defense. He wants to talk about the cost of all our security programs… He 
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wants to say ‘This is what we are doing for security; these costs must be borne; they are 
absolutely essential to our defense and security programs.’”352  He also wanted a 
“heighten emphasis” on budget and national security requirements. To make this point 
explicitly, we should tell the American public that “we are whittling every possible 
expenditure that is not a necessary one in other fields.
353
 During this meeting, Senator 
Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) urged the President to treat the problem of national security 
first in order of budgetary priority, to which Eisenhower “responded vigorously that there 
could be no national security without a healthy economy except at the price of a garrison 
state.”354 
Later in the month, the administration presented a balanced budget of $77 billion, 
with $40.9 billion for national security and a spending increase of $2 billion. In 
promoting the budget to fellow Republicans, Eisenhower warned that they should be 
aware of any bills coming from the Democratic Congress and “stressed that every 
possible sort of foolish proposal would be advanced in the name of national security and 
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of the poor fellow.”  The President “continued to think that thrift was not a bad word.”355 
The Bureau of the Budget expressed a similar view in a memo on the 1959 State of the 
Union. In it, the bureau reiterated that  
[w]e must all recognize that our national security in the long run may 
depend more upon our ability to maintain a free, stable, and growing 
economy than it does upon the size of our military forces at any given 
time. If we lose our strength at home we could lose our freedom just as 
surely as if we lost it in a military struggle.”356 
 
Additionally, the administration tried to deflect oppositional arguments about the level of 
spending. As the Bureau of the Budget also noted, “[e]ven before anyone knew the 
details of the budget, it was being attacked for endangering our national security or 
ignoring our domestic welfare.”357 
For liberals, national strength could only be met by increasing spending on public 
programs and policies that more completely fortified the nation. Their post-sputnik 
refrain was that an increase to the federal budget would only further bolster national 
strength. As Morgan puts it, “Higher defense spending was vital but more money was 
also needed for public services, welfare programs and the public plant, all of which were 
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essential for the expansion of American’s productive capacity in the face of the new 
Soviet economic challenge.” One prominent liberal sums up this position perfectly. Yale 
economist and, future Kennedy CEA member James Tobin asserted that “Sputnik will be 
well worth the blow it dealt our national pride if it frees national policy from the shackles 
of fiscal orthodoxy.”358 
 
The Missile Gap, the 1960 Election, and the Foreshadowing of the War on Poverty  
 
The increasing partisan dispute over defense expenditures laid the foundation for 
Kennedy’s claims of a missile gap during the 1960 presidential campaign.359 After all, it 
was liberals such as Lyndon Johnson and the Democratic Advisory Council (DAC) who 
led the attack on Eisenhower’s defense program.360 During the Sputnik-Gaither crisis, the 
DAC sought an extra $3-4 billion for the 1959 defense budget.  As one historian points 
out, such liberal groups and organizations “were particularly adamant that Eisenhower’s 
efforts to trim the defense budget had seriously weakened America’s strength.” 361 
 But more than that, the Democrats’ co-opting of national strength and the defense 
issue further solidified defense policy as a partisan issue. The 1960 campaign is a case in 
point. As Eisenhower’s replacement, Richard Nixon, along Nelson Rockefeller, wrote the 
defense plank for the 1960 Republican National Convention’s platform. Moving away 
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from Eisenhower’s economy-security nexus, the new GOP nominees stressed in the 
platform that “the United States can afford and must provide the increased expenditures 
to implement fully this necessary program for strengthening our defense posture. There 
must be no price ceiling on America’s security.” For their part, Eisenhower and Jim 
Hagerty, his former Press Secretary, found the wording “astonishing.” It was particularly 
disheartening as it was written by two Eisenhower administration officials “who had 
never voiced any doubt…of the adequacy of America’s defenses.”362  
Campaigning in 1960, Eisenhower told an audience of his concerns that “some 
statements in this campaign have had world-wide circulation and have cruelly distorted 
the image of America.” Kennedy and his supporters were presumably invoking images of 
the nation’s low prestige and military weakness, which Eisenhower called out as “an 
exercise in calculated confusion.” He challenged the opposition to stop “wringing [their] 
hands” and explain to the American public “how they would pay for the many billions of 
additional federal spending pledged by their platform of glittering promises.” The former 
President believed they “could not pay for them with high hopes alone.” While the 
country must move forward, he saw “no sense in America galloping in reverse to what 
has been called a New Frontier.”363 While Eisenhower decried the charges of the missile 
gap and insufficient spending as “useful pieces[s] of demagoguery” he failed to 
appreciate how his own vision of national strength created the conditions for such a turn 
of events.
364
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discovered a politically effective response to Eisenhower’s claim that budgetary restraint 
was essential for the nation’s interests.” 365 Armed with the notion that a larger federal 
budget was good for the country, 
the Democrats could promise social and economic justice to low-income 
Americans, greater material abundance to the expanding middle class, the 
replenishment of public services and a build-up of military power to 
strengthen the nation’s security and combat communism in the 
underdeveloped world.”  
 
President Lyndon Johnson’s ‘War on Poverty’ was still several years out from 
being declared, but the discursive elements and themes had been developing for a decade, 
if not longer. For instance, during the Eisenhower administration’s re-construction of 
‘security’ and ‘strength’ after Sputnik, Don Paarlberg, Special Assistant to the President 
for Economic Affairs, suggested promoting a ‘unifying theme’ to rally the nation.  The 
theme he chose was “Using Our Strength for the Common Good.” In a memo to Arthur 
Larson, who at the time was working on Eisenhower’s ‘Science and Security’ speech, 
Paarlberg wrote that the nation was “coming out of the recession with surging strength… 
We will use our strength – For military preparedness, For the successful waging of peace, 
For advancing the cause of freedom. For an assault on poverty (emphasis added).”366 
Eisenhower himself once urged that disarmament would free up resources for “a new 
kind of war… upon the brute forces of poverty and need.”367 
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Conclusion 
Eisenhower famously declared in the 1952 presidential campaign that he would 
“go to Korea” as a way of taking ownership of an issue that had dominated the agenda 
over the past few years and had sagged Americans’ optimism. He kept good on his 
promise and the war’s stalemate set in, allowing him to turn his broader attention to the 
massive military budget he had inherited and the international tensions of the Cold War. 
As the former General much preferred to deal in foreign and defense affairs, he came to 
office with a moderate domestic agenda that primarily concerned reigning in the budget 
and finding a “middle way” between liberalism and conservatism that advocated policies 
and programs vital to the national interest. Believing that the Cold War “colored” all 
domestic politics and policy, Eisenhower articulated a vision of national strength that 
fused the commitments of both the warfare state and the welfare state.  
In this manner, the President actively pursued or tacitly endorsed domestic 
legislation that he felt strengthened the nation. For example, during the first few years of 
his administration the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was granted cabinet 
level status and the Social Security Act was amended to cover self-employed individuals 
and agricultural and domestic workers. And in other areas such as civil rights and 
transportation, Eisenhower framed his actions as vital to the national interest. Nowhere 
was this more direct than with the National Defense Education Act. Spurred on by the 
nation’s reaction to Sputnik, Eisenhower’s commitment to federal funding for education 
took on a bi-partisan theme, allowing him to support Democratic congressional efforts. 
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The effect of this legislation would be to set the foundation for the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act passed during the Johnson presidency.  
The clearest attempts to realize President Eisenhower’s vision of national strength 
came in his work on the federal budget. It was in this area where the similarities between 
Truman and Eisenhower are most striking in terms of their presidential visions and the 
linkage of security and economy. Both inherited military budgets that seriously limited 
their degrees of freedom in other policy areas. In addition, Eisenhower, like Truman, had 
to contend with military interests set on defending defense spending and congressional 
conservatives who wanted significant rollback in such spending. The President, believing 
that there were spending limits that were both too high and too low, tried to achieve a 
balanced strength that could be held for the long pull of the Cold War. While not as vocal 
about the linkage as Truman, Eisenhower himself felt that the large amount of money set 
for defense too often sapped needed resources in other areas vital to national strength. His 
speech titled “Chance for Peace,” given upon the death of Joseph Stalin, is a case in 
point. “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in 
the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are 
not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of 
its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.”368 This speech reflected 
his belief that economy in the budget was essential to security and, thus, national 
strength. 
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However, the increased partisanship that emerged after the launch of Sputnik 
challenged Eisenhower’s assertion of the linkage between economy and security. For 
years, the President had continually maintained that strength was paramount, but to 
achieve such strength would require limiting total federal spending, both defense and 
domestic. Seizing upon the symbolism of Sputnik, rival Democrats were able to exploit 
and invert Eisenhower’s argument by suggesting that the best way to attain strength was 
by increasing the federal budget. While their attacks on the Eisenhower administration 
were focused on defense spending, their broader claim was that domestic spending 
needed to increase as well. From the launch of Sputnik until the end of his term, 
Eisenhower would find his attempts at balance unsuccessful and, in his Farewell Address, 
speak directly to the dangers of the military industrial complex. 
For their part, Democrats had successfully de-coupled the President’s linkage of 
budget economy and national security and, in the process, were able to assert themselves 
as the party most capable of promoting and protecting national strength. Unfortunately, in 
due time, this vision would become terribly fraught with the association of Vietnam and 
the War on Poverty of the 1960s. Out of the wake of this crisis of vision, a Republican 
resurgence would emerge. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION  
 
In contrast to the prevailing analytical tendency in studies of the presidency to 
isolate the politics of foreign and domestic policy, this dissertation has argued that the 
intersection of warfare and welfare commitments – the politics of guns and butter – is a 
defining characteristic of modern presidential leadership and policy-making. In this 
study, I have sought to understand how presidents interpret and articulate this warfare-
welfare nexus and, moreover, the ways in which the resultant politics of this dilemma 
have shaped the institution of the presidency. Through careful archival work and close 
reading of historical texts, I have shown that, in navigating these dual commitments, 
presidents discursively, politically, and programmatically link the politics of national 
defense and social welfare. In particular, I have argued that one of the main developments 
to emerge from the dynamic of presidents and the politics of linkage is the articulation of 
visions of national strength. My purpose in this concluding chapter is to revisit the central 
claims of this dissertation and to introduce questions and inquiries that suggest potential 
avenues for future research.  
  
Linkage, Institutionalization, and a New Look at the Modern Presidency 
One of the fundamental debates in the subfield of presidential studies is the theory 
of the rise of the modern presidency.
369
 At the heart of this perspective is a claim that 
there is a qualitative difference in both the leadership challenges faced and institutional 
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actions deployed by presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt. The thesis of this dissertation 
– that the politics of guns and butter have been institutionalized in the leadership 
approaches of post-war presidents – offers another look at the concept of the modern 
presidency. To more fully appreciate this claim, this section reviews how the dynamic 
between presidents and the warfare-welfare nexus developed from Theodore Roosevelt to 
Dwight D. Eisenhower. More specifically, I explain how warfare and international crises 
have thrust presidents more deeply into the articulation and strategic use of the politics of 
linkage in pursuing domestic policies and programs.  
An essential aspect of TR’s vision for the American nation and for the role of the 
presidency was the linkage between domestic and foreign affairs. In both manner and 
action, he strove for vigor and greatness, yet was never afforded the historical 
opportunity that he hoped would bring about the realization of this vision. While he 
would bemoan the lack of a war or crisis through which he hoped to assert his own 
strength and that of the presidency, Roosevelt laid the early foundation for the eventual 
practices of linkage that would emerge in the institution by mid-century. 
With the onset of World War I, and Woodrow Wilson’s management of wartime 
mobilization, we see an early glimpse at the institutional linkages between guns and 
butter. As noted, Wilson’s ambitious domestic reform was cut short by the challenges of 
mobilizing for the war, however, certain actions he took in trying to balance the two 
objectives would provide institutional memory for FDR’s presidency years later. This is 
most pronounced in the structure of economic mobilization used by both presidents. 
Similarly, Wilson discursively linked his domestic reform efforts with demands of 
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defense preparedness and national purpose in his 1915 State of the Union; a theme which 
Roosevelt would craft into his own vision of national strength.  
Roosevelt’s leadership in response to the Great Depression and World War II 
represents a turning point for the politics of linkage, establishing a set of practices in the 
presidency which subsequent executives would come to utilize in their own way. The 
particular challenge which FDR confronted was the commitment to projecting a sound 
program of national preparedness, and eventually war mobilization, while simultaneously 
promoting his domestic reform agenda of the New Deal. In grappling with the emergence 
of this warfare-welfare dilemma, Roosevelt strategized a vision of national strength 
which linked reform and defense, articulating both as vital to the strength of the nation. 
While his death would thrust Harry S. Truman into one of the most daunting political 
situations any president has had to endure, Roosevelt’s articulation of the linkage of 
reform-as-national-preparedness set the institutional stage from which his successor 
would take on these challenges.  
Truman, thus, was faced with consolidating the New Deal and successfully 
reconverting the nation from wartime, and, in short-time, would have to navigate the 
emerging politics of the Cold War. Building from the practices put in place by FDR in 
linking warfare and welfare commitments, Truman advocated that the nation’s domestic 
programs comprised a form of “internal strength” and were the foundation of the 
country’s strength abroad. As I have shown in chapters 3 and 4, this vision of national 
strength and the politics of linkage became institutionalized in the presidency during 
Truman’s administration. This is evidenced by the way themes and ideas of national 
strength were disseminated among Truman’s staff members and administration officials. 
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Moreover, the linkage between warfare and welfare commitments can be seen in 
particular legislative policies, budgetary requests, and administrative programs of the 
time. While this linkage was prevalent in the immediate post-war years, the emergence of 
the Korean War on the national agenda led the President and some in his administration 
to re-imagine the necessity of internal strength as a way of building strength at home. 
Further proof of this institutionalization, is found in chapter 5 and the analysis of 
the Eisenhower presidency. By the time Eisenhower came to office, the politics of 
linkage are fully expressed in the need to address both defense and domestic spending in 
the federal budget. In addition, as with Truman and his speechwriters and staffers, the 
discourse of the Eisenhower White House was immersed in a vision of national strength. 
With launch of the Soviet’s launch of the Sputnik satellites, Eisenhower and his 
administration were forced to rethink their previous linkage of the politics of warfare and 
welfare.  This latter development leads to interesting questions about the nature of the 
relationship between this particular vision, the politics of linkage, and presidential 
leadership. 
 
Unpacking the Politics of Linkage: Comparison and Processes 
 In light of this dissertation’s evidence that presidents practice the politics of 
linkage, there are two potential avenues of investigation through which this study can 
further develop. First, we may ask how to compare presidents according to the form and 
content of the linkage politics they practice. Second, we may address what the specific 
processes are through which individual presidents construct the politics of linkage. This 
section briefly unpacks these concepts by turning to examples from my research. 
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I begin with a brief comparison. First, domestic reform-minded presidents such as 
Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry S. Truman, all who were faced with 
periods of war mobilization, practiced what we may term “re-articulation linkage.” That 
is, with the onset of war and the demands of national preparedness, each of these 
presidents re-articulated their previous domestic objectives as vital to the defense effort. 
Contrary to the traditional narrative of the “end of reform,” each president, to varying 
degrees, attempted to keep social welfare and reform issues on the national agenda so as 
to be prepared for the politics of reconversion. In doing so, they laid the discursive, 
political, and institutional landscape upon which their successors governed.  
Alternatively, presidents such as Eisenhower, and Theodore Roosevelt to a 
degree, who were more interested in national defense and security, may practice a form 
of linkage which relegates domestic policy to a subset of American military and 
defensive strength. In this manner, the politics of butter may be subordinated to the 
politics of guns by linking the two as trade-offs. In practicing this form of linkage, these 
presidents viewed domestic policy as an area of refuge through which to view their 
broader actions on the international stage.  
Second, in beginning to address the processes at work with the politics of linkage, 
we can situate presidential action contextually. That is, we can better understand the 
limits and opportunities of navigating and linking the politics of guns and butter by 
analyzing presidents through a framework which considers the partisan and institutional 
environment, international contingencies, and the president’s ideological vision. Consider 
two examples for instance: the early linkage politics of Truman and Eisenhower and their 
re-imaginings after Korea and Sputnik, respectively.  
168 
 
In both cases, these presidents articulated a vision and practiced a political linkage 
which they hoped would help them navigate their governing environment. In Truman’s 
case, he argued that the interconnection between defense preparedness and social welfare 
helped ensure strength at home; strength that was vitally important. In response, 
Republicans accepted the need for strength but challenged Truman’s assertion that the 
country could have both guns and butter. With Eisenhower, we see a similar pattern 
emerge. His initial vision of an economy-security nexus allowed him to push back against 
both military and domestic spending in first few years of his administration. Yet, in the 
wake of Sputnik, Democrats vigorously asserted that his economy drive was weakening 
national strength and that we should increase both warfare and welfare expenditures. 
This particular example speaks to the heightened effect that the Cold War had on 
the utility of the politics of linkage. To more fully consider this insight, I briefly discuss 
the presidency of Ronald Reagan and explain the emergence of another pattern of the 
linkage of warfare and welfare.  
   
“Peace through Strength”: Reagan’s Reassertion of National Strength and the End 
of the Cold War   
Writing just one day after the first inauguration of Ronald Reagan, journalist 
Hedrick Smith depicted the sense of renewal that the new President brought to the 
country: “[T]he well-springs of national confidence had nearly run dry and the yearning 
for America to regain control of its destiny [was] palpable across the land. A decade ago, 
the seemingly endless agony of the Vietnam War sapped the nation’s strength and 
morale and left the stinging sensation that something had gone profoundly wrong 
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(emphasis added).”370 The sentiment that Smith captured, one shared by many 
Americans, was exactly what Reagan believed to be true. Coinciding with the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Reagan’s reassertion of national strength illustrates perfectly the suitability 
and culmination of this presidential vision as it developed over the course of the Cold 
War.  
In taking office in 1980, the new President articulated a vision of strength and 
greatness that sought to capitalize on the perceived weakness of liberals, and the 
Democratic Party, more broadly. With the collapse of the Great Society and the failed 
war in Vietnam, it was Democrats who soon found themselves losing grip of “strength” 
as a political vision. Of course, this was due in part to an internal splintering of their 
party, with the liberal, anti-war wing pushing through decentralized party reforms. For 
instance, in the 1972 Democratic platform, part of the defense plank stated that “Too 
much that is now spent on defense not only adds nothing to our strength but makes us 
less secure by stimulating other countries to respond.”371 More specifically, however, the 
Party’s perceived “weakness” stemmed from what has been referred to as the “Vietnam 
Syndrome.”372 To critics, this apparent affliction was the result of domestic backlash 
against the Vietnam War and the general downtrend in public support for vigorous 
military action and defense spending that emerged after the end of the conflict. While 
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Republicans initially hoped to exploit this alleged weakness, President Nixon’s own 
controversies surrounding Watergate and “the Imperial presidency” foreshortened such a 
success, and led to a feeling of national malaise embodied in the “imperiled” presidencies 
of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.
 373
 In the end, it would fall to Ronald Reagan to 
reassert the GOP’s position as the party most capable of promoting national strength. 
Throughout his presidency, Reagan articulated what one of his former 
speechwriters has described as a “vision for American renewal,” composed of four main 
themes: individual freedom, individual responsibility, common sense, and common 
decency. In addition, according to Reagan’s chief strategist and pollster, Richard B. 
Wirthlin, this vision was premised on the commitment to “restore America’s confidence 
in itself.”374 All of these various themes can be seen in both Reagan’s presidential and 
pre-presidential years. A former supporter of the New Deal, Reagan’s conversion to 
conservatism was a product of his experience living in the upper tax-bracket of the 
Hollywood elite and his staunch anti-communism. He would come to hone his vision of 
America while travelling on the lecture circuit. Most famously, giving “The Speech” in 
support of Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign, in which he spoke of the 
nation’s “rendezvous with destiny.”375 Throughout his hundreds of talks, columns, and 
broadcasts, Reagan demonstrated a clear belief in the Cold War as a defining struggle 
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against the evils of Soviet ideology. It was through this lens that he asserted the call for 
liberty.  
For Reagan, the need for strength was two-fold. First, he fervently believed that 
the United States had weakened itself over time; specifically, due to the “Vietnam 
Syndrome” and the largesse of the federal government. It was in relation to this latter 
point that his vision spoke indirectly, and sometimes directly, to the politics of the 
welfare state. According to historian Gareth Davies, the President felt that the welfare 
state had “damaged the nation as a whole, undermining those virtues that made America 
unique.”376 Or, as Reagan himself put it in “The Speech,” “Those who would trade our 
freedom for the soup kitchen of the welfare state have told us they have a utopian 
solution of peace without victory. They call their policy ‘accommodation.’”377 Even at 
this early stage in his political career, he asserted a linkage between the Cold War and the 
nation’s domestic and foreign policies. 
Second, President Reagan’s commitment to projecting national strength stemmed 
from a political and strategic calculation regarding the state of the Soviets’ defensive 
prowess vis-à-vis the United States. This view is exemplified in an often-stated remark of 
Reagan’s: “In military strength we are already second to one; namely, the Soviet 
Union.”378 Consequently, as he saw it, this supposed gap in military power left the United 
States in a vulnerable situation, particularly as it related to the country’s position in 
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potential arms-reduction negotiations with the Russians. To address such a weakness, the 
President advocated for achieving “peace through strength.” As political scientist 
Elizabeth Spalding notes, Reagan hoped to pressure the Soviets “through the application 
of the political, economic, and military strength of the United States.”379 
In attempting to realize this vision of national strength, the President pursued a 
programmatic agenda in his first few months in office consisting of the largest peacetime 
military buildup in history, a massive tax cut, and a reduction of a whopping $35 billion 
in domestic spending in one fiscal year alone. While the military component of this triad 
was obviously critical to the nation’s strength, Reagan felt that his economic policy of tax 
cuts and reduced domestic spending was the “most immediate priority” because “without 
a recovery, we couldn’t afford to do the things necessary to make the country strong 
again”380 
While this “Reagan Revolution” may have achieved some early programmatic 
success, for the most part, however, it was stymied by a Democratic-controlled Congress 
and failed to be fully implemented. Yet, the President’s broader vision that this revolution 
was based on had a more lasting legacy for the politics of guns vs. butter. First, Reagan’s 
articulation and affirmation of national strength forged new political commitments in the 
Republican Party, helping to establish the link between conservatives and their support 
for a stout defense policy. Second, with the cost of the defense build-up and the tax cuts 
achieved by his administration, Reagan ushered in an era of heightened concern over the 
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federal deficit. This had the immediate effect of stifling efforts by liberals and supporters 
of domestic spending, more broadly, who hoped to bring about increased social 
investment by re-directing any potential savings from discontinued defense expenditures 
(the peace dividend) that would emerge with the end of the Cold War.
 381
 However, given 
the state of the deficit, such claims for renewed federal spending were stridently 
challenged by conservatives and defense hawks, a trend which has only intensified over 
time. 
Ultimately, Reagan’s assertion of national strength, and the actions taken in trying 
to achieve this vision in practice, can only be understood in the context of the Cold War. 
That is, with the fall of the Soviet Union, and more importantly, the collapse of Soviet 
ideology as a rival outlook, the Reagan presidency marks the height of national strength 
as a political vision. While post-Cold War presidents have undoubtedly articulated 
similar appeals to national purpose, without communism and the ideological struggle 
posed by the Soviets, the linkage of domestic and foreign policy visions are not as 
pronounced as they have been in the past.  
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